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EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS IN LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATION TO
CHILD ABUSE
OWEN D. JONEs*
For contemporary biologists, behavior-like physical form-
evolves. Although evolutionary processes do not dictate behavior
in any inflexible sense, they nonetheless contribute significantly to
the prevalence of various behavioral predispositions that, in turn,
tend to yield observable patterns of behavior within every known
species.
In this Article, Professor Owen D. Jones carefully explores the
implications for law of evolved behavioral predispositions in
humans, urging both caution and optimism. He first provides an
introduction to law-relevant evolutionary biology, assuming no
prior knowledge in the subject. He then proposes a model for
conducting "evolutionary analysis in law"--by which legal
thinkers can locate, assess, and use knowledge about evolutionary
influences on human behavior to further the pursuit of many
existing social and legal goals. The Article illustrates the
operation of that method by showing how it could aid ongoing
efforts to understand and curb child abuse. Throughout,
Professor Jones emphasizes how the evolutionary perspective on
human behavior will typically and usefully supplement, rather
than supplant, prevailing notions of the many influences on
behavior and the complex interactions among them.
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INTRODUCTION
For centuries, people have used biology to justify political, so-
cial, and economic agendas. Some have claimed, in furtherance of
discriminatory and even genocidal policies, that biology can segregate
fit from unfit, criminal from law-abiding, and worthy from worthless.
Today, therefore, mentioning genes and humans in the same sentence
properly inspires aggressive vigilance for invidious reductionism, de-
terminism, and divisiveness. Nevertheless, important roles for
biology remain-even in law. From forensic medicine to environ-
mental law and from toxic torts to behavioral biology, the study of
biological processes deepens our understanding of law's human sub-
ject and furthers our efforts to improve through law the conditions of
human existence. This Article explores in particular how an under-
standing of human biology that focuses on evolved human behavioral
commonalities, rather than on individual differences, can aid the pur-
suit of existing social and legal goals.
Popular notions of biological influences on human behavior
comprise a patchwork of truths and untruths. While many people
today accept, for example, that the human body evolved from ances-
tors we share with other primates, few know that Darwin's theories
extended to behavioral traits, as well as to physical ones-and that
behavioral biologists consider these theories essentially correct. Al-
though the modem integration of genetics with the study of processes
by which heritable behavioral traits evolve has initiated a profound
conceptual reorientation within other human-centered disciplines,
such as psychology and anthropology, law lags far behind.1 Indeed,
1. The synthesis during the 1930s and 1940s of Darwinian natural selection and
Mendelian genetics is sometimes known as "neo-Darwinism." For examples of the reori-
entation this continues to inspire in other disciplines, see David M. Buss, Evolutionary
Psychology: A New Paradigm for Psychological Science, 6 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1 (1995);
J. Lawrence Dew et al., Mating Systems: Anthropologists and Behavioral Ecologists
Combine Perspectives, 3 EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 111 (1994); John Tooby, The
Emergence of Evolutionary Psychology, in EMERGING SYNTHESES IN SCIENCE 67 (David
[Vol. 751120
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more than a century after Darwin's death, the very discipline de-
signed to regulate human behavior often reflects, though perhaps
unintendedly, the presupposition that all truly significant law-
relevant human behavior is socially constructed.2 For while law care-
fully attends to rare circumstances of insanity or perceived genetic or
chemical aberrations in individuals, it has devoted insufficient atten-
tion to law-relevant behavioral predispositions that are species-wide
and emphatically non-aberrational. Law has therefore largely ig-
nored what other disciplines have revealed: Many complex human
behaviors that law seeks to regulate, such as those involving aggres-
sion, risk-taking, deception, and sexuality, have evolutionary origins
in the deep ancestral past-origins that remain relevant today.
Scholars from many disciplines (including a few in law) have
tried to impress upon the legal academy the relevance of evolution-
ary processes in general, and human behavioral evolution in
particular, to any sophisticated regulatory regime? The approaches
Pines ed., 1988). On the emergence of evolutionary psychology generally, see THE
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE
(Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE ADAPTED MIND]; ROBERT
WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE
(1994).
It is odd that many lawyers remain unaware of the impact of evolution on human be-
havior when judges and legal scholars so frequently analogize the development of law
itself to the process of evolution, see E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in
Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 38 (1985) (tracing the traditions in which legal
theories have been shaped by analogy to evolution, and observing that the idea that law
"evolves" is "so deeply ingrained in Anglo-American legal thought that most lawyers are
no longer even conscious of it as a metaphor"); E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution:
Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1984); Herbert Hovenk-
amp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985); M.B.W. Sinclair,
Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. L. REV. 31 (1993) (noting limitations on
the use of evolutionary theory in law); M.B.W. Sinclair, The Use of Evolutionary Theory
in Law, 54 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 451 (1987) (same), and when debates over the
sources of "natural law" have so long occupied legal thinkers, see, e.g., James V. Schall,
The Natural Law Bibliography, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 157 (1995); Symposium, Perspectives on
Natural Law, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
2. To sociologists, the term "socially constructed" describes behavior that is the
product of shared cultural assumptions, rather than any biologically influenced human
nature. Although views vary considerably regarding how much of the human behavioral
repertoire is socially constructed, even moderate social constructionist positions afford
little room for evolved predispositions toward behavior that law might deem significant,
holding instead that even those predispositions that may exist are filtered, stabilized, and
systematized through a social context that overwhelmingly determines their manifesta-
tion. I am thankful to Mark Suchman, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin,
for helpful discussion of this point. The extent to which "nurture versus nature" di-
chotomies may sometimes mislead is explored infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS (1987);
RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS (1979) [hereinafter
ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS]; JOHN H. BECKSTROM, DARWINISM
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APPLIED: EVOLUTIONARY PATHS TO SOCIAL GOALS (1993) [hereinafter BECKSTROM,
DARWINISM APPLIED]; JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE:
PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF MODERN DARWINISM THROUGHOUT
THE LEGAL PROCESS (1989); JOHN H. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW:
THE BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM IN THE COURTROOM OF THE FUTURE (1985) [hereinafter
BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW]; BIOLOGY, CULTURE, AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW (Michael T. McGuire & Manfred Rehbinder eds., 1993); ROBERT H.
FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988);
OLIVER GOODENOUGH, PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY: SOCIETY, DOCTRINE, AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 11-19 (1996); MARGARET GRUTER, LAW AND THE MIND:
BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1991) [hereinafter GRUTER, LAW AND
THE MIND]; JACK HIRSHLEIFER, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY (1987);
HUMAN NATURE AND THE NEW EUROPE (Michael T. McGuire ed., 1993); LAW,
BIOLOGY & CULTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannan
eds., 1983) [hereinafter LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE]; ROGER D. MASTERS, BEYOND
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES (1993); ROGER D. MASTERS, THE
NATURE OF POLITICS (1989); THE NEUROTRANSMITrER REVOLUTION: SEROTONIN,
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND THE LAW (Roger D. Masters & Michael T. McGuire eds.,
1993); OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter &
Roger D. Masters eds., 1986) [hereinafter OSTRACISM]; RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON (1992); THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger
D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); Richard D. Alexander, Natural Selection and
Societal Laws, in MORALS, SCIENCE, AND SOCIALITY 249 (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. &
Daniel Callahan eds., 1978); John H. Beckstrom, The Potential Dangers and Benefits of
Introducing Sociobiology to Lawyers, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1279 (1985); Kingsley R.
Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological Sex Differ-
ences, 38 Sw. L.J. 617 (1984); Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern
Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIz. L. REV.
971 (1995) [hereinafter Browme, Sex and Temperament]; Robert D. Cooter, Structural
Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 215 (1994); E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. (Fall 1997) (forthcoming); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313
(1985); Wolfgang Fikentscher & Michael T. McGuire, A Four-Function Theory of Biology
for Law, 25 RECHTSTHEORIE 291 (1994); Lawrence A. Frolik, The Biological Roots of the
Undue Influence Doctrine: What's Love Got to Do with It?, 57 U. Pi'. L. REV. 841
(1996); Suzanne Gibson, Law Representing Life-Reflections on Darwinian Jurisprudence,
3 LAW & CRITIQUE 99 (1992); Oliver R. Goodenough, Mind Viruses: Culture, Evolution
and the Puzzle of Altruism, 34 SOC. SCI. INFO. 287 (1995) [hereinafter Goodenough, Mind
Viruses]; Margaret Gruter, Law in Sociobiological Perspective, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 181
(1977); Margaret Gruter, The Origins of Legal Behavior, 2 J. Soc. & BIOLOGICAL
STRUCTURES 43 (1979); Owen D. Jones, Genes, Behavior, and Law, 15 POL. & LIFE SCI.
101 (1996) [hereinafter Jones, Genes, Behavior, and Law]; Owen D. Jones, Law and
Evolutionary Biology: Obstacles and Opportunities, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
265 (1994); Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary Biology: A Regu-
latory Framework for Trait-Selection Technologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187 (1993)
[hereinafter Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary Biology]; John 0. McGin-
nis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 49 (1996); John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 251 (1996); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward a
Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205
(1982) [hereinafter Rodgers, Bringing People Back]; William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception,
Self-Deception, and Mythology: The Law of Salmon in the Pacific Northwest, 26 PAC. L.J.
821 (1995); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources
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they espouse reflect the growing recognition that an evolutionary
perspective can usefully illuminate the origins of particular kinds of
behavior that law seeks to regulate,4 of basic moral intuitions,5 and of
proto-legal behaviors (such as ostracism).' Sometimes the perspec-
tive will be relevant at doctrinal or case levels.7 Other times it may
provide important policy-relevant insights about the social and politi-
Law: The Drifter/Habitu Distinction, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 195 (1986); William H. Rodg-
ers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evolution of
the Environmental Statutes, 4 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 377 (1989); William H. Rodgers,
Jr., The Lesson of the Red Squirrek Consensus and Betrayal in the Environmental Statutes,
5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 161 (1988); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Envi-
ronmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective
Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 25 (1993); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illu-
sion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705 (1990); Symposium, Behavior, Evolution
and the Sense of Justice, 34 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST283 (1991); Lionel Tiger, The Possible
Biological Origins of Sexual Discrimination, 20 IMPACT Sci. ON Soc'Y 29 (1970); Amy L.
Wax, Against Nature-On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 307
(1996); Margo Wilson, Impact of the Uncertainty of Paternity on Family Law, 45 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 216 (1987); articles collected in volume 8 of the JOURNAL OF
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES (devoted to Law, Human Behavior, and Evolutionary
Biology) (forthcoming) and volume 22 of the VERMONT LAW REVIEW (devoted to Biol-
ogy, Behavior, and Criminal Law) (forthcoming Dec. 1997); sources cited supra note 1.
On the related relevance of applying complex adaptive systems theory to legal processes,
see Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641
(1996); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society
System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45
DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to De-
scribe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996); Peter Strahlendorf, Evolutionary Jurisprudence: Darwinian
Theory in Juridical Science (1991) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis) (University of Toronto, on
file with author) [hereinafter Strahlendorf, Evolutionary Jurisprudence].
4. See, e.g., Paul Bohannan, Some Bases of Aggression and Their Relationship to
Law, in LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE, supra note 3, at 147.
5. See, e.g., FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND
WRONG IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996); ROGER D. MASTERS, BEYOND
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES (1993); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, EVO-
LUTION, MORALITY, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE (1982); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE
MORAL SENSE (1993); Richard D. Alexander, Biology and the Moral Paradoxes, in LAW,
BIOLOGY & CULTURE, supra note 3, at 101; Christopher Boehm, The Evolutionary De-
velopment of Morality as an Effect of Dominance Behavior and Conflict Interference, in
LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE, supra note 3, at 134; Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian
Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713 (1989); Wax, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., OSTRACISM, supra note 3; Donald T. Campbell, Legal and Primary-
Group Social Controls, in LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE, supra note 3, at 159; Jane Goo-
dall, Order Without Law, in LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE, supra note 3, at 50.
7. See, e.g., Browne, Sex and Temperament, supra note 3 (arguing that in certain
employment contexts the sexes may tend to separate themselves according to sex-specific
evolved psychologies, and that one should therefore not assume in employment discrimi-
nation cases that the entire statistical difference in representation between the sexes is the
product of traditionally conceived, invidious discrimination).
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cal ordering of humans,8 or may facilitate predicting the instrumental
effects of different laws9 and the relative resistance humans may pre-
sent to certain efforts to direct or constrain their behavior."0 This
attention to evolved human behavioral predispositions will have
much to contribute, for example, to the fields of family law, criminal
law, environmental law, property law, and privacy law."1 For while
biology typically supplies no independent content to policies them-
selves, it can significantly contribute to that body of knowledge that
helps us to pursue the policies we set.
To date, legal literature has lacked an extended discussion of
precisely how, methodologically, legal academics and other policy-
makers might usefully integrate into law knowledge of the
evolutionary processes that science uncovers. This Article under-
takes to remedy this absence by proposing and demonstrating a
method by which law can, without losing its normative center, reori-
ent itself to take account of evolutionary influences on law-relevant
behavior. This is the basic logic: Evolutionary processes influence
the physical and behavioral traits of every organism. Understanding
how and why these processes operate as they do helps us to identify
factors that influence the probability that organisms will manifest
particular patterns of behaviors in response to various environmental
stimuli. Because a (perhaps the) fundamental purpose of law is to
regulate human social behaviors, understanding the evolutionary in-
fluences upon the development of some of those behaviors will
necessarily assist any sound and practical legal enterprise. What
might be called "evolutionary analysis in law" will prove a valuable
tool to those charged with maintaining an equitable, safe, and orderly
society through the machinery of law.
Many resist this logic. Recent attempts to explain the functions
in law that an evolutionary analysis might serve have thus far been
8. See, e.g., ROGER D. MASTERS, THE NATURE OF POLITICS (1989); FRANS DE
WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES (1982); FRANS DE
WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES (1989); Roger D. Masters, Evolutionary Biol-
ogy, Political Theory and the State, in LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE, supra note 3, at 171.
9. See Richard D. Schwartz, On the Prospects of Using Sociobiology in Shaping the
Law: A Cautionary Note, in LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE, supra note 3, at 15,22-23.
10. See, e.g., GRUTER, LAW AND THE MIND, supra note 3, at 14-15, 21, 36 (stressing
that legislators should be aware of biological propensities and constraints in the human
behavioral makeup); Fikentscher & McGuire, supra note 3, at 300-10 (developing the
ideas of "Constraining" functions and "Liberating" functions).
11. See, e.g., GRUTER, LAW AND THE MIND, supra note 3, at 71-142; Richard D. Al-
exander, Biology and Law, 7 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 167 (1986); Rodgers,
Bringing People Back, supra note 3.
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met with either stubborn denial that evolutionary processes continue
to importantly influence human behavior, with fear that behavioral
biology must inevitably inspire evil uses, or with pragmatic skepticism
about precisely how evolutionary insights might usefully inform our
legal system. Consequently, Part I of this Article explains in non-
technical terms the fundamental, scientifically well-accepted, and of-
ten counter-intuitive principles of evolutionary biology essential to a
properly contextualized discussion of human behavior. It therefore
offers an integrated framework for understanding behavioral biology,
confronts widespread misperceptions of human evolution, and sum-
marizes the essential theories and findings that those who think about
law need to know.
Part II builds upon Part I to introduce and develop a concrete
four-stage model for using evolutionary analysis to serve societal
goals. It demonstrates the model's utility in detail, showing how it
can inform and significantly aid efforts to address tough legal prob-
lems, such as the prevalence of child abuse. The Article concludes
that evolutionary analysis is an exceptionally powerful but easily
misunderstood tool for legal policymakers. Carefully handled, it can
serve to: 1) refine behavioral models; 2) generate new legal strategies
for regulating behaviors; 3) improve the cost-benefit analyses by
which society often prioritizes social and legal goals; and 4) suggest
important and promising new areas of research.
I am well aware that discussions about the evolution of human
psychology and behavior can become extremely volatile.12 Incorrect
assumptions, sparked by insufficient explanations, can yield the kinds
of misunderstandings likely to polarize parties and galvanize hostili-
ties. It is therefore important to make clear, at the outset, what this
Article does not say.
This Article does not suggest that genes "determine" specific
human behavior.13 They do not. It does not suggest that an evolu-
12. See, e.g., Symposium, Genetics and Crime, 15 POL. & LIFE SCI. 83-110 (1996)
(collecting participant reactions to conference exploring possible influences of biology on
the incidence of certain proscribed behaviors); David L. Wheeler, An Escalating Debate
over Research that Links Biology and Human Behavior, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June
24, 1992, at A7.
13. I fully agree with Professors Dreyfuss and Nelkin that we must carefully avoid
"genetic essentialism," which might inappropriately be used to justify reorientation of
particular social policies. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurispru-
dence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 338 (1992). While I share their concerns over
the frequent misuses and misunderstandings of biology, however, this Article explores
how one may usefully acknowledge human behavioral predispositions in ways that are not
genetically deterministic.
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tionary approach to any human affair should be dispositive of any
legal or other issue whatsoever. It should not. Nor does the Article
suggest that an evolutionary analysis is the most important analysis,
or that it should displace other analyses that it might more usefully
supplement or complement. Instead, this Article argues that under-
standing the processes by which some of our diverse human
behaviors evolved will inevitably further whatever social and legal
goals we pursue that address those behaviors. That is: More knowl-
edge is better than less knowledge. Far from over-simplifying human
behavior, evolutionary analysis will vindicate, more fully than may
currently unsupplemented behavioral models, our species' unique
history, consciousness, capabilities, and richly complex behavioral
processes.
I. A PRIMER IN LAW-RELEVANT EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
Understanding the relevance of behavioral biology to concrete
legal and policy questions requires some facility in evolutionary the-
ory." Because few lawyers have formal scientific training, and
14. Theories to explain phenomena come in two kinds: supernatural theories, which
posit unknowable forces operating outside the principles that apparently govern the ob-
servable world, and which are therefore incapable of being tested or disproved, and
natural theories, the predictive hypotheses of which are potentially vulnerable to disproof.
For many scholars, and indeed for our legal system, this "testability" separates science
from religion. See CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE (1966); KARL
R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) (stating that "the criterion of the scientific status of a the-
ory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability") (quoted favorably in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959). At the moment, the theory of evolution by natural selec-
tion is the only natural theory that explains both the physical and behavioral
characteristics of life. It is extremely robust and powerfully in accord with empirical re-
search. The reasons to prefer natural to supernatural explanations for nature's puzzles
have been and will continue to be debated elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this
Article. Compare PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991) (arguing against natu-
ralistic hypotheses), and THE CREATION HYPOTHESIS: SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE FOR AN
INTELLIGENT DESIGNER (J.P. Moreland ed., 1994) (same), with RICHARD DAWKINS,
THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986) (defending naturalistic hypotheses), and DOUGLAS J.
FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR EVOLUTION (1983) (same). Here we
will simply adopt the conventional preference for natural theories and proceed directly to
explore evolutionary explanations for the origins and persistence of some observable
behaviors.
Quibbles on the margin about the specifies of evolution, such as the appropriate sig-
nificance, if any, to evolutionary theory of "punctuated equilibrium" or the so called
"new" group selectionism, should not be confused with fundamentally different para-
digms explaining how and why life looks and behaves as it does. Compare S.J. Gould &
R.C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of
the Adaptationist Programme, B205 PROCEEDINGS ROYAL SOCIETY LONDON 581 (1979)
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because the theoretical and empirical landscape of biology has
changed so dramatically in the last two decades, this Part provides a
non-technical, panoramic survey of the current and fundamental
principles necessary to make or follow evolutionary analysis in law.
While it is unnecessary to master every detail of evolutionary theory
to follow the subsequent logic in Part II, a "big picture" perspective
will help to reveal both the thematic coherence and the deep synergy
of evolutionary biology's patterns and make obvious its utility to law.
Admittedly, this takes time. And were it possible to plunge di-
rectly into discussion of the model in Part II, and of the child abuse
analysis that demonstrates it, I would do so. For there lies some fas-
cinating (if often gruesome) material that stands as a testament to
man's (and often woman's) creative cruelty and heartless violence.
Like an economic analysis that preceded a foundation in basic eco-
nomic principles, however, that would be premature.
A. Preparatory Remarks: Law and Biology on Causation
Law and biology overlap in their preoccupations with
"causation." The term has different meanings, however, within each
discipline and it is critical to keep these meanings in mind. While
lawyers parse distinctions between proximate causes, remote causes,
concurrent causes, contributory causes, intervening causes, and "but
for" causes of phenomena,"5 behavioral biologists draw a single but
crucial distinction between "proximate" causes and "ultimate"
causes. 6 The seeming familiarity to lawyers of these last two terms is
misleading, because they are terms of art-with meanings in biology
quite different from any that lawyers might impute to them. 7
In biology, the term "proximate cause" refers only to the "how"
of behavior. It peacefully coexists with the term "ultimate cause,"
(laying important groundwork for "punctuated equilibrium"), with DAWKINS, supra, at
223-52 (arguing for "puncturing punctuationism"); and compare David Sloan Wilson &
Elliott Sober, Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences, 17
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 585, 598-605 (1994) with the collected commentaries that immedi-
ately follow it.
15. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed.
1985).
16. On proximate and ultimate causation generally, see JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL
BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 2-6 (5th ed. 1993); TIMOTHY H.
GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN
EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 3-11, 46-69 (1991); John Alcock & Paul Sherman, The Util-
ity of the Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 ETHOLOGY 58 (1994); Bobbi S.
Low, Human Sex Differences in Behavioral Ecological Perspective, 16 ANALYSE &
KRITIK 38,40-42 (1994).
17. See Jones, Genes, Behavior, and Law, supra note 3, at 101.
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which describes the larger "why" of behavior. More precisely,
"proximate causes" describe immediate causes, related to the inter-
nal mechanisms and development that cause an organism to manifest
a particular behavior. They may be defined in terms of physiology
and biochemistry, for example, as well as, at times, an organism's
unique developmental-environmental history."8 "Ultimate causes,"
on the other hand, describe evolutionary processes by which the same
behavior came to be commonly observable.19 These may be defined
in terms of the history and reproductive consequences of behavior.
Proximate and ultimate causes operate together, with al behavior
depending on ultimately-shaped proximate mechanisms."
To clarify, suppose one were to ask why a male robin sings. One
answer would be: "Because hormonal changes triggered by the
lengthening of successive days cause the robin to force air over ap-
propriately shaped vocal chords." But this answer, using terms of
proximate causation, leaves many questions unanswered. It does not
explain, for instance, why it came to pass that lengthening days in-
stead of shortening ones spark these hormonal changes instead of
others, or why it came to be that these particular hormonal changes
cause singing rather than, for example, one-legged hopping. These
questions concern the historical origins of currently manifested gene
combinations, and thus require an inquiry into ultimate causation.
The ultimate cause of singing behavior, evolutionary analysis reveals,
reflects the fact that the remote ancestors of today's singing males-
through their singing-claimed territory, attracted mates, and left
more offspring than did contemporaries not predisposed to sing. To
the extent that the ability to sing and the urge to respond to certain
environmental cues with singing were influenced by heritable predis-
positions, the proportion of male robins in successive generations
that sang inevitably increased over time until we now observe the
trait to be typical of males of the species.
In the same fashion, many behaviors-including many human
behaviors-are most completely understood in terms of proximate
and ultimate causes. That is, when people exhibit law-relevant be-
haviors, there are often two very different kinds of causes operating
simultaneously. What follows offers a way to understand the insepa-
rability of proximate and ultimate causes, and thereby to better
18. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 6-11.
19. See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 2-6; GOLDSMIT, supra note 16, at 6-11.
20. Indeed, as Goldsmith puts it: "Nothing of importance in biology can be said to
have but a single cause." GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 8.
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understand the complex process by which law-relevant behaviors
emerge.
B. The Evolutionary Perspective: On the Making of Ancestors
Like some of the world's most complex games, evolution takes a
minute to learn and a lifetime to master. Its basic contours seem
vaguely familiar, but its details are "fractal-ed" into micro-landscapes
rich with detail and subtlety. Fortunately, understanding evolution-
ary processes sufficiently to see their relevance to the legal enterprise
requires working knowledge of only a few foundational concepts. I
believe that the simplest way for lawyers to organize and understand
these concepts is to put them into the framework of a metaphorical
game-a game that all living organisms are forced to play, simply by
virtue of certain necessary correlates to reproducing in a world of
limited resources.
This game, like every game, has:
1) a duration;
2) an objective;
3) rules of play;
4) attendant strategies; and
5) inherent opportunities for conflict and cooperation.
What follows considers these in sequence.
1. The Duration of the Game: The Clock of Evolution
Existing evidence indicates that the Earth formed roughly 4.5
billion years ago.2 ' The game of evolution started when life first
emerged a little more than half of one billion years later, and will
play on so long as any life continues. Along the way, organismic con-
testants and the genes' they carry typically appear briefly and then
disappear into extinction. Indeed, scientists estimate that 99.9% of
all species that have ever lived are now extinct.24 (For the carried
genes, we'll call this "losing.") In order to understand how humans
have fared in this game, it is absolutely essential to understand evolu-
tionary time. Lacking this, absolutely everything-from the
incremental evolution of the eye from light-sensitive cells to the rele-
21. See Lawrence Badash, The Age-of-the-Earth Debate, Sci. AM., Aug. 1989, at 90,
90.
22. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 186 (1992).
23. Genes are faithfully replicating units that encode information necessary for con-
structing the principal building blocks (proteins) of all living organisms.
24. See DAVID M. RAUP, EXTINCTION: BAD GENES OR BAD LUCK? 3-4 (1991).
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vance of evolutionary biology for legal enterprises-will seem utterly
implausible.
These are current estimates of the game-time leading to modern
humans. Early organisms were singled-celled and lacked central nu-
clei for about two billion years.' Between the first microscopic,
nucleated organisms and the first known vertebrate fish, more than
another billion years elapsed.' The next 100 million years saw the
evolution of amphibians, early reptiles, and early land arthropods
(like millipedes),' while the 100 million years after that brought the
early dinosaurs and mammals.' From this point, it still took more
than an additional 100 million years before the first tiny primates ap-
peared.29
After nearly fifty million years of ensuing early primate history,
the ancestors we share with today's orangutans, gorillas, and chim-
panzees branched from the ancestors of what we now call the
monkeys? Thirteen million years later, the ancestors we share with
gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos then branched from the ancestors
of today's orangutans." Our own hominid ancestors subsequently
diverged from the ancestors of gorillas, chimps, and bonobos about
three million years later,32 with the first Homo (Homo habilis) ap-
pearing nearly five million years after that.3 Although archaic forms
of Homo sapiens emerged after roughly two million years more (and
remain the subject of continuing anthropological debate) the so-
called modem humans-Homo sapiens sapiens-seem not to have
appeared for yet another 200,000 years?4 Nevertheless, it was still
roughly an additional 70,000 years before our own subspecies of
Homo sapiens, which we imagine when we think of ourselves, had
apparently displaced our competing subspecies, Homo sapiens nean-
25. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 186.
26. See RICHARD COWAN, HISTORY OF LIFE 126 (2d ed. 1995).
27. See id. at 30-179.
28. See id. at 201-92.
29. See iL at 390.
30. See DE WAAL, supra note 5, at 4.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See COWAN, supra note 26, at 410. Early Homo recently has been dated to 2.33
million years ago. See John Noble Wilford, 2.3-Million-Year-Old Jaw Extends Human
Family, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1996, at Al.
34. See COWAN, supra note 26, at 417-18; see also CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HUMAN EVOLUTION 241-51 (S. Jones et al. eds., 1992). On continuing debates about
dating and classifying ancestral hominids, see Nancy Minugh-Purvis, The Modern Human
Origins Controversy: 1984-1994, in 4 EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 140 (1995).
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derthalensis, causing the latter's extinction.35
Looking back, then, we see the first Homo roughly two million
years ago, archaic Homo sapiens 300,000 years ago, our own subspe-
cies of Homo sapiens roughly 100,000 years ago, and post-
neanderthal human existence a mere 35,000 years ago. To put the
remaining time in perspective, scholars currently believe that mem-
bers of our species remained hunter-gatherers until merely 10,000 to
15,000 years ago, at which time they started shifting to an agricul-
tural-pastoral existence, the efficiencies of which provided much of
the energy for the explosion in technological development.36 Non-
pictographic human writing appeared only 5000 years ago,37 and the
celebrated Hammurabi Code, one of the earliest known written legal
systems, appeared only about 3700 years ago.
In short, if the history of life on Earth were condensed into a pe-
riod of seven days, the time elapsed since the year 1 A.D. would
constitute barely 1/3 of a second. We are therefore, in fact, fully
thirty-five thousand times as far from our first primate ancestor as we
are from year 1 A.D. And the length of time our primate ancestors
were the same creatures that gave rise to the gorillas, chimpanzees,
and bonobos (roughly sixty-three million years) is six-hundred-and-
thirty times as long as the period during which we have existed as our
own, modem species-and more than thirty-one thousand times as
long as the time elapsing since year 1 A.D. As will be seen below,
during all this time evolutionary processes sifted the precursors of
genetically influenced human behaviors, as our ancestors played the
game we continue to play.
35. See COWAN, supra note 26, at 419-21; see also IAN TATTERSALL, THE FOSSIL
TRAIL: How WE KNOW WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW ABOUT HUMAN EVOLUTION 229-
46 (1995); IAN TATTERSALL, THE LAST NEANDERTHAL: THE RISE, SUCCESS, AND
MYSTERIOUS EXTINCrION OF OUR CLOSEST RELATIVES 174-99 (1995).
36. See FUTUYMA, supra note 14, at 110-13.
37. See ALBERTINE GAUR, THE HISTORY OF WRITING 17 (1984); THE MAIN-
STREAM OF CIVILIZATION TO 1715, at 6-9 (Stanley Chodorow ed., 5th ed. 1989).
38. See Richard S. Ellis, Code of Hammurabi, in 13 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 750,750 (1996). The Hammurabi Code is no longer the earliest known writ-
ten legal system, although among the early systems it is the most famous. See id.
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Selected Developments in Life History*
Years Ago Development Years Elapsed
4,500,000,000 Earth Forms N/A
3,900,000,000 Life Appears 600,000,000
1,800,000,000 Nucleated Organisms 2,100,000,000
460,000,000 Vertebrate Fish 1,340,000,000
360,000,000 Arthropods, Amphibians, Reptiles 100,000,000
210,000,000 Dinosaurs, Early Mammals 150,000,000
70,000,000 Early Primates 140,000,000
23,000,000 Homo Ancestors Branch from Monkeys 47,000,000
10,000,000 Homo Ancestors Branch from Orangutans 13,000,000
7,000,000 Homo Ancestors Branch from Gorillas, Chimps, Bonobos 3,000,000
2,300,000 Earliest Homo 4,700,000
300,000 Archaic Homo sapiens 2,000,000
100,000 Skeletally Modem Homo sapiens sapiens 200,000
35,000 Homo sapiens neanderthalis Extinct; Modem Humans 65,000
13,000 Human Agriculture 22,000
5,000 Human Writing 8,000
3,700 Written Law 1,300
2,000 Start of Modem Calendar 1,700
*Dates are quite approximate, and likely to change with new findings
2. The Objective of the Game: Persistence of Existence
a. Getting Ahead: Reproductive Success
The objective of the evolutionary game is to have equal or
greater "reproductive success" ("RS") than other members of one's
species." Yet because increases in RS tend to yield geometric in-
creases in a species' population size at the same time that exploitable
resources of the world are ultimately finite, the evolutionary game is
inherently competitive."
39. The term "reproductive success" is often used in the narrow sense of "direct fit-
ness" (which includes genes replicated only in direct descendants) and is often
distinguished from "indirect fitness" (which includes the genes replicated indirectly by
increasing the reproduction of non-descendent kin). See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 576,
578; see also infra text accompanying notes 43-47 (discussing "inclusive fitness"). To
avoid confusion, reproductive success is used here in the broader sense 'also common in
ethological literature. See, e.g., Paul Turke & L.L. Betzig, Those Who Can Do: Wealth,
Status, and Reproductive Success on Ifaluk, 6 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 79, 79 (1985)
("Modem Darwinian theory predicts that human behavior will be adaptive, that is, de-
signed to promote maximum reproductive success (RS) through available descendent and
nondescendent... relatives." (emphasis added)).
40. As economist Jack Hirshleifer has observed, Darwin's ideas are consistent with
universal economic laws: The patterns of social organization "are the product of scarcity
of resources, of the limited availabilities of materials and energy in the face of the unlim-
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Although reproductive success is the only thing in the end that
matters in evolution, that proposition often proves difficult to sell
outside biology circles. Defining "success" in such a seemingly arbi-
trary and mechanistic way appears to slight other important qualities
that might serve as alternative definitions of success-such as ex-
traordinary (but non-reproductive) physical prowess or, in the human
context, such things as capacity to love, artistic talent, economic
wealth, or political achievement. Yet while different definitions of
success apply in different contexts, one must at least initially focus on
reproductive success, as opposed to other perhaps more laudable vir-
tues, whenever seeking to understand why organisms, in any
particular slice of time, tend to look and behave as they do.
To see this, imagine time divided into discrete slices, with each
slice containing creatures of different shapes, sizes, and behaviors.
Only the characteristics of organisms, not the organisms themselves,
can flow smoothly through time; only a few characteristics will reap-
pear in slice after slice, as if in successive frames of a lengthy motion
picture. Attention to reproductive success is important, therefore,
whenever we are more interested in characteristics that exist in more
than one slice of time than we are in characteristics that may flash in
one, momentarily, and disappear.4' The characteristics of individuals
that are reproductively successful are simply far more likely to ap-
pear in any later generation than are characteristics of individuals
that were not reproductively successful.42 Thus, the word "success,"
which at first seems so susceptible of individually-ascribed meaning,
is as objectively measurable in the biological context as are the rela-
tively unmalleable concepts of "existence" and "persistence."
b. Keeping Score: Inclusive Fitness
Until relatively recently, biologists kept score in the game of
evolution by counting the number of an individual's offspring that
ited expansive tendency of life." J. Hirshleifer, Natural Economy Versus Political Econ-
omy, 1 J. Soc. & BIOLOGICAL STRUCrURES 319,337 (1978).
41. Even heritable characteristics are unlikely to become prevalent in subsequent
populations unless they generally contribute to RS (in even the smallest of ways) or man-
age to free-ride with characteristics that do.
42. In other words, one thing we know for certain is that every creature, at every
moment, is the product of ancestors traceable back in time, frame by frame. Yet not
every creature will itself become an ancestor. Only the heritable physical and behavioral
characteristics of ancestors stand a chance of being replicated into successive generations
and of traveling down through time to that slice of time we happen to be studying. See
generally RICHARD DAWKINs, RIVER OUT OF EDEN: A DARWINIAN VIEW OF LIFE 1-29
(1995) (highlighting evolutionary significance of ancestors with metaphor comparing ge-
netically influenced traits to a digital river, flowing through time).
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survived and reproduced. But this measure ignored one critical fact:
Offspring are not the only genetic relatives an individual has. To the
extent that other relatives also share genes with an individual, their
reproductive success also contributes to the individual's reproductive
success. Each parent in a sexually reproducing species contributes
1/2 of the genetic complement of each offspring, so every individual
is, on average, equally related (by 1/2) to its own parents, offspring,
and siblings (the latter of which typically receive a different combina-
tion of maternal and paternal genes). An individual is therefore also
equally related to the offspring of these three groups (by 1/4, since 1/2
x 1/2 = 1/4). Put another way, since an offspring shares 1/2 of its
genes with each of its parents, an offspring will on average share
through each parent 1/4 of its genes with each of that parent's sib-
lings, 1/8 of its genes with the offspring of its parent's siblings (its
"cousins"), and so forth.43 The average fraction of genes shared with
a given relative can thus be calculated by the degree of consanguin-
ity.4
4
The important thing to know, from this, is that while offspring
were once commonly thought to be the only currency of reproductive
success, they are now recognized to be only a subset of the relatives
capable of transferring some of an individual's genetic complement
into future populations. Reproductive success, therefore, cannot be
calculated in offspring alone. Rather, one needs to take stock of the
extent to which an individual has increased the reproductive success
of its relatives (discounted by their degree of relatedness). This cu-
43. This common phrasing oversimplifies by convention. Technically, members of a
species already share most of their genes in common. See ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 126 (1985). Moreover, the term "gene" often refers to a locus on a chromo-
some that codes for a trait-affecting protein, but in the inclusive fitness context "gene" is
also shorthand for "allele," which is a term for each alternative version of a gene that may
occur at a single locus. See id. at 126-28.
44. Biologists term this the "coefficient of relatedness." See ld. Classics on "kin se-
lection," which yields behavior acutely sensitive to differing degrees of relatedness,
include Mary Jane West Eberhard, The Evolution of Social Behavior by Kin Selection (pt.
1), 50 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 1 (1975) (Letter to the Editors); W. D. Hamilton, The Evolution
of Altruistic Behavior, 97 AM. NATURALIST 354 (1963); and W. D. Hamilton, The Geneti-
cal Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1 (1964). Quite accessible
discussions also appear in GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 39-41; TRIVERS, supra note 43,
at 45-47; WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 155-79. It is important to note that the calculus is
rather different for those social insects (such as ants, bees, and wasps) that have an un-
usual (haplodiploid) chromosomal structure, resulting in unusually cooperative behavior
that is nonetheless entirely consistent with kin selection principles. See ROSs H. CROZIER
& PEKKA PAMILO, EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL INSECT COLONIES: SEX ALLOCATION AND
KIN SELECTION (1996); RANDY THORNHILL & JOHN ALCOCK, THE EVOLUTION OF
INSECT MATING SYSTEMS (1983); Robert L. Trivers & Hope Hare, Haplodiploidy and the
Evolution of the Social Insects, 191 SCI. 249,261 (1976).
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mulated, additive, RS calculation is known as "inclusive fitness."45
That term, in turn, captures the idea that for any given individual (all
else being equal) each of its reproductive offspring contributes as
much, genetically, to that individual's reproductive success, as: a)
one reproductive sibling or parent; b) two reproductive nieces, neph-
ews, uncles, or grandchildren; c) four reproductive cousins; and so
forth.46 Thus, as will be explored further below, an organism's "self-
interest" in reproductive success reduces to its promotion of inclusive
fitness.
3. The Ground Rule for the Game: Natural Selection
Every competitive game has rules that identify what equipment
players may wear (their physical traits) and how they may behave
(their behavioral traits). Additionally, there are rules to penalize
transgressors. The closer the competition, the more the cumulative
effects of such penalties will divide the winners from the losers. At
first blush, the process known as "natural selection" operates like a
rule system. Whom it mindlessly punishes, and how, eventually di-
vides those who might win the evolutionary game from those who
lose. Natural selection appears simply to punish organisms that fail
to reproduce by precluding their genetically influenced traits from
being represented in future populations. But understanding some of
the nuances of natural selection is critical to proper evolutionary
analysis, and to later appreciating the powerful role it can play when
45. See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 506-10. Inclusive fitness can also be thought of as
the sum of indirect and direct fitness, which is the total genetic contribution of an individ-
ual to the subsequent generation. See supra note 39.
46. See Martin Daly & Margo I. Wilson, Child Maltreatment from a Sociobiological
Perspective, in DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECrIvEs ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 93, 100
(Ross Rizley & Dante Cicchetti guest eds., 1981) (New Directions for Child Development
Series, No. 11, William Damon ed.) [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Child Maltreatment].
47. See id. at 100. This, incidentally, is why Spencer's inapt (but catchy) bumper-
sticker phrase "survival of the fittest," which launched the ill-begotten Social Darwinism,
is so misleading. (On Spencer's influence on Social Darwinism, see RICHARD HOF-
STADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 39 (1992)). First, survival is
relevant only to the extent that it contributes to reproduction. In many species, creatures
who sacrifice their lives in the reproductive effort have greater reproductive success than
those who do not but who survive longer. See, e.g., Maydianne C.B. Andrade, Sexual
Selection for Male Sacrifice in the Australian Redback Spider, 271 SCI. 70 (1996). Second,
fitness is not measured only by an organism's ability to reproduce. It sums that ability, in
a precise way, with the abilities of other relatives. Under some conditions, an individual
can maximize reproductive success by not reproducing and instead contributing to the
reproduction of its relatives. See THORNHILL & ALCOCK, supra note 44, at 41-42; Paul
Sherman et al., Naked Mole Rats, Sci. AM., Aug. 1992, at 72, 73; Trivers & Hare, supra
note 44, at 261 (certain insects).
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we design systems to pursue the goals of law.4"
Natural selection, like a giant colander sorting small pebbles
from large, sifts the less reproductively successful members of a spe-
cies from the more reproductively successful. While this sifting is
non-purposeful, in that it is caused by a mindless and often hostile
environment, it also is decisively non-random.49 The key to under-
standing the precise nature of this sifting lies in the interrelationship
between three features observable in most species:
* Heredity: Genetically influenced physical and behavioral
traits sometimes pass from parent to offspring (in which case
they are called "heritable").0
* Variation: Individuals of a species may differ in their physi-
cal and behavioral traits.'
* Differential Reproduction: Some inherited traits will enable
some individuals possessing them to leave more offspring
and reproductive relatives than others.
As the following paragraphs will explain in greater detail, "natural
selection" is the inevitable result of combining these three fundamen-
tal features of life on our planet.
48. Technically, natural selection is one of four factors influencing gene frequencies.
See GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 29-31. The other three are: 1) mutation, involving
replication errors in genetic codes; 2) gene flow, referring to migration of genes between
populations due to the movement of organisms carrying them; and 3) random drift, which
describes effects of chance events, such as accident or disease, on reproductive success.
Of these four, natural selection has by far the most powerful influence. See id.
49. It is a profound mistake to consider evolution an argument that organisms arise
by mere chance. As an example of this mistake, see Arthur S. Lodge, Theory of Evoht-
tion Is Still Evolving, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1995, at A15 (letter to editor incorrectly
asserting that evolutionary theory contends "that all living things on earth have been by
chance," in response to prior letter of law professor Larry Frolik, which had criticized the
teaching of creationism in the classrooms). The selective power of natural selection is
quite unlike random chance. See RICHARD DAWKINS, CLIMBING MOUNT IMPROBABLE
(1996) (contrasting the incremental process by which natural selection shapes adaptations
with the supposedly sudden effects of chance alone). If a trait arises that provides even a
2% reproductive advantage to an organism bearing it, compared to a specific, coexisting
alternative, the former can drive the latter to extinction in merely 200 generations. See
Tim Goldsmith, Is Culture Really Not Part of Our Biology?, Address to the Law, Biology,
and Human Behavior Teaching Conference (June 27, 1995). At the same time, never-
theless, the general effect of natural selection upon the traits of successive populations of
a species is also inevitably sensitive to some random shocks occasioned by luck, which
may, for example, affect the precise composition of localized breeding populations.
50. See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 6.
51. See id. Variations are the things that prevent us from calling parent and offspring
"identical." Variations relevant to the discussion at this point are those that are geneti-
cally inheritable, ultimately caused by mutation. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 29-
30.
52. See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 6.
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Organisms that are not genetically identical often will differ in
their physical and behavioral traits (resulting in within-species
"variation"). Each genetically influenced (and thus "heritable") trait
will prove "adaptive" (that is, advantageous), "maladaptive" (that is,
disadvantageous), or "neutral" with respect to its effect on the repro-
ductive success of the organism bearing it." When an adaptive and
heritable trait increases an individual's reproductive success relative
to the reproductive success of the individual's contemporaries
(resulting in "differential reproduction"), then that trait will corre-
spondingly increase in prevalence in successive generations of a
population. Conversely, when a maladaptive and heritable trait de-
creases the reproductive success of the organism bearing it relative to
the reproductive success of the organism's contemporaries, then that
trait, on average, will decrease in prevalence in successive genera-
tions. This phenomenon, which the term "natural selection"
captures, therefore can be understood as one of the principal mecha-
nisms governing the relative proportions of the various physical and
behavioral traits that are observable in any particular generation of a
species.
The most useful technique for grasping the effect this "rule" of
natural selection has on the evolutionary game is to posit an ancient
population in which variations are introduced, and to estimate how
each variation would fare in successive generations. For example,
imagine a herd consisting of 100 individual antelope (fifty female and
fifty male) all of which share a species-typical ear shape (as a func-
tion, of course, of prior evolutionary processes). Imagine that in
arbitrarily named Generation 1 two heritable mutations (copying er-
rors in the genetic code), each of which affects adult ear shape,
appear simultaneously in two infant females. One mutation results in
a slight advantage (over both the second female and all the other fe-
males) in, say, that female's ability to hear predators sneaking up on
53. In other words, the trait might: promote reproductive success (as through im-
proved detection of predators); impede reproductive success (as through an urge to run
toward, rather than away from, a predator); or have no effect whatsoever on reproductive
success (as through introduction of genes that never activate, and therefore have no sig-
nificance for the organism bearing them). In reality, very few variations are adaptive-as
there are more ways to worsen something than to improve it. However, because even
infrequently occurring adaptive variations tend, on average, to supplant less adaptive
alternatives over successive generations, physical structures and behavioral tendencies
that most efficiently contribute to individual reproductive success become increasingly
prominent. Many adaptations are simply so successful that they become shared by all
members of the species many generations hence. For a concise discussion, see Martin
Daly & Margo Wilson, Discriminative Parental Solicitude: A Biological Perspective, 42 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 277,278 (1980).
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her. This gives her a slightly better chance than that of any other fe-
male of surviving to reproductive age. If she successfully reproduces,
contributing to Generation 2, roughly 50% of her offspring are likely
to share her genetically enhanced hearing and will likewise receive a
slight advantage over their contemporaries.
In contrast, imagine that the second female's mutation results in
a slight disadvantage (compared both to the first female and to all
other females) in the second female's ability to hear predators
sneaking up on her. This gives her a slightly worse chance than that
of any other female of surviving to reproductive age. If she does sur-
vive and reproduce, contributing to Generation 2, roughly 50% of her
offspring will share her poorer hearing, putting them too at a slight
disadvantage with respect to survival, and thence to reproduction.
What will the population look like at, say, Generation 1000-
merely 998 generations hence? Separate and simple calculations
(demonstrating the power of exponential growth) reveal that even a
trait providing its possessor with only a 1% reproductive advantage
over its contemporaries can swell from 1% representation in a popu-
lation to 99% in merely 265 generations. 4 There will probably,
therefore, be more descendants of the first female than of the second
female, and perhaps even more descendants of the first female than
of any other female from Generation I (depending upon the relative
contribution to reproductive success of acute hearing compared to
that of alternatively arising traits, such as longer necks or superior
camouflage). The first female will have her genes represented in a
larger proportion of the later population. Consequently, we may
predict that natural selection, by punishing poorer hearing, would
effectively favor the "better-hearing," more adaptive ear shape and
let it spread throughout future populations.
The same analysis obtains for genetically influenced behavioral
characteristics.55 Every behavioral act has consequences, and natural
54. See TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 28-29.
55. See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 57-88; MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, NATURE'S
MIND: THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THINKING, EMOTIONS, SEXUALITY, LANGUAGE,
AND INTELLIGENCE (1992); QUANTITATIVE GENETIC STUDIES OF BEHAVIORAL
EVOLUTION (Christine R.B. Boake ed., 1994); TRIVERS, supra note 43; Ralph J.
Greenspan, Understanding the Genetic Construction of Behavior, SCI. AM., Apr. 1995, at
72-78; articles collected in Genes and Behavior, 264 SCI. 1686, 1686-1739 (1994).
Humans pass behavioral traits culturally, as well as genetically. While they are not
the only animals to pass behavioral traits through non-genetic means, they are particu-
larly adept at doing so. Although this capability is beyond the scope of this Article, some
of the more interesting examples of literature attending to the intersection of culture and
evolution include ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE
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selection operates inexorably upon genetically influenced conse-
quences, whenever they serve to differentiate individual organisms in
ways that affect reproductive success.56 This effectively creates
evolved psychologies, to the extent that a psychology is a short way of
describing species-typical information processing pathways tending to
yield some behaviors, in given circumstances, more than others." For
example, observe that individuals tend, even without "learning," to
mate with members of their own species. Why? The analytic tech-
nique just demonstrated, for estimating how genetic variations would
fare in successive generations, makes clear that if a novel gene com-
bination arose in Generation 1, predisposing its bearer to spend
precious time and energy pursuing ultimately non-reproductive
copulation with members of an unrelated species, that combination is
unlikely to be represented in a significant portion of the population in
Generation 1000. The same would be true for thousands of other
gene combinations predisposing their bearers to be less interested in
mating, less capable of correctly identifying opposite-sex members of
their own species, inappropriately calibrated with respect to when
they should be hungry, and so on. This is also true for an extraordi-
narily diverse set of other behavioral traits that affect reproductive
success.
Natural selection is therefore a non-directed yet non-random
process of differential reproduction, as a consequence of genetic
variation, that tends to make animals of existing species look as if
EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS (1985); L.L. CAVALLI-SFORZA & M.W. FELDMAN,
CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH (1981);
W.H. DURHAM, COEVOLUTION: GENES, CULTURE AND HUMAN DIVERSITY (1990);
THE ETHOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CULTURE (R. Allen Gardner et al. eds., 1994); Robert
Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Why Does Culture Increase Human Adaptability?, 16
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 125 (1995); Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary
Psychology and the Generation of Culture: Case Study, Part II: A Computational Theory
of Social Exchange, 10 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 51 (1989); Goodenough, Mind Vi-
ruses, supra note 3; Kiyosi Takahasi & Kenichi Aoki, Two-Locus Haploid and Diploid
Models for the Coevolution of Cultural Transmission and Paternal Care, 146 AM.
NATURALIST 651 (1995); John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Evolutionary Psychology and
the Generation of Culture, Theoretical Considerations, Part I, 10 ETHOLOGY & SO-
CIOBIOLOGY 29 (1989).
56. See ROBERT A. HINDE, ETHOLOGY: ITS NATURE AND RELATIONS WITH
OTHER SCIENCES 102 (1982).
57. These pathways can be extremely context-sensitive. As Tim Goldsmith describes
the "Garcia Effect," rats made ill by x-ray doses delivered after eating will associate their
delayed distress with the taste but not with the shape or color of the food. Conversely, if
given a shock while eating, rats remember visual or auditory cues, but not taste cues. As
a function of natural selection, eating-related cues are far more readily associated with
subsequent internal distress than auditory or visual cues. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 16,
at 97-98.
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they were designed to survive and reproduce in their ecological
niche." Though its influence surrounds us, we know natural selection
only by silhouette, as it incessantly eliminates traits carried by organ-
isms that reproduce less successfully than their contemporaries. 9
It is important to recognize that, most typically, only those traits
helping individuals to improve their reproductive success can prolif-
erate. Inheritable traits that might help the group or species to
survive, at the expense of individual gains to inclusive fitness, would
generally diminish toward disappearance." This means that under
most circumstances natural selection operates primarily at the level
of the individual or gene, and not at the level of the group.6 In other
words, it is unlikely that a trait could ever arise and persist in indi-
viduals that benefits the group at the expense of an individual's own
reproductive success.62
58. Richard Dawkins calls natural selection the "blind watchmaker," as an implicit
refutation of the creationist argument that such design implies a conscious designer, in the
same way that a watch supposedly implies a watchmaker. See DAWKINS, supra note 14, at
4-5.
59. Although natural selection is the principal rule in the game of evolution, a sup-
plemental, special rule that applies only to species that sexually reproduce will be
discussed infra section I.B.4.c.
60. Think, for example, of a heritable trait in deer predisposing its possessor to raise,
during times of overpopulation, far fewer offspring than it is physically capable of raising,
or of a heritable trait in trees predisposing its possessors to grow less tall-on the chance
that all members of the species would benefit by collecting the same amount of sunlight as
they do now if they halted their competitive, intra-species height race. Such traits would
be at an extreme disadvantage relative, respectively, to a trait prompting unrestrained
reproductive effort, or unrestricted competition for more sunlight.
61. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); FUTUYMA, supra note 14,
at 114-31; HINDE, supra note 56, at 142-53; TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 67-85; see also
GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION: A CRITIQUE OF
SOME CURRENT EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT (1966) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ADAP-
TATION AND NATURAL SELECTION] (considered to have eviscerated "naive" group
selectionism as espoused by V.C. Wynne-Edwards in ANIMAL DISPERSION IN RELATION
TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (1962)). Some have argued that the "selfish gene" thesis has
been a bit overstated. George Williams has recently urged that if we pay more attention
to units of heredity (replicators) rather than to units of selection (vehicles) we will see
that natural selection, under some circumstances, can also operate at other levels. See
GEORGE WILLIAMS, NATURAL SELECTION: DOMAINS, LEVELS, AND CHALLENGES
(1992); accord ELIZABETH LLOYD, THE STRUCTURE AND CONFIRMATION OF EVO-
LUTIONARY THEORY (1988); ELLIOTr SOBER, THE NATURE OF SELECTION:
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY IN PHILOSOPHICAL FOCUS (1984); see also Wilson & Sober,
supra note 14, at 585 (arguing that "the vehicle based theory makes it clear that group
selection is an important force to consider in human evolution"). On the history and sig-
nificance of the debate, see Ernst Mayr, Driving Forces in Evolution: An Analysis of
Natural Selection, in THE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY OF VIRUSES 29 (Stephen S. Morse
ed., 1994).
62. The questions this raises with respect to the evolution of cooperation and
"altruism" are addressed infra section I.B.5.b.
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4. The Strategies for the Game: Reproductive Strategies
The rules of a game circumscribe effective strategies for playing.
Consequently, natural selection's relentless sweeping away of indi-
viduals with relatively low reproductive success inevitably exposes,
like rocks at low tide, a variety of more successful "reproductive
strategies" for generating relatives. These are simply the different
(and typically unconscious) successful physiological and behavioral
pathways to becoming an ancestor that natural selection has not
swept from existence. "Strategies" is plural here because, while natu-
ral selection favors physical structures and behavioral predispositions
that together function successfully to transfer genes to subsequent
generations, there are many different successful combinations. These
vary according to the number of offspring one produces, the extent to
which each offspring is cared for after birth, whether reproduction is
asexual or sexual, and so forth.
This section features two important variables in reproductive
strategies-the amount of parental investment and the existence or
absence of sexual reproduction. The latter warrants a brief but sepa-
rate discussion of special rules applicable to sexually reproducing
species. This is followed by a brief explanation of behavioral predis-
positions that may vary, sensitive to environmental conditions.
a. Parental Investment
One of the most important variables in any reproductive strategy
is parental investment (known as "PI"), which is any investment by
the parent in an individual offspring that increases that offspring's
chance of surviving and reproducing at the cost of the parent's ability
to invest in other offspring.0 Contrary to intuition, perhaps, simply
maximizing the number of offspring born is not necessarily a domi-
nant reproductive strategy. An offspring contributes to reproductive
success only if it reaches adulthood and successfully reproduces (or
assists its relatives in doing so). Because each offspring is a separate
investment of finite parental resources (from body, time, and en-
ergy), quantity eventually trades against quality. Increasing the
number of offspring eventually requires decreasing parental invest-
ment per offspring. An ocean sunfish, for example, may release as
63. See Robert L. Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL
SELECTION AND THE DESCENT OF MAN 136, 139 (B. Campbell ed., 1972) [hereinafter
Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection]; Robert L. Trivers, Parent-Offspring
Conflict, 14 AM. ZOOLOGY 249 (1974) [hereinafter Trivers, Parent-Offspring Conflict].
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many as 300,000,000 eggs in a single clutch." It invests nothing in
raising the young, however, and therefore only a few survive. Near
the other extreme, the human animal invests extraordinary amounts
in every offspring, many of which survive. But humans must then
inevitably produce fewer offspring at a single time. There are many
different, intermediate, equally optimal balances between number of
offspring and amount of parental investment, depending on how
many offspring are produced, and how much a parent of a given spe-
cies invests in each.
b. Sexual Reproduction
One way to invest in an offspring is through a long gestation pe-
riod. In mammals, the longer the offspring can grow protected inside
the parent's body and still successfully be birthed, the better its
chances of surviving vulnerable infancy and reaching reproductive
age. This component of a reproductive strategy, however, does not
automatically require a separation of sexes within the species. Asex-
ual reproduction (such as "budding" or "cloning") is less costly than
sexual reproduction because it enables an organism to reproduce
without diverting its time and energy to locating, attracting, and
mating with others. Moreover, an organism reproducing asexually
typically transmits twice as many of its genes to each offspring as
does a sexually reproducing parent.
Why, then, is sexual reproduction so widespread? The question
warrants some explanation, because the different economic costs im-
posed by natural selection on aspects of sexual reproduction are
responsible for much of the behavior-shaping forces that affect hu-
man behavior. There are many theories to explain the prevalence of
sexual reproduction, but the predominant one at present stresses the
evolutionary significance of lowly parasites. 5
Parasites evolved by exploiting the bodies of hosts, the way
64. See L. Scott Forbes & Douglas W. Mock, Proximate and Ultimate Determinants of
Avian Brood Reduction, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE 237, 237 (Stefano Parmig-
iani & Frederick S. vom Saal eds., 1994) (citing J. L. Hart, Pacific Fishes of Canada,
Fisheries Research Board of Canada Bulletin No. 180 (1973)).
65. For a brief but sophisticated elaboration of this theory, see MArT RIDLEY, THE
RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EvoLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 55-87 (1994). Other ex-
amples include, W.D. Hamilton, Sex Versus Non Sex Versus Parasite, 35 OIKOS 282
(1980); R. Stephen Howard & Curtis M. Lively, Parasitism, Mutation Accumulation and
the Maintenance of Sex, 367 NATURE 554 (1994); R. Ladle, Parasites and Sex: Catching
the Red Queen, 7 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 405 (1992). For brief overviews of
the sex conundrum, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 47-49 and Roger V. Short, Why
Sex?, in THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SExES 3 (R.V. Short & E. Balaban eds., 1994).
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hosts, in turn, evolved to exploit their own environment. But because
hosts are already engaged in a stiff competition over RS, every para-
sitic freeloader inevitably weakens them, penalizing them in the
competition with any parasite-free contemporaries." Since natural
selection will favor hosts resistant to parasites, as well as parasites
that defeat host defenses, the hosts and parasites are in a constant
arms race. Were the game a fair one, an equilibrium standoff might
ensue. But the game is not fair, and parasites have one distinct ad-
vantage: Short generation spans. Certain species of bacteria, for
example, can produce a new generation every twenty minutes in the
body of a human, while their human hosts produce a new generation
about once every twenty-eight years.67 This means that the physical
and behavioral traits of parasitic species can evolve faster than those
of their host species (because each generation provides a new oppor-
tunity for genetic variation) and that they will inevitably outrace the
hosts whenever hosts exhibit little genetic variation between succes-
sive generations.
In asexual reproduction, offspring are genetically identical to the
parent (excluding random mutations). This leaves asexually repro-
ducing individuals extremely vulnerable to the various weapons that
evolve within the tiny organisms who parasitize and exploit them.
Sexual reproduction, on the other hand, reshuffles the host's genetic
deck between each generation. This has the effect of restarting the
arms race every time the parasites get ahead." Because more than
half of all organisms in the world are parasites, and because most
non-parasitic organisms are infected with parasites for at least some
66. Because parasites that regularly kill their hosts before reproducing would have
extremely low reproductive success, a parasite's virulence is generally and directly related
to the speed with which it can infect new hosts. Highly virulent strains of sexually-
transmitted diseases, like AIDS, flourish more readily when the number of partners per
host per unit of time is very high, while less virulent strains achieve greater relative suc-
cess when the number of partners per host per time is very low. For more on the
evolution of viruses, see THE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY OF VIRUSES (Stephen S. Morse
ed., 1994); PAUL W. EWALD, EVOLUTION OF INFECrIOUS DISEASES (1994); Paul W.
Ewald, The Evolution of Virulence, SCI. AM., Apr. 1993, at 86.
67. Personal Communication with Dr. Michael McGuire, Professor of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences, University of California at Los Angeles, in Squaw Valley, Cal. (June
24, 1996).
68. One complication of this theory as an explanation for sexual reproduction is the
way our immune systems operate. Antibodies are produced by somatic cell mutation and
recombination at a tremendous rate and in a directed (i.e., clonal selection) way. Given
this capability, it is unclear why the germ line (sex cell) recombination noted in the text is
also necessary. Personal Communication with William Zimmerman, Professor of Biol-
ogy, Amherst College Department of Biology (Jan. 25,1996).
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of their lifetimes," natural selection generally favors sexual reproduc-
tion over asexual reproduction (especially in species with long
generation spans).'
c. Sexual Selection: A Special Rule for a Special Strategy
The pressure of natural selection yields sexual reproductive
strategies, but these in turn create new pressures and rules. Sexual
reproduction requires mating, and mating requires mates. The com-
petition to attract mates and exclude rivals imposes evolutionary
pressures occasionally at odds with those encouraging simple sur-
vival. Darwin himself recognized that natural selection (as he had
articulated it) could not alone account for all the characteristics crea-
tures manifest. Things like elaborate peacock tails, for example,
seemed more likely to increase than to reduce vulnerability to preda-
tion. At first glance, this would seem to reduce the reproductive
success of peacocks with such tails.
To explain the persistence of such attributes, Darwin proposed
the existence of a process now known as "sexual selection"'" (now
generally considered to be a special sub-aspect of natural selection').
Imagine a sexually reproducing species (of mammal, for example)
manifesting an evolved reproductive strategy that requires individu-
als: a) to reproduce sexually; b) to fertilize internally; and c) to
produce live young. In such a species one sex typically must invest
69. See P.W. PRICE, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY OF PARASITES vi-vii, 8 (1980).
70. To date, field and experimental evidence tends to support this hypothesis. See,
e.g., C.M. Lively, Evidence from a New Zealand Snail for the Maintenance of Sex by Para-
sitism, 328 NATURE 519 (1987) (reporting that, in a snail species that can reproduce either
sexually or asexually, sexual reproduction is strongly correlated with parasitism); Guiyun
Yan & Lori Stevens, Selection by Parasites on Components of Fitness in Tribolium Beetles:
The Effect of Intraspecific Competition, 146 AM. NATURALIST 795 (1995) (reporting that
parasitism strongly affects host reproductive success when intra-species competition is
high). Incidentally, there is much to suggest that the powerful effect of parasites on body
symmetry, color, and physical performance plays a crucial role in sexual selection, which
is the subject of the immediately following section. See, e.g., D.H. Clayton, The Influence
of Parasites on Host Sexual Selection, 7 PARASITOLOGY TODAY 329 (1991); William D.
Hamilton & M. Zuk, Heritable True Fitness and Bright Birds: A Role for Parasites?, 218
Sc. 384 (1982).
71. Sexual selection was first described in Chapter IV of CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE
ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (1859), and later elaborated at
length in CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO
SEX (1871). For modem elaboration, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 43-45, 49-67;
ANDERS PAPE MOLLER, SEXUAL SELECTION AND THE BARN SWALLOW (1994);
RIDLEY, supra note 65, at 131-69; TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 203-70; Trivers, Parental
Investment and Sexual Selection, supra note 63.
72. See, e.g., HELENA CRONIN, THE ANT AND THE PEACOCK: ALTRUISM AND
SEXUAL SELECTION FROM DARWIN TO TODAY 234 (1991).
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more in the creation of a viable offspring than must the other sex. In
addition to mating time and energy, for example, the male has to in-
vest only sperm. On the other hand, if copulation yields conception,
the female must continue to invest in the organism growing within
her, frequently for long periods, and must often assist the vulnerable
young (by nursing it, for example) for some significant post-birth pe-
riod. Following conception in such a species, the male investment,
although useful, is not technically necessary for birth or infant care.
This disparity in minimum investment between males and fe-
males in such a species produces a disparity in potential cost-benefit
payoffs for every act of copulation. From a single act of copulation, a
male may gain an offspring that carries his genes into future genera-
tions. While the female may gain a similar benefit from the same act,
unlike the male she must first grow within her, and often rear, that
offspring. Because she must nourish the growing embryo with the
fruits of her body, the maximum number of offspring a female can
grow and raise in a lifetime is comparatively limited. She is bound by
the limits of her own body. The maximum number of young a male
could father, on the other hand, is limited only by the number of fe-
males he can inseminate. The theoretical maximum number of
children a male human could father, for example, could number in
the thousands. The theoretical maximum number of children a fe-
male human could mother, on the other hand, even assuming
frequent triplets, likely hovers near one hundred-with a practical
limit probably in the vicinity of thirty.
In all species reflecting this disparity in reproductive maxima,
females are generally the limiting resource for maximum male repro-
duction. These two critical features of sexual selection typically
emerge: greater male-male than female-female competition for
mates, and greater female than male choice (on average over a
population) regarding who one's mate will be. 3 Some features and
behaviors that might produce no immediate advantage for survival,
food-acquisition, or offspring-rearing, therefore, can still be favored
by sexual selection over time because they provide advantages over
members of the same sex in the competition for access to, and choice
73. See MOLLER, supra note 71, at 3. Exceptions prove the rule. In seahorses, for
example, in which female seahorses inject eggs into the male's body, where they develop,
the females are the more active sex in courtship. See RIDLEY, supra note 65, at 180-81.
Also, predictably larger, more brightly colored female phalaropes (such as sea snipes)
display and fight for males, who, in these bird species, provide the larger share of egg-
tending. See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 458-59; TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 215-19;
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 48.
1997] 1145
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
by, members of the other sex. Sexual selection is therefore the result
of a non-random association between a given characteristic and a
component of mating success, such as excluding rivals (with big ant-
lers) or attracting mates (with colorful tail feathers).7 4
d. Condition-Dependent Strategies
Because circumstances vary significantly, an ability to shift
among a variety of potential behaviors in response to endlessly shift-
ing environmental conditions often proves adaptive. 5 For example,
genetically influenced behavioral algorithms rendering an organism's
aggressiveness particularly sensitive to the relative value of the terri-
tory it defends (say in food quality and abundance), and to the
relative size of any challenger for that territory, tend to increase in
frequency over successive generations compared to similar algo-
rithms that cause fleeing or fighting behavior insensitive to the value
of the territory. Many creatures therefore exhibit relatively simple
condition-sensitive or "conditional" strategies that are continuously
honed by natural selection to reflect the increasingly familiar logic of
game theory.76 Additionally, in species with advanced cognitive ca-
pacities, behavioral plasticity is further increased by an ability to
analyze a very large number of variables, to assess probable out-
comes as a consequence of given behaviors, and to choose among
them. The existence of such an ability does not necessarily eclipse
the influence of condition-dependent predispositions, but it does of-
ten diminish their influence.
5. The Strategies in Tension: On Conflict, Cooperation, and
Deception
Thus far, it should be clear that persistent patterns in physical
and behavioral traits of living things vary as a function of reproduc-
tive success, as measured by inclusive fitness. Reproductive success is
then, in turn, mediated by the force of natural selection, the pressure
of which yields reproductive strategies. Some of these strategies are
sexual (resulting in sexual selection), and all involve delicate trade-
offs regarding the amount and kind of parental investment. The
74. See generally MOLLER, supra note 71, at 1-17 (providing an overview of sexual
selection). Bright colors, incidentally, appear to be a reliable proxy for low parasite load.
See Hamilton & Zuk, supra note 70.
75. A species' increasing behavioral plasticity inevitably carries its own costs, how-
ever, in terms of increased brain size, delayed reaction time, and the like.
76. See, e.g., ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 297-99, 305-12, 414-15, 418-19, 553-55; see
also infra text accompanying note 88.
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important point is that these tradeoffs introduce varying degrees of
intra-species conflict and cooperation into the evolutionary game, the
varieties and combinations of which describe much of the vast diver-
sity of animal behavior.
a. Conflict
Related but non-identical individuals can have overlapping but
non-identical reproductive interests. In sexually reproducing species,
consequently, we might divide common forms of conflict into four
categories: 1) intra-sexual conflict; 2) inter-sexual conflict (including
parent-parent conflict); 3) sibling-sibling conflict; and 4) parent-
offspring conflict.'
Intra-sexual conflict is that over access to mates or other re-
sources, as discussed above in the context of sexual selection. Where
females are the limiting reproductive resource, male-male physical
contests are the norm. Inter-sexual conflict results from differences
between the sexes in their lifetime reproductive potential and mini-
mum necessary investments in offspring (mentioned earlier) as well
as in their certainty of relatedness to putative offspring. In internally
fertilizing species, for example, a female is always related to the off-
spring of her own body, regardless of which male sired them. In
contrast, paternity certainty is a special problem for males in species
characterized by paternal assistance in offspring rearing, because a
male may or may not be related to the infants he helps to raise.
There are therefore dramatically different consequences to the indi-
vidual reproductive success of males and females when they
themselves or their mates engage in extra-pair copulations that result
in conception, and natural selection must then exert different selec-
tive pressures on heritable predispositions in male and female mating
behavior. For example, male mate-guarding during periods of female
fertility is adaptive where paternity is uncertain, particularly when
guarding varies in direct proportion to that uncertainty. Conversely,
a female predisposition to solicit specific extra-pair copulations will
be adaptive if on average it results in the conception of higher quality
offspring than would be the offspring of the male partner that may in
fact help to raise those offspring. 8
77. Group-group conflict in social species is beyond the scope of this Article.
78. Even in some of the bird species typically considered to be monogamous, DNA
analysis reveals that up to 40% of the young a male may help raise are not his own. See
Robert B. Payne & Laura L. Payne, Heritability Estimates and Behavior Observations:
Extra-Pair Mating in Indigo Buntings, 38 ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 457 (1989); David F.
Westneat et al., The Ecology and Evolution of Extra-Pair Copulations in Birds, 7
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Sibling-sibling conflict is expected to be less intense than average
conflict among non-relatives, but more intense than conflict among
clones. For while each sibling is related to the other by roughly 50%
(and therefore can further its own self-interest through the other's
survival and reproductive success), each is nevertheless 100% related
to itself. In the end, each receives twice the benefit by thriving at the
cost of the other as it would by sacrificing itself to the other's bene-
fit." Put another way, each sibling can be expected, for example, to
value the parental investment it receives twice as highly as parental
investment its sibling receives-and to treat its parents and siblings
accordinglyY
Parent-offspring conflict might be viewed, in part, as simply an
epiphenomenon of competition between the siblings for a dispropor-
tionate share of parental investment. But in fact, genetic
asymmetries between parent and offspring have their own, more di-
rectly powerful effects. Again, each is 50% related to the other but
100% related to itself. Thus, the incessant pressure from natural se-
lection for each to optimize transmission of genes to subsequent
generations yields overlapping but also conflicting interests in such
things as the optimal length of the period of parental investment and
in the optimal total amount of parental investment.81 Offspring will
typically seek more resources from parents capable of future repro-
duction than those parents will have been selected to provide,
particularly as the offspring matures from necessary dependence to
CURRENT ORNITHOLOGY 331,334-35 (1990); see also T.R. BIRKHEAD & A.P. MOLLER,
SPERM COMPETITION IN BIRDS: EVOLUTIONARY CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES 18-28
(1992).
79. In many species, aggression toward a sibling correlates with decreasing food sup-
ply. See Forbes & Mock, supra note 64, at 237, 245-46. In some species (like eagles,
boobies, and pelicans), it is nearly routine for the elder sibling to eat the younger sibling
shortly after it hatches. See id Parents do not often intervene in such siblicide, perhaps
because it would rarely be possible in such species to raise more than one offspring at a
time, suggesting that the second egg is but an insurance against the unexpected failure of
the first. See id at 248-49. The young of some species of shark seek out and devour sib-
lings inside the mother's oviduct-before they have even been born. See Wallace J.
Dominey & Lawrence S. Blumer, Cannibalism of Early Life Stages in Fishes, in IN-
FANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 43, 62-63 (Glen
Hausfater & Sarah Blaffer Hrdy eds., 1984) [hereinafter INFANTICIDE]; R.G. Gilmore et
al., Reproduction and Embryonic Development of the Sand Tiger Shark, Odontaspis taurus
(Raflnesque), 81 FISHERY BULL. 201 (1983).
80. On the unusually low sibling-sibling conflict of many social insects, see supra note
44.
81. See H.C.J. Godfray, Evolutionary Theory of Parent-Offspring Conflict, 376
NATURE 133 (1995); Virginia D. Hayssen, Mammalian Reproduction: Constraints on the
Evolution of Infanticide, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 105; Trivers, Parent-Offspring
Conflict, supra note 63, at 249-60.
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possible independence.8 Moreover, the relentlessly economizing
process of natural selection yields the somewhat counter-intuitive
proposition that parental investment is (from a genetic perspective)
efficiently redirected away from one offspring whenever there is a
probable increase in eventual parental reproductive success by doing
so. Natural selection has therefore favored heritable predispositions
to allocate investment among offspring commensurate with generally
accurate indicators of that offspring's likely contribution to parental
RS. The result is the widespread animal phenomenon of
"discriminative parental solicitude" (or DPS), which may yield addi-
tional conflict.' As a consequence of DPS, for example, animal
parents can increase their reproductive success by allocating more
resources to a more promising offspring at the expense of another, or
indeed by abandoning offspring that are sickly, weak, or deformed
and investing elsewhere the resources thereby released (such as in
future offspring).
b. Cooperation
Even individuals in conflict, of course, often will have overlap-
ping interests that can generate cooperation. In the biological
context, cooperation involves acts that appear "altruistic" (at least at
first glance). Altruistic acts appear in two basic contexts: 1) those
directed toward kin; and 2) those directed toward non-kin. The evo-
lutionary origins of both can be explained by the logic of
reproductive success, because such acts are widespread throughout
the animal kingdom. But because the beneficiaries of both tend to
differ precisely along the line of genetic relatedness, the two contexts
require two different evolutionary explanations.
The evolution of altruism toward kin is more intuitively obvious,
because improving the prospects of kin can contribute to reproduc-
82. For example, although it would not be advantageous for a primate infant to ex-
tract so much maternal investment that its mother dies before it achieves independence, it
may often be advantageous to extract additional maternal investment that might come
only at a cost to future siblings. See Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Fitness Tradeoffs in the History
and Evolution of Delegated Mothering with Special Reference to Wet-Nursing, Abandon-
ment, and Infanticide [hereinafter Hrdy, Fitness Tradeoffs], in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL
CARE, supra note 64, at 3, 4; David Haig, Genetic Conflicts in Human Pregnancy, 68 Q.
REV. OF BIOLOGY 495 (1993) (highlighting in utero tensions between human fetus and
mother).
83. For a general overview, see Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Discriminative Paren-
tal Solicitude and the Relevance of Evolutionary Models to the Analysis of Motivational
Systems, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 1269 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 1995)
[hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Discriminative Parental Solicitude]. This will be explored in
detail below because of its centrality to the child abuse demonstration of the model.
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tive success. Examples include providing resources to offspring (as
already discussed), sharing resources with other relatives, and giving
alarm calls to relatives about approaching predators. A kin selection
model predicts that in each case natural selection will have favored
those who provide relatives with such benefits in greater abundance,
or more frequently, than non-relatives. The evidence bears this out
rather strikingly, as parents often aggressively exclude non-relatives
from receiving their parental investment (witness the persecution of
an orphaned seal pup lost among unrelated mothers') and, even in
such highly social colonizing species as ground squirrels, the propen-
sity to provide alarm calls is powerfully linked to the density of
relatives in the immediate vicinity." Those species that manifest co-
operation typically exhibit well-developed mechanisms for
identifying close relatives."
The more difficult question is why individuals would ever favor
non-relatives with resources, as they often do. Two models help ex-
plain this. The more intuitively obvious one is known as mutualismY
It simply describes, through now-familiar game theoretic terms, how
cooperation with others can yield average reproductive success pay-
offs to each cooperator that exceed those achievable by each without
cooperation." For there are many times when even unrelated indi-
viduals may achieve more together than either could in isolation.
The other model is known as reciprocal altruism,89 and it applies in
contexts in which there is a deferred reproductive gain for the helper,
providing a net reproductive gain to the helper over not helping in
the first instance. In such circumstances, genetically-influenced al-
truistic behavior toward unrelated individuals can still be sufficiently
84. See, e.g., Burney J. Le Boeuf & Claudio Campagna, Protection and Abuse of
Young in Pinnipeds, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at 257,259,260,
264.
85. See TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 110-12; Paul W. Sherman, Nepotism and the Evo-
lution of Alarm Calls, 197 Sci. 1246, 1252 (1977). For an overview of mechanisms by
which organisms recognize kin, see David W. Pfennig & Paul W. Sherman, Kin Recogni-
tion, SCI. AM., June 1995, at 98.
86. See, e.g., KIN RECOGNITION (Peter G. Hepper ed., 1991); Pfennig & Sherman,
supra note 85.
87. See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 506.
88. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); KARL
SIGMUND, GAMES OF LIFE: EXPLORATIONS IN ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR
155-206 (1993); JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, DID DARWIN GET IT RIGHT? ESSAYS ON
GAMES, SEX AND EVOLUTION (1988); JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE
THEORY OF GAMES (1982); PHILIP D. STRAFFIN, GAME THEORY AND STRATEGY
(1993); JORGEN W. WEIBULL, EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (1995).
89. See ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 506; Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal
Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35 (1971).
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adaptive to increase in frequency in successive populations.
c. Deception and Self-Deception
Competition can make deception adaptive. Within prey species,
for example, natural selection favors such deceptive traits as camou-
flage (to avoid detection by predators) and mimicry (to take free-
riding advantage of adaptive features in other species). However, the
pervasive conflicts of interest within species, as well as the particular
fragility of cooperative relations between genetically unrelated indi-
viduals, also provide opportunities favoring heritable abilities to
deceive. The ability to elicit altruistically cooperative acts from oth-
ers without reciprocating, for example, makes Gullible's loss
Deceiver's gain. And gains that translate into increased relative re-
productive success tend to be adaptive. Unsurprisingly, then, animal
communication systems hardly perform as unsullied vehicles for
transmission of truth.
Yet the very adaptiveness of deception creates countervailing
pressures favoring the ability to detect deception-and to discrimi-
nate carefully among potential recipients of cooperative acts. A
coevolutionary struggle often follows, "with more skillful deception
being matched by greater powers of detecting deception."' This
arms race does two things. First, it favors advanced intellectual capa-
bilities: to evaluate an actual return on altruistic investment (thereby
detecting bad bargains); to identify individuals as individuals; to asso-
ciate individuals with good or bad past bargains; to avoid future
interactions with bad-bargain individuals (or "cheaters"); and to de-
tect physiological and behavioral cues of would-be deceivers.9'
Second, it eventually favors self-deception in deceivers, rendering a
deceptive intent unconscious to the practitioner, thereby eliminating
the physiological and behavioral cues, such as nervousness and other
subtle signs of stress, that might give the deception away.'
Because the adaptiveness of deception increases with increased
social interaction, the ability of any one individual to engage in de-
90. Robert Trivers, Deceit and Self-Deception: The Relationship Between Communi-
cation and Consciousness, in MAN AND BEAST REVISITED 175,176 (Michael H. Robinson
& Lionel Tiger eds., 1991).
91. See, e.g., Linda Mealey et al., Enhanced Memory for Faces of Cheaters, 17
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 119 (1996).
92. On deceit and self-deceit generally, see TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 395-420;
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 263-86; Randolph M. Nesse, The Evolutionary Functions of
Repression and the Ego Defenses, 18 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIS 260 (1990); see also
LOYAL D. RUE, BY THE GRACE OF GUILE: THE ROLE OF DECEPTION IN NATURAL
HISTORY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS (1994).
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ception, counter-deception, and self-deception under varying condi-
tions makes these behaviors particularly prominent among highly
social species.93 For example, many species with advanced coopera-
tive mechanisms-such as chimpanzees-manifest deception,
counter-deception, and a deeply emotional moralistic aggression.
The institutionalized ostracism of habitual cheaters may indeed evi-
dence the biological underpinnings of proto-legal systems.'
6. Homo sapiens sapiens
Of what relevance is all this to human behavior? A very great
deal. The theories summarized above are as robustly "factual" as
many other theories and things we commonly accept as true.95 The
general, evolutionary processes ordering the existence and persis-
tence of heritable traits, and their increasing or decreasing
prominence among successive populations, are not subject to signifi-
cant debate within the scientific community. Because all available
evidence indicates that these various evolutionary processes have af-
fected all species that ever lived, and because Homo sapiens sapiens
is descended from pre-existing species, it is currently at least clear
that these processes affected the physical form and behavior of hu-
man ancestors at some time.
The question, of course, is whether this historical influence of
evolutionary processes on human ancestors continues to affect mod-
em human behavior in significant ways. The overwhelming
probability is that it does. First, because evolutionary pressures have
long shaped the behavior of human ancestors, one should start from a
presumption (allowably rebuttable) that they still do. This is consis-
tent with the allocation in other areas of science of burdens of
persuasion, by use of presumptions, reflecting the logical-though of
course not infallible-power of parsimony. 6 The opposite presump-
93. Many believe that the selection pressures yielding the complex human brain are
more the result of an intra-species arms race over deception and counter-deception than
of other environmental conditions typically associated with survival. See, e.g., RIDLEY,
supra note 65, at 329-37.
94. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 14. For further background, see ALCOCK, supra note 16;
FUTUYMA, supra note 14; GOLDSMITH, supra note 16; TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH &
WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR
(forthcoming 1999); J.R. KREBS & N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL
ECOLOGY (3d ed. 1993); MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION (1993); TRIVERS, supra note 43.
96. See generally HEMPEL, supra note 14, at 40-45 (discussing parsimony); infra notes
305-07 and accompanying text (discussing, in more detail, presumptions and burdens of
persuasion). But see ELLIOTT SOBER, FROM A BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW: ESSAYS IN
EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY 136-57 (1994) (cautioning against overzealous application
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tion would necessarily be ahistorical, reasoning backwards from un-
connected and narrowly contemporary conjecture.'
Second, although individual humans can inject highly abstract
analysis into their behavior-governing processes, we continue to ob-
serve humans engaging in specific and non-random patterns of
behavior (in, for example, sexual jealousies, mate-guarding, violent
confrontation, status-seeking, and offspring-obsessions) that are en-
tirely consistent with patterns observable in many other species that
do not share our capacity for abstract analysis."
Third, no one has yet presented argument or evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption. We have encountered nothing at all
troubling in the fit between theory and data to supply the kind of
Kuhnian crisis necessary to require a conclusion that modem human
behavior is not influenced by natural selection. It would be thor-
oughly illogical to presume, for example, that what we call human
"mind" is incompatible with the existence of important, evolutionary
influences on human behavior."° Similarly, it would be wrong to pre-
sume either that there cannot be both proximate and ultimate causes
of human behavior or that the existence of maladaptive human be-
haviors somehow disproves evolutionary influences on behavioral
predispositions. Individuals of all species are more or less living fos-
sils-bearing the imprint not of the current environment, but rather
of the environment (technically the "environment of evolutionary
adaptation" or EEA) in which currently manifested, heritable traits
evolved-having proved adaptive over time.10' "Increasing fitness" is
of the principle of parsimony).
97. Moreover, for humans to establish a presumption that humans are, alone among
all species, exempt from evolutionary influences on behavior would appear suspiciously
anthropocentric (not to mention arrogant and narcissistic).
98. See, e.g., DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF
HUMAN MATING (1994); MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 187-219 (1988)
[hereinafter DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE]; HELEN E. FISHER, ANATOMY OF LOVE:
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MONOGAMY, ADULTERY, AND DIVORCE (1992); RIDLEY,
supra note 65; Douglas T. Kenrick, Bridging Social Psychology and Sociobiology: The
Case of Sexual Attraction, in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 5 (Robert W.
Bell & Nancy J. Bell eds., 1989). Many believe, in any event, that our highly developed
analytical abilities evolved as an adaptation that furthers the effectiveness of these be-
haviors. See supra note 93.
99. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
66-91 (2d ed. 1970) (elaborating the now well-known idea that some shifts in scientific
frameworks (paradigms) follow the perception of anomalies (crises)).
100. One could not, in any event, reason from the supposition that some important
human behaviors were not subject to evolutionary pressures to the conclusion that no
important human behaviors are so subject.
101. Rapid environmental changes can dramatically outpace a species' slow adapta-
tion. Thus, the fact that humans have completely (and almost instantaneously-in
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not in itself a conscious, psychological goal. Rather, psychological
processes, reflected in emotions and information-processing patterns,
evolved as means to the end of fitness in the social and material envi-
ronments of evolutionary adaptation. 2 Some of these remain
adaptive when social and material conditions change, and some do
not.
Fourth, a prevalent competing hypothesis, that all relevant hu-
man behavior is socially constructed, exhibits several glaring
weaknesses. 3 It is environmentally deterministic, for example, and is
therefore as incoherent as would be a genetically deterministic the-
ory. That hypothesis also requires a theory (to date unarticulated
and suspiciously bootstrapping) that could explain the process by
which a species could evolve beyond the influence of the processes
that shaped it. That, in turn, requires that one posit the improb-
able-a precise moment in history at which time either: a) a living
organism forever nullified the effects of its own genotype; or b) an
organism with evolved behavioral predispositions had an offspring
without behavioral predispositions.
Consequently, and with knowledge of evolutionary processes,
one may expect that humans would behave in many ways that they do
even without their higher reasoning capabilities. One may expect, for
example, that humans on average will devote extraordinary energy to
sex and child-rearing activities, will allocate attentions differently to
kin and non-kin, will exhibit sex differences in behavior, will exhibit
aggression in non-random patterns, will have psychological/emotional
reactions that would have furthered reproductive success during an
environment of evolutionary adaptation, will cooperate and defect
from cooperation in patterns consistent with game-theory, and so on.
And in fact, results of numerous experiments and studies in human
evolutionary time) altered the environments within which they live, says exactly nothing
about whether or not particular behaviors, even if maladaptive within those environ-
ments, remain influenced by past selection. We would not think to argue, for example,
that a predisposition toward sweet (and hence high-calorie) foods is not genetically influ-
enced merely because our nearly unlimited access to modem refined sugars make such
cravings arguably maladaptive. See Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Anti-Science and the
Pre-Darwinian Image of Mankind, 93 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 162, 163-64 (1991)
[hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Anti-Science]; Low, supra note 16, at 42-43. Moreover, there
will always be creatures that behave in maladaptive ways (through conscious choice or
otherwise). Natural selection does not prevent such things from occurring, it only pre-
vents them from becoming the norm for long periods of time.
102. See Daly & Wilson, Anti-Science, supra note 101, at 164.
103. For examples of additional critiques, see Lee Ellis, A Discipline in Peril: Sociol-
ogy's Future Hinges on Curing Its Biophobia, 27 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 21 (1996); John
Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED
MIND, supra note 1, at 19.
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psychology precisely track the predictions of evolutionary biology.14
C. Closing Remarks: Some Points to Take Away
The relevance for lawyers of any given detail from the foregoing
will vary according to the legal subdiscipline in which evolutionary
analysis is invoked. For example, evolutionary influences on patterns
of aggression will be more relevant to the criminal law, while influ-
ences on general patterns of sexuality will be more relevant to family
law. But acquiring a general understanding of the processes of evolu-
tion, and of their inherently economic pressures upon heritable
characteristics of living organisms, provides a necessary foundation
for understanding the many causes, both proximate and ultimate, of
human behavior.
For legal thinkers, the general evolutionary approach to under-
standing human psychology and behavior means several things. First,
it is pointless to think in terms of "nature versus nurture." Asking
whether a particular behavior is the product of nature (genetic influ-
ences) or of nurture (environmental influences) is like asking
whether the area of a field is determined by its length or by its
width.105 It is necessarily a product of both. Neither nature nor nur-
ture has any meaning, for any organism, except in concert with the
other. Consequently, behavior, including human behavior, simulta-
neously can have-and usually does have-both proximate
104. See Buss, supra note 98; HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR: A DARWINIAN
PERSPECTIVE (Laura Betzig et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE
BEHAVIOUR]; HUMAN SPERM COMPETITION: COPULATION, MASTURBATION, AND
INFIDELITY (R. Robin Baker & Mark A. Bellis eds., 1995); RIDLEY, supra note 65;
TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 395-420 (discussing, in part, Ruben C. Gur & Harold A.
Sackeim, Self-Deception: A Concept in Search of a Phenomenon, 37 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSYCHOL. 147, 147-69 (1979)); WRIGHT, supra note 1; Browne, Sex and Tempera-
ment, supra note 3; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Psychology and Family
Violence, in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 293
(Charles Crawford et al. eds., 1987); Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary
Biology, supra note 3, at 202-07 (reviewing evidence from humans consistent with Triv-
ers-Willard Hypothesis on differential treatment of male and female offspring); Low,
supra note 16; Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence:
The Young Male Syndrome, 6 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 59 (1985).
105. Since at least the 1950s, many have labored to expose the absurdity of the dichot-
omy. See, e.g., DONALD OLDING HEBB, A TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 195-96 (2d ed.
1966); Anne Anastasi, Heredity, Environment, and the Question "How?," 65 PSYCHOL.
REV. 197, 197 (1958); D.O. Hebb, Heredity and Environment in Mammalian Behaviour, 1
BRIT. J. OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 43, 43-47 (1953). Unfortunately, it persists. For cogent
attacks on its oversimplicity, see RIDLEY, supra note 65, at 175, 316-20 and Paul R.
Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton, Introduction: Nature, Nurture, and In-Between, in
SEXUAL NATURE, SEXUAL CULTURE 1 (Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton eds.,
1995) [hereinafter SEXUAL NATURE].
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(immediate) and ultimate (evolutionary) causes.
Second, combinations of genes may "predispose" without rigidly
"determining." It is precisely because evolutionary processes favored
behavioral plasticity that (with the exception of reflexes and the like)
genes do not determine our behavior as if we were "hard-wired" in-
evitably to respond to a certain stimulus with a single, corresponding
act.16 Instead, gene combinations can provide behavioral propensities
that simply affect the probability that an organism bearing them will
behave in some way. Stated differently: Evolutionary processes
leave all organisms with many predispositions to respond to envi-
ronmental stimuli in various fashions-but how strongly the
predispositions affect behavior can vary quite widely among species,
individuals, and circumstances)1
Third, some behavioral predispositions, including some buman
ones, are inherited according to definite rules. Because resources are
finite at the same time that populations can grow exponentially, the
relative proportions within a population of alternative inheritable
predispositions are inevitably governed by a process of natural selec-
tion. That process tends to favor over time those among
contemporaneously existing predispositions that more efficiently
translate resources into reproduction. That is, when different inher-
itable predispositions unequally influence the reproductive success of
the organisms bearing them (including the reproduction of genetic
relatives), those predispositions tending to increase it by the greatest
amount will tend to appear in increasing proportions of successive
populations. Over many generations, alternative predispositions will
tend to dwindle and disappear.
Fourth, the economic nature of such competition tends to yield
heritable predispositions toward condition-dependent patterns of co-
operation and conflict, as well as toward condition-dependent
106. Relatively unambiguous stimuli (like the arrival of food in the stomach or the
rapid heating of skin) prompt automatic behavioral responses (like digestion or recoil)
that free an organism to attend to other things. At the same time, even the most simple
evaluative processes provide a distinct advantage over automatic responses when com-
plex situations (such as an arrival at water) are encountered. Recognizing subtle and
multiple differences in context then can divide beneficial responses (such as attempting to
swim a pond) from disastrous ones (such as attempting to swim an ocean). The species-
typical analytic abilities of our human brains evolved as surely as did the cranial capacity
of the skull that shields them.
107. Moreover, the influence of genes on behavior, though often manifest, is rarely
quantifiable with precision, like force, mass, or energy. Because there is no single gene
"for" any complex human behavior, even the presence of genes that increase the likeli-
hood of a behavior never guarantees that it will or will not occur. There is no more a
single gene for "altruism," for example, than there is for a hand or face.
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deception, self-deception, and counter-deception. At any given time,
most organisms within a species will share certain evolved psycho-
logical mechanisms (with predictable variations as a function of such
things as age and sex) that will predispose it toward behaviors that
were, on average, adaptive for similarly situated organisms during the
environment of evolutionary adaptation.
What all of this means for a legal system charged with governing
human behavior is the subject of the next Part.
II. EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS IN LAW: A MODEL, AND ITS
APPLICATION TO CHILD ABUSE
Learning more about modem evolutionary biology may help
clarify why the discipline is inescapably relevant to the enterprise of
law, but that will not alone show how. Consequently, this Part pro-
poses a model for usefully employing evolutionary analysis in the
pursuit of pre-articulated legal goals."0 8 This Part is divided into four
sections (see Figure 1) corresponding to the four stages of the model:
A. The Identification Stage
B. The Information Stage
C. The Integration Stage
D. The Application Stage
In brief, The Identification Stage frames the subject to analyze. It
108. There are at least two different approaches to such analysis. In the first, one
looks to biology for insight regarding pre-identified law-relevant behavior. In the second,
one learns of new developments in biology and subsequently considers aspects of law that
might be affected. For example, new findings in biology will sometimes suggest reevalua-
tion of assumptions that underlie the law's approach to common controversies. See, e.g.,
Browne, Sex and Temperament, supra note 3 (arguing that the evidence for sex differ-
ences in evolved psychology undercuts policies predicated on the assumption that there
are no differences between the sexes in evolved behavioral predispositions). Recent
theoretical and empirical work, for example, strongly suggests that genes can and do in-
fluence the sexual orientation of many non-human and human animals. See, e.g., DEAN
HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR THE GAY
GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR (1994); SIMON LEVAY, THE SEXUAL BRAIN
(1993); Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome
and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 ScI. 321 (1993); Simon LeVay & Dean H. Hamer, Evi-
dence for a Biological Influence in Male Homosexuality, SCI. AM., Feb. 1994, at 44;
Angela M.L. Pattatucci & Dean H. Hamer, The Genetics of Sexual Orientation: From
Fruit Flies to Humans, in SEXUAL NATURE, supra note 105, at 154. This recommends
reevaluation of those legal policies and doctrines that may be grounded in the theory that
sexual orientation is determined solely by environmental factors or by choice. Because
few legal academics read biology journals regularly, however, the model below is de-
signed principally for the first approach.
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clarifies one's legal goal with respect to a law-relevant aspect of hu-
man behavior and assesses the likelihood that evolutionary analysis
can aid pursuit of that goal. The Infonnation Stage uncovers and or-
ganizes new information on the multiple causes of the defined
behavior. It describes how one can explore evolutionary theories,
examine the evidence bearing on their falsifiable predictions, assess
the fit between theory and evidence, evaluate robust theories' appli-
cability in the human context, and decide whether to include any
specific evolutionary theory in the decision-making processes by
which law pursues the pre-determined goal. For those evolutionary
theories worthy of such inclusion, The Integration Stage describes
how to expose true conflicts between evolutionary and prevailing
theories and how to integrate the best parts of each in furtherance of
a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the behavior.
The Application Stage then applies the information generated by the
previous stages to effect concrete improvements in the legal system.
It describes how one can refine behavioral models underlying law's
treatment of the behavior, generate new legal strategies for pursuing
pre-articulated legal goals, improve the cost-benefit analyses that of-
ten drive various legal policies, and provide new directions for future
research initiatives.
The advantage of this model, which partly parallels the scientific
method of evaluating multiple causal hypotheses, is that it provides
sufficient methodological guidance that anyone with the interest
could apply evolutionary analysis to contemporary legal issues. The
remainder of this Article explores this model in detail and shows, for
each step of the analysis, a practical application of the model-in this
case, to aspects of the problems raised by child abuse.
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FIGURE 1: Evolutionary Analysis in Law: A Model
I. THE IDENTIFICATION STAGE: ON PURPOSE AND PROCESS
A. What is the Legal Goal?
B. Will Evolutionary Analysis Further Pursuit of That Goal?
1. What Are the Prevailing Theories?
2. Is the Failure to Achieve the Goal Solely Attributable to
Inadequate Implementation of Adequate Theories?
3. Are the Prevailing Theories Already Informed by the Influence
of Natural Selection on Behavior?
4. How Greatly Might the Behavior in Question Have Affected the
Reproductive Success of Our Ancestors?
II. THE INFORMATION STAGE: ON THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
A. What Are the Relevant Evolutionary Theories and Predictions?
B. What Empirical Evidence Bears on Those Predictions?
C. How Does the Evidence Fit the Predictions?
D. Do the Theories Apply to Humans?
E. Should the Theories Be Considered in Legal Analysis and Policy-
Making?
II. THE INTEGRATION STAGE: ON CONFLICTS AND COMPATIBILITIES
A. Where Do Prevailing and Evolutionary Theories Conflict?
1. Conflicts Between Theoretical Substructures
a. Levels of Analysis
b. Basic Assumptions
2. Conflicts Between Predictions
B. How May Non-Conflicting Elements Be Integrated?
IV. THE APPLICATION STAGE: ON UTILITY
A. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help to Refine Behavioral Models?
1. Emphasizing Both Proximate and Ultimate Causation
2. Revealing New Associated Environmental Factors ("AEFs")
3. Restating Prior AEFs More Precisely
4. Predicting Interactions of AEFs
B. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help to Generate New Legal
Strategies?
1. New Strategies for Newly Identified AEFs
C. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help to Improve Cost-Benefit
Analyses?
1. Identifying Policy Conflicts
2. Clarifying Costs of Conflicts
D. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help to Reveal Promising Directions
for Future Research?
1. New Ways to Collect and Slice Data
2. Further Study of Multiple Evolutionary Theories
3. Further Research to Test Conflicting Predictions
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A. The Identification Stage
The first stage of the model, The Identification Stage, is straight-
forward and preparatory. Its purpose is to answer two questions: 1)
What is the legal goal?; and 2) Will evolutionary analysis further pur-
suit of that goal?
1. What Is the Legal Goal?
There are many different ways to identify a legal goal."0 9 Re-
gardless of the route taken, however, it is important at the outset of
most evolutionary analysis in law to define a legal goal in terms of
specific human behaviors, the incidence of which law is asked to in-
crease or decrease."' Employing this approach, for example, reveals
drunk driving as an impediment to society's quest for reasonably safe
highways, and clarifies how child abuse obstructs efforts to secure
unimpeded child health. Successfully framing a legal goal in a fash-
ion conducive to later evolutionary analysis simply requires that one
specify a preference for law's relationship with or general orientation
toward the defined behavior. Thus, for example, law should specifi-
cally help to reduce drunk driving or to reduce child abuse (though
not, of course, at any cost).,1 I
109. For some people, legal goals spring spontaneously to mind. "Reducing drunk
driving" or "reducing child abuse" are examples. For other people, legal goals are only
remote subsets of larger areas of concern, discoverable through a winnowing process that
moves hierarchically from issue to objective to physical and social conditions to goals.
People tending to think in this way, for example, may initially be concerned about entire
issues, such as "public safety" or "child welfare," each of which may have many possible
legal dimensions. And within those issues, they could state multiple normative objectives
worth society's pursuit, such as "secure homes" and "safe highways," on one hand, or
"adequate schooling" and "healthy children," on the other. These objectives, in turn,
impliedly divide observable environmental conditions, such as prevalent social behaviors,
according to their consistency or inconsistency with those objectives. And this process
leads logically to legal goals that reflect a shared sense of what law should do about the
incidence of those conditions. Policymakers are then charged with selecting and imple-
menting legal strategies to pursue those goals.
110. It is theoretically possible to define the behavior in terms of the psychological
states typically associated with it. For example, if one is interested in reducing the inci-
dence of excessive speeding, one might define the goal in terms of decreasing the
incidence of the psychological discounting of the probability that one will receive or inflict
injury as a consequence of speeding. On common errors in assessing probabilities, for
example, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1991).
111. Legal goals can be equivalently worded in the affirmative or negative. "Reducing
drunk driving" is a flip side to "increasing the incidence of careful and responsible driv-
ing." In addition, sensitivity to various economic considerations, such as the opportunity
cost of all investment efforts, might recommend framing the goal more explicitly in cost-
benefit terms. For example: To minimize the sum of both the costs of child abuse and the
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Although any number of goals might usefully serve, let us dem-
onstrate this aspect of the model by designating "the reduction of
child abuse" as our legal goal."' The many legal regimes that address
child abuse, as well as the media's daily attention to the subject, al-
ready reflect widespread public concern."' Although attempts to
costs of measures to prevent child abuse.
112. Although child abuse encompasses an enormous range of acts, both of commis-
sion and omission, it should be understood that the term, as used here, will primarily refer
to non-sexual physical abuse or proscribed neglect by genetic parents or parent substi-
tutes, such as stepparents. Child abuse yields no universally accepted definition, in part,
because of ambiguities inherent in such terms as "severe" and "chronic." Because en-
suring a child's welfare requires adequate and safe gestation, birth, physical growth,
emotional growth, and education, however, we generally categorize as "child abuse" any
human behavior that substantially impedes or harms a child during any of these develop-
mental stages. These include, for example, physical battering, physical endangerment,
physical neglect, medical neglect, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, emotional abuse,
developmental neglect, improper ethical supervision, educational neglect, and abandon-
ment. See Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to
Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 589 app.
(1985); see also David Finkelhor & Jill Korbin, Child Abuse as an International Issue, 12
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 3, 4 (1988) (defining child abuse as "the portion of harm to
children that results from human action that' is proscribed, proximate, and preventable"
(emphasis omitted)). Some researchers subdivide maltreatment into acts of commission
(abuse) and omission (neglect), while others categorize maltreatment with reference to
presence or absence of perpetrator intent or to violation of cultural norms. See PANEL
ON RESEARCH ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 4-5, 57-72 (1993) (summarizing the vari-
ety of definitions) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT]; Richard
J. Gelles, Problems in Defining and Labeling Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE PREDICTION:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1, 1-29 (R.H. Starr ed., 1982) (noting how definition varies by
profession); see generally OLIVER C.J. TzENG ET AL., THEORIES OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: DIFFERENTIAL PERSPECTIVES, SUMMARIES, AND EVALUATIONS 7-8 (1991)
(explaining definitional approaches) [hereinafter TZENG ET AL., THEORIES OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT] and sources cited therein. The federal government uses different
definitions in different contexts, and definitions also vary from state to state in both public
and private arenas and in professional disciplines. See Robert T. Ammerman & Michel
Hersen, Research in Child Abuse and Neglect Current Status and an Agenda for the Fu-
ture [hereinafter Ammerman & Hersen, Research in Child Abuse and Neglect], in
CHILDREN AT RISK: AN EVALUATION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 3, 6 (Robert T. Ammerman & Michel Hersen eds., 1990) [hereinafter
CHILDREN AT RISK]; TZENG ET AL., THEORIES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra,
at 7. Although child sexual abuse is not less susceptible of evolutionary analysis, it is sus-
ceptible of a different evolutionary analysis than the examples used below.
113. Although adults have abused children throughout history, see Ruth E. Holland,
Children in Peri" Historical Background, in SOURCEBOOK FOR CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: INTERVENTION, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION THROUGH CRISIS
PROGRAMS 39, 39-52 (Oliver C.S. Tzeng & Jamie Jasper Jacobsen eds., 1988), child mal-
treatment was not a subject of serious study until the 1960s, when an article by several
pediatricians introduced the term "battered child syndrome." C.H. Kempe et al., The
Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 105 (1962). Congress subsequently passed the first
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974, and amended it several times
through 1994. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88
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measure the significance of the problem vary by year and methodol-
ogy, in 1989 alone there were at least 160,000 reported incidents of
abuse leading to the death or serious injury of a child,1 4 as well as
more than two million additional reports of significant child mal-
treatment.
115
There are at least two reasons why the legal goal should be ar-
ticulated this early in evolutionary analysis. First, analysis rarely fails
to benefit from the guidance of a pervasive, focused sense of purpose.
Second, and even more important, the early association of a specific
goal with a behavior minimizes the extent to which subsequent analy-
sis could, even unintendedly, encroach upon the normative functions
properly reserved to other political processes. Critics of those who
invoke biology as policy-relevant, for example, almost reflexively fear
Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-05 (1994)). The Act established a pro-
gram to guide and consolidate national and state data collection efforts, conduct national
surveys concerning household violence, and sponsor research to identify, prevent, and
treat child abuse and neglect. See id.; see also DONALD T. KRAMER, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN §§ 16.01-.33 (2d ed. 1994) (providing overview of legal aspects of child abuse
prevention programs). The 1988 Amendments established the U.S. Advisory Board on
Child Abuse and Neglect. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No.
100-294, 102 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5102). An example of such
data collection appears in NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION RE-
SEARCH, NATIONAL COMM'N FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE, CURRENT TRENDS IN
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES: THE RESULTS OF THE 1995 ANNUAL
FIFTY STATE SURVEY (1996) [hereinafter CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE RE-
PORTING AND FATALITIES].
114. See INGER J. SAGATUN & LEONARD P. EDWARDS, CHILD ABUSE AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 4-6 (1995); see also NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION
RESEARCH, NATIONAL COMM. FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE, CURRENT TRENDS
IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES: THE RESULTS OF THE 1990 ANNUAL
FIFTY STATE SURVEY (1991) [hereinafter 1990 SURVEY] (summarizing recent findings).
115. See UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 38,78-85.
Although reporting statistics provide only a loose estimate of actual incidence, research-
ers generally agree that reported cases represent only the "tip of the child abuse iceberg"
(because not all abuse is reported and not all reports are substantiated). Raymond H.
Starr, Jr. et al., The Epidemiology of Child Maltreatment, in CHILDREN AT RISK, supra
note 112, at 23, 29; accord MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS:
VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 6 (1980). A 1995 Gallup Poll suggests that the
actual number of children physically abused each year may exceed three million-more
than 16 times the number officially reported to the National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect. See Tamar Levin, Parent Poll Shows Higher Incidence of Child Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1995, at B16.
The General Accounting Office estimated in 1991 that, excluding the expenses of
agencies charged with detecting child abuse, the cost of services for abused children, in-
cluding medical care, family counseling, foster care, and specialized education, currently
exceeds five hundred million dollars annually. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION: STATUS OF THE CHALLENGE GRANT PROGRAM 1 (1991).
And according to more recent reports, the federal government alone now contributes four
billion dollars a year to state child protection services. See Robert Pear, Many States Fail
to Meet Mandates on Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at Al.
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(and not entirely without reason) the kind of encroachment into
norm-formulation made famous by the Social Darwinists of the 1870s
and 1880s who had reasoned: What is, in nature, ought to be.116 Be-
cause such illegitimate blending of descriptive and normative
processes is possible (though not inevitable), securing a pre-
articulated goal this early may both vindicate and alleviate critics'
concerns that an amoral biology will supply any normative goal to
legal policymaking.1 7 An early goal provides some assurance that
one will not later let the tail wag the dog-by perhaps reaching the
absurd result that "other animals, too, abuse their offspring and
therefore child abuse is allowable."
2. Will Evolutionary Analysis Further Pursuit of That Goal?
With goal in hand, we must assess whether a full and rigorous
evolutionary analysis will be worth the effort. That is: Will evolu-
tionary analysis further pursuit of the specified goal? Answering this
larger question requires, in sequence, that one briefly answer four
subordinate queries: a) What are the prevailing theories?; b) Is the
failure to achieve the goal solely attributable to inadequate imple-
mentation of adequate theories?; c) Are the prevailing theories
already informed by the influence of natural selection on behavior?;
and d) How greatly might the behavior in question have affected the
reproductive success of our ancestors?
116. See, e.g., SOCIAL DARWINISM: SELECTED ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM
SUMNER (1963). On Social Darwinism generally, see HOFSTADTER, supra note 47. For
an example of reaction (now dated) to sociobiological thinking that reflects important
concerns regarding potential misuses of biology, see MARSHALL SAHLINS, THE USE AND
ABUSE OF BIOLOGY: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF SOCIOBIOLOGY (1976).
117. Many have argued that one commits the "naturalistic fallacy" whenever con-
tending that a description from biology (an "is") can alone imply a normative conclusion
in law (an "ought to be"). See, e.g., DAVID A. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (making famous, in the origi-
nal 1888 edition, the "no is to ought" formulation); G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 62,
89-110 (Thomas Baldwin ed., 2d ed. 1993) (coining "naturalistic fallacy" and using Social
Darwinist Herbert Spencer as an example); see also JAMES RACHELS, CREATED FROM
ANIMALS: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF DARWINISM 62-79 (1990) (discussing the
naturalistic fallacy). But see LEWIS PETRINOVICH, HUMAN EVOLUTION, REPRO-
DUCTION AND MORALITY 23-42 (1995) (arguing "is" importantly influences, without
itself determining, "ought"); MICHAEL RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY: A
NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY 207-72 (1986) (arguing that Darwinian the-
ory has some utility in enriching our understanding of morality); Strahlendorf,
Evolutionary Jurisprudence, supra note 3 (thoughtfully probing potential normative im-
plications of natural selection); Peter Strahlendorf, An Evolutionary Theory of the Good
Is the Mind Designed to Sense Fundamental Categories of the Good?, 1 RECHT UND
VERHALTEN 249 (1994) (same).
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a. What Are the Prevailing Theories?
This first step in assessing the potential utility of evolutionary
analysis in law requires one to identify prevailing theories that pur-
port to explain the behavior that impedes access to the legal goal.
One cannot logically expect to influence the incidence of a behavior
without a working theory of the sorts of things that affect it; evolu-
tionary analysis will prove useful only if it holds some promise to
provide something that existing theories cannot.
Because this aspect of The Information Stage requires only a
preliminary determination of whether or not to expend further ef-
forts in evolutionary analysis, it is unnecessary to detail or canvass
exhaustively every existing theory on the behavior. It is instead suffi-
cient to establish a general frame of reference by identifying and
describing the prevailing theories' larger features, common thematic
underpinnings, and general orientations toward the behavior under
study. A prevailing theory might, for example, locate the primary
causes of a given, law-relevant behavior in childhood trauma, drug
abuse, insufficiently developed social skills, economic stratification,
racial tensions, personality disorders, and the like, or in some com-
plex interplay of these.
In the context of child abuse, for example, the dozens of separate
theories that purport to explain its incidence sort loosely into four
models:
" The Psychopathology Model blames child abuse on parental
psychiatric disturbance or mental illness (such as sadism). It
suggests that child abuse is but one manifestation of parental
psychodynamic dysfunction or personality disorder, in which
a parent's unmet emotional needs and expectations yield ei-
ther impulsive aggressiveness or an inability to care properly
for a child.
• The Social-Cultural Model emphasizes the contributions of
social and cultural forces (such as economic hardship or cul-
turally permissible physical punishment). It suggests that
child abuse results when sociodemographic stressors meet
abuse-permissive cultural, community, and family socializa-
tion.
* The Social-Interactional Model scrutinizes each abusive par-
ent-child relationship in its dynamic social context. Process-
oriented, it suggests that child abuse is a function of interplay
between the unique characteristics of parent and child,
against a background that includes past and present events
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that each experiences.
* The Transitional Model builds upon these others, but places
greater emphasis on the very gradual process by which fac-
tors contributing to the likelihood of abuse develop
("transition") into an abusive situation. It suggests that child
abuse can result when "destabilizing factors" initiate a multi-
stage process in which child abuse follows from reduced
stress-tolerance and mishandled provocations.'
These prevailing theories are quite well-developed and distinct."9
They reflect the extraordinary diligence of many scholars and practi-
tioners deeply committed to understanding and reducing child abuse.
Despite the apparent differences among them, however, they do illus-
trate several of the many kinds of foundational commonalities and
thematic underpinnings that may usefully be noted, when present,
among prevailing theories.
First, for example, these prevailing theories are all skewed pow-
erfully toward the present tense, focusing on a very narrow slice of
our species' behavioral history. They generally reflect an implicit as-
sumption that anything that happened before the birth of an
individual (or of her parents) is irrelevant to understanding abusive
behavior. Those that do glance back in time, as to the emergence of
social mores or familially linked psychopathologies, typically probe
no deeper than a few generations back. Second, the theories are
strongly slanted toward individual persons, individual environments,
and even individual countries, typically presupposing that the be-
havior of an abusive individual can be best understood by studying
118. See DAVID A. WOLFE, CHILD ABUSE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD DEVEL-
OPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 44-68 (1987); Robert T. Ammerman, Predisposing
Child Factors, in CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 112, at 199, 199-202. The first three of
these models are the most traditional. For greater detail, see TZENG ET AL., THEORIES
OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 10-200 (grouping 46 separate theo-
retical viewpoints into nine paradigms, describing individual theories, summarizing
different theoretical views, and evaluating the current status of child abuse theories);
Robert T. Ammerman & Michel Hersen, Research in Child Abuse and Neglect: Current
Status and an Agenda for the Future, in CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 112, at 3
(summarizing the history of research on child maltreatment).
119. These four categories can hardly capture the full sophistication of and variation
among all the theories of child abuse. Nonetheless, it seems clear that other non-
evolutionary theories are sufficiently similar to the prevailing theories here overviewed to
be treated similarly in discussions that follow. See, e.g., TZENG ET AL., THEORIES OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 11; Jay Belsky, Child Maltreatment! An
Ecological Integration, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 320, 320-32 (1980); Robert Fiala & Gary La
Free, Cross-National Determinants of Child Homicide, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 432, 433-35
(1988) (dividing factors that contribute to child abuse into: 1) economic stress; 2) social
disorganization; 3) culture of violence; and 4) social isolation and surveillance).
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only the characteristics, experiences, and social environments of that
individual. They therefore fail to inquire into species-wide behavior
and thereby often amplify, even if unintendedly, the importance of
individual psyches over naturally selected behavioral predicates.
Third, the prevailing theories are biased by an anthropocentric spe-
cies isolationism, as reflected in the absence of any meaningful
consideration of "abusive" behavior in other creatures. And fourth,
the theories presuppose that, in the absence of genetic pathology or
defect, naturally selected genes have no palpable influence on the
behavior of individuals; abusive behavior is socially constructed.
These are precisely the kinds of commonalities, which might at
first seem to be trivial truths, that will be critical to an understanding
of how evolutionary analysis can improve a legal system. While they
do not render the theories incorrect or unhelpful, they do suggest an
overemphasis on immediate causes at the expense of concurrent and
equally significant evolutionary causes.
b. Is the Failure to Achieve the Goal Solely Attributable to
Inadequate Implementation of Adequate Theories?
One asks this question to preclude an unexamined assumption
that the prevailing theories are necessarily inadequate. An unmet
goal can be the result of two separate phenomena, or a combination
of both: 1) inadequate theories (including an absence of any theory)
on what causes the behavior; and 2) inadequate implementation of
adequate theories. It is possible that prevailing theories perfectly
predict the behavior, even though the means to effect change with
that knowledge escapes us.
Is the failure to reduce child abuse solely attributable to inade-
quate implementation of adequate theories? Probably not.'
Behavioral theories, at least those concerning humans, rarely predict
behavior so consistently as to preclude improvement. Reports of
physical abuse doubled between 1980 and 1990,"' despite the blos-
soming of several dozens of theories on the causes of maltreatment
and the proliferation of counteractive programs. Indeed, researchers
120. The U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect refers to child maltreat-
ment as "epidemic," requiring a critical national emergency response. See
UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 42. It is generally
agreed that "existing models are inadequate." E.g., Roy C. Herrenkohl, Research Direc-
tions Related to Child Abuse and Neglect, in CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 112, at 85, 91.
121. See TZENG ET AL., THEORIES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112,
at 5. Although the doubling of reports may provide little reliable evidence of the actual
rate of abuse, it at least indicates that child abuse has not disappeared.
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conclude that the prevalence of child abuse has increased signifi-
cantly in recent years.'" Although existing theories also may be
inadequately implemented, warranting our constant and close atten-
tion, the continued prevalence of child abuse in the face of
widespread efforts to curtail it strongly suggests that these theories
can be improved."'
c. Are the Prevailing Theories Already Informed by the
Influence of Natural Selection on Behavior?
An affirmative answer to this question, though not precluding
further refinement of theory, suggests there may be less potential in
evolutionary analysis than when prevailing theories reflect no recog-
nition of behavioral evolution. Because evolutionary analysis has
only recently begun to illuminate human behavioral models in a sys-
tematic fashion,24 however, this question will generally be answered
in the negative for the near future.
The prevailing theories on child abuse, for example, if anything,
reflect an environmental determinism in which nearly all abusive be-
havior (with the possible exception of genetically influenced mental
illness) is the result of post-birth, directly experienced, social and cul-
tural phenomena."' A recent book devoting 300 pages to factors that
contribute to child abuse, for example, neither mentions nor reflects
recognition of evolutionary influences on human behavior.Y Fur-
122. See, e.g., id. at xv.
123. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at v-vi:
[D]aunting obstacles inhibit the scientific study of this topic: the nature of the
subject itself is emotionally overwhelming, the field lacks consistent definitions
and valid instrumentation, data collection efforts are cumbersome and often un-
reliable, and the presence of multiple cofactors in the study populations-
including poverty, violence, and other forms of victimization-makes it exceed-
ingly difficult to isolate key factors.
124. See, e.g., THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note 1; JEROME H. BARKOW, DARWIN,
SEX, AND STATUS: BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO MIND AND CULTURE (1991); DALY &
WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 98.
125. See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 118, at 24 ("Child-rearing practices are influenced by
numerous cultural and situational factors that determine the level of conflict or coopera-
tion in the emerging parent-child relationship ... [and] families become socialized into
abusive patterns of child treatment."). Various causal models propose that child abuse is
primarily a function of personality disorders, having been abused oneself, disruptions in
parent-child attachment, inappropriate parental expectations, frustration due to stress,
inadequate social supports, child temperamental or behavioral deviance, and the
"sociocultural milieu." See, e.g., Herrenkohl, supra note 120, at 89-92; Joan I. Vondra,
Sociological and Ecological Factors, in CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 112, at 149, 150,
162-63.
126. See CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 112. There are notable exceptions. See, e.g.,
DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT
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thermore, a 1993 summary of the last three decades of child abuse
research observed that modem models have advanced from single-
factor explanations to "multicausal interactive models, which empha-
size the importance of the sociocultural context of child
maltreatment.""i The conspicuous absence from the prevailing theo-
ries of any mention of human evolution, or of evolved behavioral
predispositions of any kind, reflects a passive and unexamined as-
sumption that, absent genetic defects, human behavior simply is not
significantly influenced by the cumulated effects of natural selection
on our species." Indeed, the 1993 report of the National Research
Council's Panel on Research on Child Abuse and Neglect illustrated
the pervasiveness of this assumption when listing only "medicine
(especially pediatrics and psychiatry), psychology, social work, crimi-
nal justice, law, sociology, public health, nursing, anthropology,
demography, statistics, and education" as the "disciplines and subject
areas [that] contribute[] to studies of child maltreatment.""2 9
FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND
SOCIETY 70-73, 165-73 (1996); Richard J. Gelles & John W. Harrop, The Risk of Abusive
Violence Among Children with Nongenetic Caretakers, 40 FAM. REL. 78, 78-83 (1991)
(squarely confronting biosocial theories); Michael T. McGuire & Richard Gelles, Family
Violence, Evolutionary Biology, and the Law in GEWALT IN DER KLEINGRUPPE UND DAS
RECHT, 3 FESTSCHRIFT MARTIN USTERI, SCHRIFTEN ZUR RECHTSPSYCHOLOGIE, at 1
(forthcoming 1997); David Popenoe, The Evolution of Marriage and the Problem of Step-
families: A Biosocial Perspective, in STEPFAMILIES: WHO BENEFITS? WHO DOES NOT?
3 (Alan Booth & Judy Dunn eds., 1994) [hereinafter STEPFAMILIES].
127. UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 107
(emphasis added); see also id. at vi, 7-10 (discussing the progress in research and devel-
opment of etiological models).
128. See, e.g., id. at 54 ("Although the pathogenic model remains popular among the
general public in explaining the sources of child maltreatment.... [r]esearch investigators
now recognize that individual behaviors are often influenced by factors within the family,
community, and society as a whole.").
129. Id. at 23; see also Vondra, supra note 125, at 149-50 (suggesting interdisciplinary
child abuse work draws only on sociology, developmental psychology, clinical psychology,
and the "family disciplines"). The panel was created at the request of the Commissioner
of the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families (ACYF) of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services. Its mission was to "[r]eview and assess research on child
abuse and neglect, encompassing work funded by ACYF and other known sources under
public and private auspices; [ildentify research that provides knowledge relevant to the
field, and [r]ecommend research priorities for the next decade." UNDERSTANDING
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 3. Most notably, the final product men-
tions and dismisses possible evolutionary influences in a single paragraph-which
evidences a jaw-dropping misunderstanding of even the simplest tenets of evolutionary
theory. See ia. at 122 (grossly mischaracterizing current evolutionary theory as concerned
with genetic factors that "enhance the chances of survival of the species").
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d. How Greatly Might the Behavior in Question Have
Affected the Reproductive Success of Our Ancestors?
This fifth and final question is the most important. The extent to
which an evolutionary perspective will be useful in regulating a be-
havior will vary as a function of the extent to which consequences of
that behavior, as well as of alternative behaviors, bore on individual
reproductive success in deep ancestral environments."3 Greater ef-
fects suggest greater utility. For even though all behaviors are played
through bodies and brains natural selection has helped to shape, not
all behaviors are susceptible of truly useful evolutionary analysis.
Estimating those effects requires a thorough understanding of the
details, themes, and theories set forth above in Part I.
To what extent, for example, might child abuse have affected the
reproductive success of our ancestors? A great deal. Generating off-
spring and contributing toward their eventual reproduction represent
the essence of the process by which genes in humans replicate them-
selves. Because Homo sapiens sapiens is a species that has long
exhibited a reproductive strategy requiring high parental care, the
rearing of offspring is absolutely central to the offspring's success in
the gene-replication process. Activities that affect offspring-rearing,
such as neglecting, abusing, or killing an offspring, are therefore
paradigmatic issues on which an evolutionary analysis could probably
provide great insight. Under the incessant pressure of natural se-
lection, these activities are unlikely to have had a neutral effect on
reproductive success. Consequently, the absence of any meaningful
evolutionary backdrop to prevailing theories on the causes of child
abuse, as well as the likelihood that abusive behavior would power-
fully affect reproductive success, makes the goal of reducing child
abuse an exemplar of one that justifies further evolutionary analysis.
130. A more precise, though more cumbersome way of phrasing the question is: To
what extent might a genetically heritable psychological mechanism that increased the
probability of the defined behavior during the environment of evolutionary adaptation
have contributed to the reproductive success of its bearer more than contemporaneously
existing alternative psychological mechanisms?
131. Depending on how the behavior has been defined, estimating its likely effect on
ancestral reproductive success may require further specificity. For example, it is far eas-
ier to estimate the effects of "risk-taking" behavior by ancestors than of their "driving too
fast." When such a circumstance obtains, it may be necessary to redefine the behavior,
breaking it down into more basic elements that are more easily susceptible of evolution-
ary analysis-elements that are more generalizable constituents of the behavior as
originally framed.
132. Other paradigmatic issues include those invoking human sexuality, courtship,
cooperation, aggression, and the like.
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3. Summary
In sum, this Identification Stage provides an outline for beginning
evolutionary analysis in law. Asking "What is your legal goal?" helps
to shape an inquiry by defining terms and clarifying purposes. Ask-
ing "Will evolutionary analysis further pursuit of that goal?" prompts
a careful assessment of whether to undertake that analysis in the first
place. To demonstrate how these questions might be answered in a
specific context, this section introduced an example concerning the
legal goal of reducing child abuse, and concluded that continued
evolutionary analysis was indeed likely to aid that effort. As it did in
this first stage, the child abuse example will continue to illustrate the
explanations of each successive stage of the model for evolutionary
analysis in law.
B. The Information Stage
When evolutionary analysis shows some promise of utility, one
must identify specific evolutionary theories that purport to illuminate
the "ultimate" (rather than simply "proximate"') influences on the
defined behavior and then assess each theory's merit. Scientific
method measures the merit of each theory by straining the falsifiable
predictions it generates with the weight of empirical evidence. Be-
cause robust theories bear that strain, the second stage of the
proposed model of evolutionary analysis, The Information Stage, will
consist of five subordinate questions: 1) What are the relevant evolu-
tionary theories and predictions?; 2) What empirical evidence bears
on those predictions?; 3) How does the evidence fit the predictions?;
4) Do the theories apply to humans?; and 5) Should the theories be
considered in legal analysis and policy-making?
This section explains the methodological basis for each of these
questions. By tracing a sample problem from child abuse through
each question in succession, this section also demonstrates how evo-
lutionary theory can, in ways relevant to law, both reveal and make
sense of surprising patterns in human behavior, such as child-killing.
The third question, involving empirical evidence, is the most fact in-
tensive to demonstrate, and will require somewhat lengthier
examination below than will the other questions.
133. These terms of art, used differently in biological than in legal contexts, are ex-
plained supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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1. What Are the Relevant Evolutionary Theories and Predictions?
In its largest sense, "evolutionary theory" is a general level the-
ory that explains the existence and persistence of organism
characteristics as the result of natural selection.TM Like many such
metatheories, its logic begets mid-level theories or operational prin-
ciples, like those of "sexual selection," "parental investment," and
"competition for resources," that address entire domains of organis-
mic functioning. These in turn beget more specific theories (or
"hypotheses") that purport to explain increasingly specific patterns of
behavior. While there is no absolute limit to the taxonomy of sub-
theories and sub-sub-theories, one eventually reaches a workably
specific theory that generates extremely narrow predictions of what
should be testable and observable if that theory is robust.'35 The first
step of The Information Stage entails examining those subtheories of
evolutionary theory that may illuminate ultimate causes of the be-
havior under study.
Because there can be multiple evolutionary influences on be-
haviors (such as aggression, for example), this step of The
Information Stage ordinarily will require first identifying and under-
standing the broad evolutionary and thematic contexts in which the
behavior operates. It subsequently will entail the particularized ap-
plication of specific evolutionary theories to the behavior itself. This,
in turn, may involve research into the vast stores of evolutionary
knowledge and theoretical work currently under development in
evolutionary psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and the like, as
well as deriving new theories from the basic principles of evolution-
ary biology, undertaking new empirical research, or both.'36
Because a theory is only as valuable as the accuracy of the pre-
dictions it generates, this step of The Information Stage will also
134. See Buss, supra note 1, at 2-4.
135. So that it may be clear, this is the layer of theories, where specific predictions are
generated, to which this Article henceforth refers when it speaks of "evolutionary theo-
ries" or "specific evolutionary theories" (except where context may otherwise require).
136. At this point, research might again suggest that the behavior as it was originally
framed for study in the Identification Stage may usefully be divided into logically separa-
ble subunits, and the subsequent analysis may be refocused accordingly. The analysis of
aggressive male behavior, for example, might usefully be separated into that concerning
aggression toward other males and that concerning aggression toward females, because
research and theory suggests these phenomena have different explanations. See, e.g.,
Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Psychology of Male Violence, in MALE
VIOLENCE 253, 268-69 (John Archer ed., 1994) (contrasting male-male violence with
male-female violence); Barbara Smuts, Male Aggression Against Women: An Evolution-
ary Perspective, 3 HUM. NATURE 1 (1992) (discussing male-female aggression among
primates).
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require, following study of each theory, the enumeration of specific,
narrow, and falsifiable predictions of the non-random patterns of
human behavior that should be obvious in the evidence if a given
theory (or hypothesis) is a good one.
a. The Evolutionary Theories: An Example
Space limits the comprehensive exploration here of all evolu-
tionary theories concerning what we might, in the non-human
context, simply call "harming juveniles." For the limited purpose of
demonstrating the model, however, we may narrow our focus (for the
first of several times) to explore one subset of harms to juveniles:
Infanticide.'37 The topic has been well studied, and the unambiguity
of death precludes interpretive complications surrounding cross-
species definition of "abuse" or "harm." Additionally, infant killing
is surprisingly common among human populations. Very conserva-
tive estimates of infanticide rates in the United States, for example,
range from about three to thirteen abuse-related infant deaths per
day,138 making abuse the leading cause of trauma death for young
137. Definitions of infanticide in the human context vary as a function of the inten-
tionality of the act, the age of the child, and (for some) the prevailing cultural norms
regarding child-rearing and child-killing. Compare William L. Langer, Infanticide: A
Historical Survey, 1 HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 353, 353 (1974) (infanticide defined to require
wilfulness), with Laila Williamson, Infanticide: An Anthropological Analysis, in IN-
FANTICIDE AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 61, 63 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1978) (classifying fatal
neglect as infanticide). For the purposes of this Article, both ultimate and proximate
causation is relevant, so intentionality will not be an element of infanticide.
While the majority view appears to be that lethal child abuse and non-lethal physical
abuse exist on the same continuum of violence, some have argued to the contrary. Com-
pare Gelles & Harrop, supra note 126, at 82 (challenging majority view), with Martin
Daly & Margo Wilson, A Reply to Gelles: Stepchildren Are Disproportionately Abused,
and Diverse Forms of Violence Can Share Causal Factors, 2 HUM. NATURE 419, 420
(1991) [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Reply to Gelles] ("Sound explanations of lethal and
sublethal assaults are certain to overlap considerably .... ).
138. This is as many infants killed every two to six days as the number of children that
died in the notorious Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995. See Jo Thomas, In
Oklahoma City, Silence for Each of the Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1996, at 7 (reporting
ninteen children killed). For estimates, see, CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE
REPORTING AND FATALITIES, supra note 113, at 12 (noting that approximately three
children per day have died during the past ten years as a result of parental maltreatment);
U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, OFFICE OF HUMAN DEV.
SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY 56 (1990)
[hereinafter CRITICAL FIRST STEPS] (estimating 1200 to 5000 child maltreatment fatali-
ties per year (or 3 to 13 per day)). Confirmed child maltreatment fatalities have been
rising in recent years, increasing 39% between 1985 and 1995. See CURRENT TRENDS IN
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES, supra note 113, at 12. Children under the
age of one comprise nearly half of all such fatalities. See id. at 20.
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children-over auto accidents, accidental falls, choking on food,
drowning, and the like.'39
Exploring evolutionary perspectives on infanticide offers a
glimpse into the sophistication of modem evolutionary understand-
ings of behavior and lays an important foundation for demonstrating
the final two stages of the model. In addition to improving our un-
derstanding of infanticide, the comprehensiveness of the theoretical
structure will also shed useful light on child abuse generally.
The general theoretical foundation undergirding evolutionary
theories on infanticide is well developed. Early animal behaviorists
believed that animals rarely killed their own kindl"-assuming that
an appropriate inhibition must have evolved "for the good of the spe-
Many believe the actual incidence of infanticide in fact far exceeds the conservative
estimates. See, e.g., CRITICAL FIRST STEPS, supra, at 2, 12 (estimating that 85% of all
child abuse deaths are misidentified); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., A
REPORT OF THE U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, A NATION'S
SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1995)
[hereinafter A NATION'S SHAME]; Philip W. McClain et al., Estimates of Fatal Child
Abuse and Neglec4 United States, 1979 Through 1988, 91 PEDIATRICS 338, 338 (1993)
(estimating that 85% of all child abuse deaths are misidentified); Starr et al., supra note
115, at 23, 32 (suggesting that many infanticides are misclassified as accidental deaths or
SIDS (Sudden Infant Death Syndrome)); cf. John L. Emery et al., Three Crib Deaths, A
Babyminder and Probable Infanticide, 28 MED. Sci. L. 205, 209-10 (1988) (concerning
difficulty differentiating SIDS from murder by asphyxiation); Raymond Hernandez,
Mother Gets 75 Years for Smothering5 of Her Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at B5
(reporting case of a mother's confession to the murders of her five children, whose deaths
were originally attributed to SIDS); Marjie Lundstrom & Rochelle Sharpe, Getting Away
with Murder, PUB. WELFARE, Summer 1991, at 18,22-24 (reporting that in many counties
dead children are simply not autopsied).
139. See A NATION'S SHAME, supra note 138, at 20-21. In reaction, a number of states
have undertaken specific legal initiatives to ensure that child fatalities are monitored and
investigated. See SARAH R. KAPLAN, CHILD FATALITY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED
STATES app. at B3-B24 (1991) (summarizing child fatality legislation). Child fatality re-
view teams are to ascertain the causes and incidence of preventable child deaths and to
make recommendations for decreasing them. See generally TAMMY L. ANDERSON &
SUSAN WELLS, DATA COLLECTION FOR CHILD FATALITIES: EXISTING EFFORTS AND
PROPOSED GUIDELINES (1991) (surveying existing state efforts and proposing uniform
data-collection procedures). For an example of reporting pursuant to statute, see
ARIZONA DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., ARIZONA CHILD FATALITY REVIEW TEAM,
NOVEMBER 1994.
140. See SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU: FEMALE AND MALE
STRATEGIES OF REPRODUCTION 246 (1977) [hereinafter HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU];
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy & Glenn Hausfater, Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives on
Infanticide: Introduction and Overview [hereinafter Hrdy & Hausfater, Comparative and
Evolutionary Perspectives on Infanticide], Preface to INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at xiii-
xiv; Stefano Parmigiani et al., Infanticide and Protection of Young in House Mice (Mus
domesticus): Female and Male Strategies [hereinafter Parmigiani et al., Infanticide and
Protection of Young in House Mice], in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64,
at 341, 341.
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cies."14 It followed from this assumption that observed infant deaths
must be either pathological, 42 accidental, or the result of unusual cir-
cumstantial stressors (such as extreme crowding) that would make
infanticide good for the group as a whole.43 When this later proved
naive as a theoretical matter,'" and inconsistent with facts as an evi-
dentiary one,45 primatologist Sarah Hrdy argued that infanticide
could often be understood-not as evidence of pathology-but rather
as the direct or indirect result of evolved, generally adaptive behav-
ior.' 4 Her analysis reflects this basic premise: Behavior that on
average increases the reproductive success of an actor relative to the
reproductive success of its contemporaries will persist and prolifer-
141. See, e.g., KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 109-38 (Marjorie Kerr Wilson
trans., 1966) (arguing that intra-species aggression has been controlled, through evolu-
tionary processes, for the good of the species). Under "normal" conditions, it was
supposed, animals would "act to maintain, not disrupt, the prevailing social structure."
HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU, supra note 140, at 246 (discussing early theories on infan-
ticide).
142. See, e.g., John A. King, Maternal Behavior in Peromyscus, in MATERNAL
BEHAVIOR IN MAMMALS 58, 85-86 (Harriet L. Rheingold ed., 1963); see also Sarah Blaf-
fer Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals: A Review, Classification, and Examination of the
Implications for the Reproductive Strategies of Females, 1 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY
13,20 (1979) [hereinafter Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals] (discussing early theories on
infanticide).
143. See, e.g., John B. Calhoun, Population Density and Social Pathology, Sci. AM.,
Feb. 1962, at 139, 139; see also Ronald J. Brooks, Causes and Consequences of Infanticide
in Populations of Rodents, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 331, 331-33 (discussing early
theories on infanticide). This assumption has a long pedigree, dating back at least to
W. HALL CALVERT, THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF MAN: A STUDY FROM OBSERVED
PHENOMENA 31-42 (1913), who attempted to use infanticide as proof against Darwinian
evolution. Even today, the assumption continues to resurface. See, e.g., SANDER J.
BREINER, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS: CHILD ABUSE THROUGH THE AGES AND
TODAY 8 (1990) ("It is adaptive behavior, contributing to the survival of the species.");
see also HOWARD BLOOM, THE LUCIFER PRINCIPLE: A SCIENTIFIC EXPEDITION INTO
THE FORCES OF HISTORY 52-53 (1995) (assuming that maternal infanticide is inconsistent
with the theory of kin selection).
144. In 1966, acclaimed biologist George Williams eviscerated "naive group-
selectionism" (which presupposed that behavior evolved for the good of the group, rather
than for the good of the individual)-thereby similarly gutting the theoretical foundations
for then-prevailing theories on infanticide. See WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL
SELECTION, supra note 61.
145. See Hrdy & Haufster, Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives on Infanticide,
supra note 140, at xiv.
146. See Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals, supra note 142; Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Male-
Male Competition and Infanticide Among the Langurs (Presbytis Entellus) of Abu, Ra-
jasthan, 22 FOLIA PRIMATOLOGICA 19, 45-50 (1974) [hereinafter Hrdy, Male-Male
Competition]. In this effort, Hrdy was building upon early speculation by Sugiyama that
the behavior might be adaptive for individual males. See Y. Sugiyama, Social Organiza-
tion of Hanuman Langurs, in SOCIAL COMMUNICATION AMONG PRIMATES 221 (Stuart
A. Altmann ed., 1967).
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ate, to the extent that the behavior is genetically influenced, and
therefore heritable. Although her analysis may at first seem counter-
intuitive (because at least when a parent kills its own offspring that
would appear to reduce the killer's potential reproductive success)
Hrdy's reasoning is now widely accepted by evolutionary biologists as
compelling.147
Hrdy argued that because so many different behaviors can in-
crease reproductive success, on average, generally adaptive behavior
could contribute to the incidence of infanticide in four different ways.
I will here term these theories:
* The Exploitation Theory;
* The Resource Competition Theory;
* The Discriminative Parental Solicitude (DPS) Theory; and
* The Reproductive Access Theory.'
The next few pages explore these in detail, focusing primarily on the
last two, which, owing to the social organization of the human animal,
will prove the most important to a subsequent analysis of human in-
fanticide.
The Exploitation Theory highlights how an individual may on
average increase reproductive success by exploiting an infant as ei-
ther a food resource or as a tool for achieving a goal. A fox, for
example, might obtain nourishment, and thus contribute to her own
reproductive success, by eating the young of an unrelated member of
her own species just as easily as by eating a like-sized member of an
unrelated species." The Resource Competition Theory highlights
how an individual may on average increase its reproductive success
by removing a vulnerable competitor for finite and scarce resources,
such as by killing the offspring of a physically close "neighbor" in a
crowded area.'O
147. See generally INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64 (consisting of a
collection of articles discussing how infanticide can be an adaptive phenomenon).
148. See generally Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals, supra note 142 (discussing four
theories which offer various explanations for infanticide). Although I have kept the cate-
gories themselves intact, I have provided different names than Hrdy did in the original.
This is a matter of semantics only, not an attempt to improve on Hrdy's original taxon-
omy. It is intended simply to avoid confusion among non-biologists. Hrdy also discusses
social pathology in id. at 20.
149. See id. at 14-15. Cannibalism, contrary to popular misconception, is a common
phenomenon in natural populations of many species including, for example, predatory
fish. See id. at 14; Hrdy & Haufster, Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives on In-
fanticide, supra note 140, at xv-xviii.
150. See Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals, supra note 142, at 15-16.
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The Discriminative Parental Solicitude (DPS) Theory'1 explains
ultimate causes of infanticide as follows. Because natural selection
favors behavior furthering reproductive success, parents prefer to
treat offspring differently than genetic strangers (and differently than
the offspring of strangers). In biological terms, parents are solicitous
of offspring because their shared genes give them powerfully over-
lapping interests. Yet because parent and offspring are never
genetically identical (in sexually reproducing species), those overlap-
ping interests inevitably diverge: Every offspring is effectively a
consumer of a parent's limited time and energy resources and natural
selection is an ever-present economizing force that favors individuals
whose investments are allocated in ways tending to optimize inclusive
fitness. The precise allocation of a parent's investment among re-
lated and unrelated infants is therefore acutely sensitive to the
"opportunity cost" of that investment. Natural selection effectively
punishes the genetic complements of parents that allocate parental
investment in one way whenever similarly situated competitors earn
greater fitness returns by allocating the same amount of parental in-
vestment in another way-to different existing or future offspring, for
example. Thus, natural selection will favor the ability to deliver pa-
rental investment to the offspring most capable of turning that
investment into reproductive success."'
This theory therefore predicts that the motivational mechanisms
influencing parental behavior will have evolved in such a way that
parents will, on average, act as if they value a particular infant in di-
rect proportion to that infant's probable contribution to parental
inclusive fitness."' Such infant-specific variation in parental invest-
ment (whether conscious or unconscious) is thus the essence of
discriminative parental solicitude: Parents discriminate among po-
tential recipients of their solicitousness.m  DPS theory therefore
suggests that parents will generally allocate their resources among
151. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
152. That is, just as natural selection will have favored parents who provide more to
kin than to non-kin, it will also have favored parents that provide more to some juveniles
genetically related to them than to others equally genetically related. For more on the
subject of this paragraph, see DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 98, at 42; Martin
Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Social Psychology and Family Homicide, 242 SCi.
519, 521-22 (1988) [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Evolutionary Social Psychology]
(concerning confirmations of DPS predictions in many empirical studies); Trivers, Paren-
tal Investment and Sexual Selection, supra note 63, at 139.
153. See Daly & Wilson, Child Maltreatment, supra note 46, at 101.
154. See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 98, at 42.
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infants according to their assessment of the following factors:.5
" the probable degree of relatedness between parent and in-
fant;
* observable attributes of the offspring (such as health, size, or
deformity) that correlate with its eventual ability to translate
parental investment into subsequent reproductive success;
and
* alternative loci of parental investment (such as healthier ex-
isting offspring or offspring potentially reared in the future,
when better resources may be available). "6
Consequently, The DPS Theory suggests that there are at least two
different avenues by which generally adaptive, evolved behavioral
predispositions may contribute to an adult's causing the death of an
infant.
The first avenue concerns infants unrelated to the parent. An in-
fant that must rely on the resources of an unrelated adult is
somewhat more likely to die of neglect or to be killed by that adult,
simply because, on average, the infant will not evoke the same solici-
tousness as would an offspring. Since not caring for infants is the
default (or initial) evolved predisposition (in the absence of related-
ness cues), the adult will on average be less tolerant, less willing to
provide, and less protective than would the infant's own parent.
The second avenue concerns infants related to the parent. An
offspring's risk of neglect or infanticide will increase as the opportu-
nity cost of future parental investment in it increases. Natural
selection favors genetically influenced predispositions tending to re-
duce parental investment in a particular offspring toward zero when
the benefits of redirecting finite parental investment toward an off-
spring's existing or future siblings are likely to be greater than the
benefits of continued support of the offspring in question. An adult
therefore may increase its reproductive success, on average, by elimi-
nating one of its own offspring when the minimum parental
155. See id. at 42-43 (building on the work of RICHARD ALEXANDER, DARWINISM
AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 109 (1979); Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, su-
pra note 63; Trivers, Parent-Offspring Conflict, supra note 63, and arguing that parental
behavior observable today should have evolved toward distributing parental investment
among offspring and others in proportions that optimize parental fitness); Margo Wilson
& Martin Daly, The Psychology of Parenting in Evolutionary Perspective and the Case of
Human Filicide [hereinafter The Psychology of Parenting in Evolutionary Perspective], in
INFANTICIDE AND PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at 73,76 (same).
156. See ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS, supra note 3, at 109;
DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 98, at 42; Hrdy & Hausfter, Comparative and
Evolutionary Perspectives on Infanticide, supra note 140, at xxx.
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investment that that offspring requires would probably yield higher
fitness returns for the parent if it were directed instead to another
existing or future offspring."5 7 In other words, natural selection will
favor males and females that, put crudely, are disposed to "trade in"
one offspring for another one better situated to contribute to their
own reproductive success-as, for example, when the killed offspring
was ill-timed, of poor quality, or supernumerary. " '
Because natural selection favors certain sex differences in be-
havior, particularly within internally fertilizing species,"9 The DPS
Theory predicts that male and female parents often will assess their
investment costs and payoffs differently, reflecting their different re-
productive prospects for the future, and hence their different
opportunity costs for any given quantum of parental investment.
More specifically, because minimum necessary male investment for
creating a new offspring (sperm) is less than minimum female in-
vestment (egg, womb, nutrition, and often nursing), and maximum
reproductive success can be far higher for males than for females, the
opportunity cost of continued investment in an existing offspring Will
tend to be higher for males than for females. Moreover, because
males can reap the same fitness returns as females from smaller in-
vestments, males in such species may be more likely than females to
terminate investment in any given infant.W
The fourth theory, The Reproductive Access Theory, highlights
how an individual may on average increase reproductive success by
killing an infant, if such an act frequently affords that individual in-
creased access to the reproductive investment of a member of the
opposite sex. This Reproductive Access Theory, which manifests in-
tra-sexual conflict generated by sexual selection, suggests that the
likelihood of infanticide may have nothing to do with the potential
157. See Martin Daly, Parent-Offspring Conflict and Violence in Evolutionary Per-
spective, in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 25 (Robert W. Bell & Nancy J.
Bell eds., 1989). For a discussion arguing that DPS better explains parent-offspring con-
flict than Freud's theories, see Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Is Parent-Offspring Conflict
Sex-Linked? Freudian and Darwinian Models, 58 J. PERSONALITY 163 (1990).
158. I recognize that such a bleak image may strike some people as shocking. The
statement is intended to be descriptive and to imply no normative judgment whatsoever.
159. See supra text accompanying note 83.
160. Opportunity cost for both males and females decreases as an infant approaches
reproductive maturity. See Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Abuse and Neglect of Children
in Evolutionary Perspective [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Abuse and Neglect of Children],
in NATURAL SELECTION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 405, 406 (Richard D. Alexander &
Donald W. Tinkle eds., 1981) ("[W]hen a large proportion of the requisite parental in-
vestment for the raising of an offspring has been expended and relatively little more is
required, parents should tolerate greater risks before abandoning dependent young.").
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reproductive success of the infant (as it did in The DPS Theory). In-
stead, it may correlate with the extent to which infanticide may
increase the ability of a member of one sex, typically a male, to access
the reproductive resources of a member of the other sex, typically a
female.'
In many creatures, for example, including the primates, the very
act of nursing one infant to weaning age impedes a female from fur-
ther conception. This temporary contraceptive effect, known as
lactational amenorrhea, appears to adaptively regulate the interval
between successive offspring (known as the "inter-birth interval"),
which otherwise may be so short as to be suboptimal for raising each
infant to independence.6 2 Cessation of nursing, for whatever reason,
almost immediately restarts the female's capacity to conceive, which
also accelerates her availability to males as a reproductive resource.
Consequently, killing an unrelated, unweaned infant can be adaptive
for an infanticidal male."
The loss of a dependent infant brings the female back into estrus,
shortens the inter-birth interval, and increases the chance that the
infanticidal male can quickly commence his own gene replication
161. See generally supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing sexual selec-
tion). Males compete with other males not simply for access to a female, but for access to
her when she is reproductive, and advantage in this competition is measured by an in-
crease in male reproductive success,
162. See R.D. Martin, Phylogenetic Aspects of Primate Reproduction: The Context of
Advanced Maternal Care, in MOTHERHOOD IN HUMAN AND NONHUMAN PRIMATES:
BIOSOCIAL DETERMINANTS 16, 16-18, 23-25 (C.R. Pryce et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter
MOTHERHOOD]. The effect is operative in humans. See ELAINE MORGAN, THE
DESCENT OF THE CHILD: HUMAN EVOLUTION FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE 83 (1995);
John E. Anderson et al., Breast-Feeding, Birth Interval, and Infant Health, 74 PEDIATRICS
695, 695 (1984); Thomas A. Cable & Lee A. Rothenberger, Breast-Feeding Behavioral
Patterns Among La Leche League Mothers: A Descriptive Survey, 73 PEDIATRICS 830,
834 (1984) (describing prolonged lactational amenorrhea as "a common effect of unre-
stricted breast-feeding"); Renata Forste, Effects of Lactation and Contraceptive Use on
Birth-Spacing in Bolivia, 42 Soc. BIOLOGY 108 (1995); Martin, supra, at 25; Audrey E.
Rosner & Susan K. Schulman, Birth Interval Among Breast-Feeding Women Not Using
Contraceptives, 86 PEDIATRICS 747, 750-51 (1990); Artemis P. Simopoulos & Gilman D.
Grave, Factors Associated with the Choice and Duration of Infant-Feeding Practice, 74
PEDIATRICS 603,612 (1984).
163. It may seem counter-intuitive that a female would willingly mate with a killer.
But while natural selection will favor female counterstrategies to resist infant-killing, see
infra notes 173, 193, 199,218 and accompanying text, should that battle be lost the killing
male becomes one of the most desirable mates; his demonstrated dominance of the in-
fant's mother (and often father) increases the likelihood that offspring he sires will be
similarly dominant-and better contribute to the female's reproductive success than the
offspring of less dominant males. Recent video footage shows a lioness actually initiating
copulation with the male that killed her cubs. See Animal Cannibals (Discovery Channel
television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1996).
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through her.1" Over scores of generations, for example, a monkey
who simply happened to carry a gene combination predisposing it to
selectively infanticidal behavior would therefore leave, according to
this theory, more descendants than would a monkey whose genes
predisposed it to behave in ways that did not equally increase repro-
ductive success."5 Given time, the descendants of the infanticidal
male would become sufficiently numerous that the behavior could be
described as typical of individuals within the species.'66 In fact, once
the killing of unrelated infants began, males that did not practice it
would effectively be penalized by evolutionary forces. 67
164. See Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals, supra note 142, at 17-18. In addition,
when resources are scarce, selective infanticide also terminates the diversion of resources
to young non-relatives, ultimately (albeit indirectly) increasing the resources available to
the infanticidal male's offspring and his other relatives. See id. at 15. Non-offspring rela-
tives may translate such marginally increased resources into greater reproductive success,
thereby increasing the inclusive fitness of the selectively infanticidal male.
165. It can hardly be stressed enough that no rational calculus on the part of the male
is implied or necessary. It is only necessary that there at some time have been an animal
who responded to a commonly encountered environmental situation in a particular and
genetically influenced fashion that happened to result in more copies of its genes appear-
ing in successive generations than did genes of contemporaries predisposed to act
differently. See HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU, supra note 140, at 278 (making this point
forcefully).
166. The proportion of males that might actually carry the gene sequence at any given
time has been mathematically modeled in M. Chapman & G. Hausfater, The Reproduc-
tive Consequences of Infanticide in Langurs: A Mathematical Model, 5 BEHAv. ECOLOGY
& SOCIOBIOLOGY 227 (1979), and Glenn Hausfater, Infanticide in Langurs: Strategies,
Counterstrategies, and Parameter Values [hereinafter Hausfater, Infanticide in Langurs],
in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 257.
167. See HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU, supra note 140, at 277; Hausfater, Infanticide
in Langurs, supra note 166, at 281. If this seems unclear, the technique presented supra
Part I.B.3 may help. Imagine a population of monkeys 1000 generations before the pres-
ent. Let the individuals in this hypothetical population that are of reproductive age be
considered Generation 1. Suppose that, due to naturally occurring mutations, three un-
related males among the offspring of Generation 1 contain novel gene combinations, each
predisposing its bearer to respond to generalized environmental stimuli in a particular
fashion. One combination makes its bearer more likely than other members of his species
to provide for and protect any infant of his species, regardless of whether or not it is ge-
netically related to him. A second combination makes its bearer more likely than others
to kill all infants he comes across, even those he sired himself. A third combination
makes its bearer more likely than others to selectively kill infants unrelated to him that
are dependent upon females with whom he might mate.
In what proportions, relative to each other, might the gene combinations for these
behaviors appear in Generation 1000? Only the third combination is likely to have
spread widely throughout the populations in generations succeeding Generation 1. The
first two combinations will on average divert more investment from activities contributing
to their own replication than will combinations likely to be already present in the popula-
tion at large. Even if each individual bearing one of these two combinations in
Generation 1, and each of its male progeny who shares his father's combination, fathers
only one less offspring during its reproductive life than is average for males in that popu-
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In sum, infanticide modeled by the specific Exploitation, Re-
source Competition, DPS, and Reproductive Access theories derive
from the mid-level evolutionary theories reflecting resource acquisi-
tion, kin selection, parental investment, and sexual selection,
respectively. Unsurprisingly, these specific evolutionary theories are
not truly alternative or mutually exclusive. There would be, for ex-
ample, a dually adaptive significance to cannibalizing the offspring of
potential competitors, reflecting both the Exploitation and Resource
Competition theories." Moreover, potential RS benefits of infanti-
cide will accrue unequally in each of the four categories, depending
upon the degree of relatedness and the sexes of both the killer and
the killed.'69
b. The Predictions of Evolutionary Theories: An Example
As stated earlier, this first step of The Information Stage ex-
plores not only the evolutionary theories, but also the predictions
they generate that bear on the defined behavior. Taken together, the
above theories logically generate many specific, testable predic-
tions.17° Among them, for example:
lation, the proportion of individuals in successive generations who bears that combination
will steadily decline. In contrast, the selectively infanticidal male will generally increase
his reproductive success relative to that of the other two males. Moreover, he generally
improves his reproductive success relative to that of the male who sired the killed infant,
and will probably increase his reproductive success relative to the average reproductive
success of the other males in the population. The genetic predisposition for selective,
condition-dependent infanticide will be present in increasing proportions of future gen-
erations. This result will be resisted by any adaptive mechanisms that predispose mothers
to, for example, protect their offspring from marauders. On such evolved counterstrate-
gies, see infra notes 173, 193, 199,218 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Laurel R. Fox, Cannibalism in Natural Populations, 6 ANN. REV.
ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 87 (1975); see also Carolyn M. Crockett & Ranka Sekulic,
Infanticide in Red Howler Monkeys (Alouatta seniculus), in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79,
at 173, 188 (explaining that any case of infanticide that yields reproductive advantage will
also probably diminish competition for resources).
169. A slightly oversimplified model, assuming that the killer and killed either are or
are not related, yields eight different possibilities: 1) male kills related male infant;
2) male kills related female infant; 3) female kills related male infant; 4) female kills re-
lated female infant; 5) male kills unrelated male infant; 6) male kills unrelated female
infant; 7) female kills unrelated male infant; 8) female kills unrelated female infant.
170. Both these general predictions, and the predictions of the DPS and Reproductive
Access theories, exist in a wide variety of forms in the literature. See, e.g., D. Anthony
Collins et al., Infanticide in Two Populations of Savanna Baboons, in INFANTICIDE, supra
note 79, at 193, 211-12; Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals, supra note 142, at 17; Christian
Vogel & Hartmut Loch, Reproductive Parameters, Adult-Male Replacements, and Infanti-
cide Among Free-Ranging Langurs (Presbytis entellus) at Jodhpur (Rajasthan), India, in
INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 237, 253; Frederick S. vor Saal, Proximate and Ultimate
Causes of Infanticide and Parental Behavior in Male House Mice, in INFANTICIDE, supra
note 79, at 401,401.
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* General Predictions
1) it will not be uncommon for individuals to kill other mem-
bers of their own species;
2) infanticide will not be confined to high-density populations
or to animals living in otherwise stressed or disturbed habi-
tats.
The DPS and Reproductive Access theories, which primarily apply,
respectively, to species exhibiting parental care and to that subset of
those species that (like humans) fertilize internally, generate even
more specific predictions.
0 Predictions of DPS Theory
Among species manifesting a reproductive strategy requiring signifi-
cant parental investment, the following factors will be among those
that increase the likelihood of infanticide:
1) youth of the infant (reflecting a higher cost of rearing to re-
productive age, compared to an older offspring, as well as a
lower probability of surviving to reproductive age);
2) signs of poor infant health, such as physical or mental defects
(indicators of relatively low potential contribution to repro-
ductive success);
3) youth of the mother (correlating with a relatively large per-
centage of the total reproductive years remaining); and
4) limited availability of parental resources, due to either re-
source scarcity, absence of a partner that may also invest in
the infant, or both (which reduces the likelihood of the in-
fant's survival).
Predictions of Reproductive Access Theory
1) infanticide by adult males will be more commonly observed
in those species in which females typically invest a great deal
in each offspring than in those species in which they do not;
and
2) infanticide by adult males will be more commonly observed
among species in which, on average, the absence of a nursing
1182 [Vol. 75
EVOLUTIONARYANALYSIS IN LAW
infant accelerates a mother's ability to conceive (the termi-
nation of lactational amenorrhea) than in those species in
which such absence does not significantly affect that ability.
And in such species:
a) an infant will be far likelier to be killed by an unrelated
male than by a related male;
b) an infant killed by an adult male will be far likelier to be
un-weaned (still nursing) than weaned;
c) infanticidal males will more likely be those with only re-
cent access to an infant's mother than those that might
have sired the infant;
d) infanticidal males will, on average, impregnate the
mother of a killed infant earlier than if her infant had not
been killed; 7'
e) infanticidal males will become markedly less infanticidal
one gestation period after gaining sexual access to a fe-
male;'2
f) an infant born after an unrelated male gains physical ac-
cess to its mother will be at greater risk of being killed if
it is born in a period shorter than the gestation period;
and
g) females will exhibit counterstrategies to prevent invading
males from killing their infants."
171. Selectively infanticidal behavior can only be adaptive if the male's act does not
decrease the likelihood that the female will mate with him. See Sarah Blaffer Hrdy et al.,
Infanticide: Let's Not Throw Out the Baby with the Bath Water, 3 EVOLUTIONARY
ANTHROPOLOGY 151,151 (1995).
172. After one gestation period, there is an increased risk that the male's own off-
spring will be present.
173. As to this last prediction, note that through selective infanticide the male is in-
creasing his reproductive success at some expense to the female, who has already invested
considerable resources in birthing and raising an infant that is related to her. Under some
circumstances, such as where heritable traits contribute substantially to male status, a
female might increase her reproductive success by mating with a male of higher status
than the father of the child she is nursing. Among mountain gorillas, for example, the
mother of an infant killed by a newly dominant male generally increases her social status
within the group. See Dian Fossey, Infanticide in Mountain Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla ber-
ingei) with Comparative Notes on Chimpanzees, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 217,
218. Yet, depending on how the costs (including those for increased vigilance) of her
continued investment in an existing offspring (considering the likelihood of successfully
raising it to reproductive age) compare with the opportunity costs of that continued in-
vestment, the female may not always increase her reproductive success by acquiescing in
a male's infanticide. This creates a situation in which natural selection would favor fe-
male behaviors that minimize the risk that an infant would be killed. Concerning such
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In sum, this first step of The Information Stage paves the way to ex-
plore possible contributions of evolutionary analysis to pursuit of the
legal goal by identifying relevant evolutionary theories and specifying
the predictions they generate. Here, for example, if the propensity to
commit infanticide is genetically influenced (and thus heritable), and
if on average it operates to increase the actor's reproductive success,
according to the logic of the DPS and Reproductive Access theories,
we should expect to see that the predictions just enumerated will be
largely accurate descriptions of actual observations.
2. What Empirical Evidence Bears on Those Predictions?
The second step of The Information Stage requires that the evo-
lutionary theories' predictions be tested rigorously by the empirical
evidence.74 Ethical, practical, and legal limitations, of course, pro-
scribe the scope and nature of human experimentation, and human
cognitive capacities can make it difficult to assess the relative merits
of alternative explanations of behavior. Consequently, the best initial
indicators of the coherence of any evolutionary theory must come
from preliminary surveys of experimental and observational evidence
from elsewhere in the animal kingdom."5 Theories that do not ro-
bustly survive this initial examination, with respect to non-primate
animals, probably are not worth pursuing. In contrast, those that do
evolved female counterstrategies, such as aggressiveness toward new males and postcon-
ception estrous behavior, see HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU, supra note 140, at 242-90;
Hausfater, Infanticide in Langurs, supra note 166, at 272-79; Hrdy, Infanticide Among
Animals, supra note 142, at 30-35; Parmigiani et al., Infanticide and Protection of Young in
House Mice, supra note 140, at 342-54; Anne E. Pusey & Craig Packer, Infanticide in Li-
ons: Consequences and Counterstrategies, in INFANTICIDE AND PARENTAL CARE, supra
note 64, at 277; Volker Sommer, Infanticide Among the Langurs of Jodhpur Testing the
Sexual Selection Hypothesis with a Long-Term Record, in INFANTICIDE AND PARENTAL
CARE, supra note 64, at 155, 176; and Bruce Svare & Michael Boechler, Protection and
Abuse of Young in Mice: Influence of Mother-Young Interactions, in INFANTICIDE AND
PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at 465. Concerning evolved male counter-
counterstrategies, see Parmigiani et al., Infanticide and Protection of Young in House
Mice, supra note 140, at 354-58; Pusey & Packer, supra, at 277, 291-93.
174. A third step, see infra Part II.B.3, will then require that the results of this test be
assessed. Consequently, the second and third steps of this stage constitute a mini-cycle
that may be repeated several times with the data from various different species until a
decision can comfortably be reached upon whether to: 1) continue with the subsequent
evolutionary analysis; 2) further refine a theory developed in step one; or 3) abandon
further analysis.
175. Although behavioral theories that require analytic reasoning are incapable of
explaining the behavior of creatures without such reasoning ability, theories (like most
evolutionary theories) that do not depend on analytic reasoning can potentially explain
some behaviors of creatures, like humans, that do manifest such ability. That is, the exis-
tence of reason does not logically require that all behavior trace to reason.
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survive make it advisable to survey evidence regarding primate rela-
tives of humans and, subsequently, any available evidence about
humans themselves.
To demonstrate this step in the model, therefore, this section se-
quentially surveys evidence on infanticide committed by non-
primates, non-human primates, and human primates.7 The evidence
will be organized with reference to Hrdy's four-theory framework,
with principal emphasis upon the predictions of the DPS and Repro-
ductive Access theories. Because an exhaustive and mechanical study
of facts corresponding to every prediction generated above is unnec-
essary to demonstrate evolutionary analysis in law, this section will
provide only a general overview and representative sampling of evi-
dence illustrative of the kind sufficiently detailed and relevant to
further a useful evolutionary analysis. Readers willing to review this
evidence will see the emergence of a deeply interwoven series of
animal behaviors, almost shockingly consistent with the predictions
of evolutionary theories, and will begin to see the priomise of evolu-
tionary analysis, which will be explored more fully in the third and
fourth stages.
a. Infanticide in Non-Primates: The Evidence
In a great many non-primate species, contrary to popular as-
sumption, adults very regularly kill infants of their own species."
Though the massive supporting literature is not without its interpre-
tational issues, truly abundant empirical evidence reveals that, in
many species, the great majority of infant killings occur independ-
ently of population density or disturbance and sort comfortably into
one or more of the evolutionary theories Hrdy developed.17"
176. The criteria by which other species are deemed similar to or different from hu-
mans, for this purpose, may vary significantly according to the behavior being studied.
See Robert Foley, Studying Human Evolution by Analogy, in CAMBRIDGE ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION, supra note 34, at 335. With respect to some aspects
of mating institutions, for example, some bird species (such as those largely reflecting
serial monogamy) will exhibit reproductive strategies more similar to human practices
than some primate species (such as those with an overtly polygamous mating structure).
Nevertheless, the sequence suggested in the text provides a serviceable default.
177. See Hrdy & Hausfater, Comparative and Evolutionary Perspectives on Infanticide,
supra note 140, at xiv ("[I]nfanticide and cannibalism are for many animals everyday oc-
currences during those seasons when infants are present." (citation omitted)). In a great
deal of other species, infanticide, though less common, nonetheless appears significantly
to affect reproductive biology and social behavior. See id.
178. See studies collected in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79; INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL
CARE, supra note 64. Although most studies of immediate relevance were conducted in
the wild, it is important to note the valuable and overwhelmingly consistent contributions
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Many species of protozoa, rotifers, flatworms, squid, crustaceans,
arachnids, insects, amphibians, fishes, birds, rodents, and carnivorous
mammals, for example, frequently dine on their own kind-evidence
consistent with The Exploitation Theory.' In fact, in some of these
species, more than 75% of all live young are consumed by same-
species adults."' In addition, many species of birds, insects, and ro-
dents commonly engage in infanticide best characterized as
consistent with The Resource Competition Theory. 8' A nest's newly
dominant female wasp, for example, often destroys eggs laid by sub-
ordinate females in available rearing cells and replaces them with her
that laboratory studies provide regarding the controlled testing of very narrow hypotheses
and insights into the proximate mechanisms of adaptive behavior. For examples of these,
see Robert W. Elwood & Hazel F. Kennedy, Selective Allocation of Parental and Infanti-
cidal Responses in Rodents: A Review of Mechanisms, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL
CARE, supra note 64, at 397; David J. Gubernick, Biparental Care and Male-Female Rela-
tions in Mammals, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at 427, 445-54;
Parmigiani et al., Infanticide and Protection of Young in House Mice, supra note 140;
Glenn Perrigo & Frederick S. vom Saal, Behavioral Cycles and the Neural Timing of In-
fanticide and Parental Behavior in Male House Mice, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL
CARE, supra note 64, at 365; Svare & Boechler, supra note 173, at 465. In each case, evi-
dence must be understood within the context of an often-elaborate reproductive strategy
that is beyond the scope of this Article.
179. See, e.g., Dominey & Blumer, supra note 79, at 43; Robert W. Elwood & Malcolm
C. Ostermeyer, Infanticide by Male and Female Mongolian Gerbils: Ontogeny, Causation,
and Function, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 367; U. William Huck, Infanticide and the
Evolution of Pregnancy Block in Rodents, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 349, 354;
Moshe Jakubowski & Joseph Terkel, Infanticide and Caretaking in Non-Lactating Mus
musculus: Influence of Genotype, Family Group and Sex, 30 ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 1029,
1032-33 (1982); Gary A. Polis, Intraspecific Predation and "Infant Killing" Among Inver-
tebrates, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 87; Kenneth M. Rosenberg & Gordon F.
Sherman, The Role of Testosterone in the Organization, Maintenance and Activation of
Pup-Killing Behavior in the Male Rat, 6 HORMONES & BEHAV. 173 (1975); Thelma E.
Rowell, Maternal Behaviour in Non-Maternal Golden Hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus), 9
ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 11 (1961); Paul W. Sherman, Reproductive Competition and Infan-
ticide in Belding's Ground Squirrels and Other Animals, in NATURAL SELECTION &
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 160, at 311, 323-27; Martin P. Simon, The Influence of
Conspecifics on Egg and Larval Mortality in Amphibians, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79,
at 65, 72-80; Yoram Yom-Tov, The Effect of Food and Predation on Breeding Density and
Success, Clutch Size and Laying Date of the Crow, 43 J. ANIMAL ECOLOGY 479, 480
(1974).
180. See Polis, supra note 179, at 87, 92. The extremity of this cannibalism, inciden-
tally, appears to be genetically inheritable. See Gary A. Polis, The Evolution and
Dynamics of Intraspecific Predation, 12 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 225, 230
(1981); Polis, supra note 179, at 87.
181. See, e.g., Elwood & Ostermeyer, supra note 179, at 367; Douglas W. Mock, Infan-
ticide, Siblicide, and Avian Nestling Morality, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 3;
R. Mykytowycz & M.L. Dudzinski, Aggressive and Protective Behaviour of Adult Rabbits
Oryctolagus cuniculus Towards Juveniles, 43 BEHAVIOUR 97 (1972); Polis, supra note 179,
at 87, 96-98; Sherman, supra note 179, at 323-27; S. Turillazzi & R. Cervo, Oophagy and
Infanticide in Colonies of Social Wasps, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note
64, at 213 (surveying the literature on infanticide and cannibalism).
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own,182 and female seals and sea lions viciously attack unrelated
young." Moreover, both birds and amphibians often exhibit infanti-
cide strongly suggestive of The DPS Theory. For example, parent
birds acting to eliminate the one chick of two or more that has the
poorest survival prospects" contribute to the statistic that, in some
species, infanticide is the most important cause of nestling mortal-
ity.18
5
Infanticide characteristic of The Reproductive Access Theory (in
which breeding opportunities rather than ecological resources are at
issue), appears in a wide variety of species of insects,85 arachnids,"
and birds,' as well as in many mammals. This phenomenon tends to
be most prevalent in mating systems in which a male has recently
gained access to a female with an infant unlikely to be his own, and
where the tenure of such access is on average fairly short.'89 In ro-
dents such as house mice and prairie dogs, for example, intruding
182. See Turillazzi & Cervo, supra note 181, at 213 (and studies cited therein). Eggs
destroyed in such a circumstance may represent as much as 50% of all eggs present in the
nest. See id. at 220-23. Similar phenomena have been observed in other social insect
colonies. See id at 213. Among social wasps, a newly dominant female will generally
attempt to destroy the entire immature brood of a nest she has usurped, unless it is the
nest of a sister. See id at 224. A subordinate female whose eggs have not all been de-
stroyed will kill male sons of the dominant female while leaving her own sons intact. See
id. at 232. Although there is some historical evidence, principally from the first half of
this century, that some dominant females occasionally ate their own eggs along with those
of other females, most recent studies are consistent with the predicted outcomes. See idt
at 214,231-32.
183. See LeBeouf & Campagna, supra note 84, at 263-73. Indeed, female seals and sea
lions often vie for opportunities to inflict fatal bites on an unrelated pup, particularly one
attempting to nurse. See id. at 264.
184. See Forbes & Mock, supra note 64, at 237-38 (surveying the literature). In birds,
both parents and siblings regularly kill chicks. See Mock, supra note 181, at 7. Moreover,
parents will often eat the victim, apparently reclaiming some of the parental investment.
See Forbes & Mock, supra note 64, at 237-39. Siblicide, in which parents generally acqui-
esce, also generally appears to serve parental interests in optimizing brood size. See id at
250. Furthermore, the likelihood of infanticide is inversely correlated with the availability
of resources. See id at 237-38; Mock, supra note 181, at 3 (birds); Simon, supra note 179,
at 65,84-85 (amphibians).
185. See, e.g., MOLLER, supra note 71, at 201 (finding that infanticide accounts for
approximately 32% of all nestling mortality in barn swallows); Mock, supra note 181, at 7.
186. See Polis, supra note 179, at 87, 95.
187. See, e.g., Jutta M. Schneider & Yael Lubin, Infanticidal Male Eresid Spiders, 381
NATURE 655 (1996).
188. See MOLLER, supra note 71, at 110, 199-203.
189. See Chapman & Hausfater, supra note 166; Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Infanticide as a
Primate Reproductive Strategy, 65 AM. SCIENTIST 40, 45 (1977) [hereinafter Hrdy, Infan-
ticide as a Primate Reproductive Strategy]. In those rare species, such as the button quail,
where females compete for parental investment by males, females aggressively destroy
eggs laid by other females. See Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals, supra note 142, at 18.
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males generally kill all unrelated young at any opportunity."a Signifi-
cantly, the infanticidal behavior of males in these species generally
correlates closely with the female reproductive cycle, diminishing
precisely one gestation period after the male's ejaculation-and re-
emerging after a period precisely equivalent to that of the female's
birth-to-weaning interval (during which period the male's own off-
spring might be present).1 ' Furthermore, in some rodent species
infanticidal males kill as many as 40% of all infants." Females, in
turn, exhibit narrowly tailored counterstrategies, responding with in-
creased hostility to those males most likely to commit infanticide. 3
The patterns of infanticide among lions are among the most
studied and most striking among the non-primate species. For al-
though a female will normally not conceive again until her cubs reach
twenty months of age, she will become receptive to a dominant male
in the pride within mere days if those cubs die, typically conceiving in
about four months. This sixteen-month maximum acceleration cre-
ates opportunities in which, by killing small, unrelated cubs, an
intruding male could sire his own cubs eight months earlier, on aver-
age, than if he spared them."4 And actual observations of certain
prides over twenty-four consecutive years95 reveal that newly domi-
190. The pattern is particularly obvious among rodent species. See generally Elwood
& Ostermeyer, supra note 179, at 374 (finding that 63% of males housed with nonpreg-
nant females attempted to cannibalize a pup, while less than 33% did so when housed
with pregnant females); Huck, supra note 179, at 349, 354 (citing Huck et al., Infanticide
in Male Laboratory Mice: Effects of Social Status, Prior Sexual Experience, and Basis for
Discrimination Between Related and Unrelated Young, 30 ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 1158
(1982) (finding one-half of males killed unrelated pups, while only one-fifteenth of males
killed their own pups)). See generally Parmigiani et al., Infanticide and Protection of
Young in House Mice, supra note 140 (surveying general literature on animal infanticide
and, more specifically, mice).
191. See, e.g., Perrigo & vom Saal, supra note 178, at 365-66; vom Saal, supra note 170,
at 401.
192. See John L. Hoogland, Nepotism and Infanticide Among Prairie Dogs, in IN-
FANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at 321, 323 (surveying the literature).
Immigrant females are responsible for some of this because they regularly kill unrelated
infants. See id. at 322.
193. See Parmigiani et al., Infanticide and Protection of Young in House Mice, supra
note 140, at 341-45; Sommer, supra note 173, at 176-78; Svare & Boechler, supra note 173,
at 465.
194. See Pusey & Packer, supra note 173, at 281.
195. See generally B.C.R. Bertram, Social Factors Influencing Reproduction in Wild
Lions, 177 J. ZOOLOGY 463 (1975) (summarizing seven-year study of reproductive pat-
terns of two lion prides); Craig Packer & Anne E. Pusey, Infanticide in Carnivores, in
INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 31 (surveying the evidence then starting to accumulate
concerning infanticide among carnivores); Pusey & Packer, supra note 173, at 277
(surveying literature on infanticide in lions).
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nant males almost inevitably cause the death of every small cub pres-
ent at the time of their takeover, except during takeovers of prides
whose members are closely related to them.196 Indeed, infanticide by
male lions accounts for nearly 25 % of all deaths of nursing cubs (with
the risk to a cub of being killed declining rapidly with age)."9 And
while the composition of males in a pride turns over periodically,
DNA analyses tellingly reveal that at any given time all surviving
cubs born in a pride are sired by the resident males."8 In lions, too,
females exhibit narrowly tailored counterstrategies'"
b. Infanticide in Non-Human Primates: The Evidence
Infanticide among non-human primates was first observed in the
wild in 1965.m Today, primatologists consider it a "widespread"'
behavior, having been observed in every major primate group, in-
cluding the prosimians, the New and Old World monkeys, and the
apes." Some infant primates die in circumstances consistent with the
Exploitation Theory. Both male and female chimpanzees, for exam-
ple, have been known to kill and eat infants, and macaque infants
sometimes are fatally used as "buffers" during antagonistic episodes
between adults. 23 Other infants are killed in circumstances implicat-
ing Resource Competition, such as when a female chimpanzee kills
the infant of another female in the same group.' To date there has
196. See Pusey & Packer, supra note 173, at 277,279-80 (reporting that unrelated adult
males and subadults are generally evicted).
197. See id.
198. See D.A. Gilbert et al., Analytical DNA Fingerprinting in Lions: Parentage, Ge-
netic Diversity, and Kinship, 82 J. HEREDITY 378, 382-83 (1991).
199. See Pusey & Packer, supra note 173, at 277, 282-91 (noting, for example, that
females with cubs distinguish roars of resident and non-resident males, responding with
flight or hostility to latter).
200. See Yukimaru Sugiyama, On the Social Change of Hanuman Langurs (Presbytis
entellus) in Their Natural Conditions, 6 PRIMATES 381, 412-16 (1965). Although Sugi-
yama noted that infanticide caused females to resume sexual receptivity, see id. at 415-17,
the relevance of this to male reproductive strategies was undeveloped until Sarah Blaffer
Hrdy's publication of Male-Male Competition, supra note 146.
201. HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU, supra note 140, at 287-88.
202. See Id. at 242-90; JEAN BALCH WILLIAMS, INFANTICIDE IN NONHUMAN
PRIMATES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1991) (including 245 sources); Hrdy, Infanticide as a Pri-
mate Reproductive Strategy, supra note 189, at 46 ("[W]e are discovering that the gentle
souls we claim as our near relatives in the animal world are by and large an extraordinar-
ily murderous lot.").
203. See Mariko Hiraiwa-Hasegawa & Toshikazu Hasegawa, Infanticide in Nonhuman
Primates: Sexual Selection and Local Resource Competition, in INFANTICIDE & PA-
RENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at 137, 144; Hrdy, Infanticide Among Animals, supra note
142, at 14.
204. See Hiraiwa-Hasegawa & Hasegawa, supra note 203, at 149; Hrdy, Infanticide
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been little observation of primate infanticide that would implicate the
DPS Theory and no other.' 5 However, patterns of infanticide ob-
served thus far under both natural and laboratory conditions in five
of the six non-human primate branches are in fact powerfully consis-
tent with specific predictions of the Reproductive Access explanation
of infant-killing,O as one might expect of species that exhibit large
maternal investment and lactational amenorrhea.
Among the widely accepted conclusions:
Infanticide among primates:
1) is committed almost exclusively by adult males unrelated
to the infant;
2) almost exclusively targets unweaned infants;
3) is almost exclusively committed by newly dominant adult
males;
4) prompts the mother of a killed infant to resume sexual
receptivity within days or weeks (significantly more
quickly than if the infant survived);
5) usually results in the killing male siring the next offspring
of the female whose infant he killed;
6) is not confined to high-density populations or to animals
living in disturbed habitat; and
7) can be provoked predictably (in the experimental con-
text) by removing a group's dominant male.0 7
In one population of more than 1000 langur monkeys, for exam-
ple, studied at a single field site between 1969 and 1987,218 males
invading a breeding group regularly attacked and killed infants sired
by other males?--ultimately killing nearly 30% of all infants born
Among Animals, supra note 142, at 15.
205. The extent to which, in some circumstances, the DPS and Reproductive Access
theories can each explain the same phenomena is explored infra Part II.B.4.
206. See Hiraiwa-Hasegawa & Hasegawa, supra note 203, at 137 (surveying the litera-
ture on the redtail monkey, the blue monkey, Campbell's monkey, the purple-faced
langur, the silvered leaf-monkey, the black colobus, the white colobus, the mountain go-
rilla, the mantled howler, the red howler, and japanese monkeys); see also Hrdy et al.,
supra note 171, at 151 (excepting tarsiers); Lysa Leland et al., Infanticide by Adult Males
in Three Primates Species of Kibale Forest, Uganda: A Test of Hypotheses, in INFAN-
TICIDE, supra note 79, at 151, 158-60 (addressing male redtail monkeys, blue monkeys,
and red colobus monkeys); Sommer, supra note 173, at 173-74 (addressing langurs).
207. See HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU, supra note 140, at 242-90; Crockett &
Sekulic, supra note 168, at 173; Hiraiwa-Hasegawa & Hasegawa, supra note 203, at 137,
139-42; Hrdy et al., supra note 171, at 152; Leland et al., supra note 206, at 151; Sommer,
supra note 173, at 173-74; Vogel & Loch, supra note 170, at 237, 253-54.
208. See Hrdy et al., supra note 171, at 151.
209. See HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU, supra note 140, at 242-90; Hrdy, Infanticide as
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within that troop.2" At least 95% of the time, infanticidal males
killed unrelated infants,21' and at least 75% of the time the infanticidal
male succeeded in siring subsequent offspring with the victim's
mother, following a significantly shortened inter-birth interval.212
Incidents of infanticide are also "surprisingly common ' '2' among
gorillas and chimpanzees. In mountain gorillas, for example, fully
14% of all infants are killed by males.2 4 And, in chimpanzees, while
both males and females kill infants,21 1 males generally target only
those infants likely to be unrelated to them, that is, with females in or
from another group.1
Moreover, and also as predicted by The Reproductive Access
theory, evolved counterstrategies appear to be at work. Adult pri-
mate males generally tend more closely to the infants they have sired
when other males are present,2 1 7 and females exhibit a variety of be-
haviors that appear to be narrowly tailored counterstrategies to
infanticidal attacks by males. For example, researchers have fre-
quently observed:
1) females from different social ranks forming temporary coali-
tions to protect infants in the presence of strange males;
2) females with unweaned infants holding back in encounters
with strange males or avoiding the boundaries of ranges alto-
gether;
3) mothers attempting to abandon their infants in the company
of familiar ousted males rather than take infants with them
back to a troop with an interloper in it;
4) mothers avoiding and even attacking such interlopers;
a Primate Reproductive Strategy, supra note 189, at 41-42; Sommer, supra note 173, at 155.
210. See Hrdy et al., supra note 171, at 153 (citing Sommer, supra note 173).
211. See Sommer, supra note 173, at 173-74.
212. See id.
213. Fossey, supra note 173, at 217,234.
214. See David P. Watts, Infanticide in Mountain Gorillas: New Cases and a Reconsid-
eration of the Evidence, 81 ETHOLOGY 1, 4-7 (1989).
215. See Fossey, supra note 173, at 217,230-34; Hiraiwa-Hasegawa & Hasegawa, supra
note 203, at 137, 144.
216. See Hiraiwa-Hasegawa & Hasegawa, supra note 203, at 144-50. Females who do
kill generally kill infants of unrelated females. See id. However, the data from chimpan-
zees are not completely unequivocal, in part because a pronounced desire for meat is a
complicating factor. See id. at 137, 139. Additionally, infanticide has not to date been
observed among bonobos, close relatives of chimpanzees. Personal Communication with
Dr. Frans de Waal, Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center and Psychology Depart-
ment, Emory University, in Squaw Valley, Cal. (June 21,1996).
217. See C.P. van Schaik & R.I.M. Dunbar, The Evolution of Monogamy in Large
Primates: A New Hypothesis and Some Crucial Tests, 115 BEHAVIOUR 30,45-48 (1990).
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5) laissez-faire mothers transforming into obsessively restrictive
ones in the presence of strange males; and
6) females migrating into groups coinciding with the lowest vul-
nerability to infanticide."8
c. Infanticide in Humans: The Evidence
When the data from non-human animals are not consistent with
the predictions of evolutionary theories, one need not ordinarily as-
sess whether data from the human animal are consistent. Aspects of
the theories may be unsound. However, when the data from a wide
variety of creatures appear largely consistent with the theories, as is
the case here, and when the data from close relatives to humans also
appear consistent, as is the case here, then an evolutionary analysis
must turn dispassionate scrutiny to the patterns observable in human
populations. If similar patterns emerge, then the theories might use-
fully contribute to both our understanding of the behavior, and to
law's attempts to regulate it.
What follows illustrates the kind of research and the kind of evi-
dence necessary to test evolutionary theories with empirical
observations of the human animal. Specifically, it surveys cross-
cultural and cross-time evidence of how Homo sapiens sapiens treat
their offspring in order to continue assessing whether detailed knowl-
edge of evolutionary theories can increase the effectiveness of our
efforts to curtail various aspects of child abuse. If human psychology
has been shaped by natural selection, for example, then we may ex-
pect to find in the ethnographic record a correspondence between the
circumstances in which evolutionary theories predict diminished pa-
rental solicitude and the circumstances and rationales of actual
infanticide.1 9
As will be seen below, ancient and modern humans not only kill
infants with regularity, but they do so in circumstances powerfully
218. See Hrdy et al., supra note 171, at 151-52 (citing, inter alia, van Schaik & Dunbar,
supra note 217). The first of these points is courtesy of a personal communication from
Dr. Michael McGuire, who has extensive experience with vervet monkeys. For more on
extra-familial female alliances and their several functions, see Dorothy L. Cheney, Extra-
familial Alliances Among Vervet Monkeys, in PRIMATE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS: AN
INTEGRATED APPROACH 278 (Robert A. Hinde ed., 1983). For further observations on
evolved counterstrategies, see JANE GOODALL, THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE:
PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR (1986); HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU, supra note 140, at 279-
84 and Jan R. de Ruiter, Infanticide Counter-Strategies, 5 EVOLUTIONARY AN-
THROPOLOGY 5 (1996).
219. See Wilson & Daly, The Psychology of Parenting in Evolutionary Perspective,
supra note 155.
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consistent with the predictions of evolutionary theory, and with the
empirical evidence from other species. Because the truth of this
counter-intuitive proposition is evident only when both the coher-
ence of the larger picture and the detail of its constituent elements
come into view, we will proceed from the general to the specific-
looking first at the larger descriptive context and then examining the
extent to which human child-killing distributes among the four theo-
ries Hrdy identified. We will subsequently explore several specific
predictions, and, for brevity's sake, focus on only one of them (which
addresses patterns in stepparent-stepchild relations) for illustrative
purposes.
(1) Child-Killing in Homo sapiens sapiens: An Overview
Many today assume that human infanticide has always been both
rare and universally condemned.m That is fantastically untrue.
Homo sapiens sapiens, like other primates, has long been a highly
infanticidal species." Many historic and current societies have con-
220. See, e.g., Roger Wertheimer, Philosophy on Humanity, in ABORTION: NEW
DIRECTION FOR POLICY STUDIES 117, 135-36 n.15 (Manier et al. eds., 1977) (assuming
that prohibitions against child-killing are "endorsed by a mono-lithic consensus"); see also
Kathryn L. Moseley, The History of Infanticide in Western Society, 1 ISSUES L. & MED.
345, 345 (1986) (noting that "[w]e preferred to think that we had been exempted from the
stigma of murdering our young"); Richard C. Trexler, Infanticide in Florence: New
Sources and First Results, 1 HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 98, 98-99 (1973) (reporting evidence to
rebut assumption that infanticide is rare).
221. On the history of infanticide in humans, see BREINER, supra note 143 (examining
infanticide in five ancient civilizations: Greece, Rome, Egypt, Israel, and China);
WILLIAM BURKE RYAN, INFANTICIDE: ITS LAW, PREVALENCE, PREVENTION, AND
HISTORY (1862); Mildred Dickemann, Demographic Consequences of Infanticide in Man,
6 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 107 (1975) (containing an excellent review of
the history of infanticide research and theory to 1975); Langer, supra note 137; Anna Fer-
raris Oliverio, Infanticide in Western Cultures: A Historical Overview, in INFANTICIDE &
PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at 105; Susan C.M. Scrimshaw, Infanticide in Human
Populations: Societal and Individual Concerns, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 439;
Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect: Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Ma-
trix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1972); N. Prabha Unnithan, Children as
Victims of Homicide: Part I-Historical and Anthropological Research, 23 CRIM. JUST.
ABST. 146 (1991) [hereinafter Unnithan, Historical and Anthropological Research]; N.
Prabha Unnithan, Children as Victims of Homicide: Part II-Research on Child Homicide
in Contemporary Societies, 23 CRIM. JUST. ABST. 315 (1991); Frederick S. vor Saal, The
Role of Socia4 Religious and Medical Practices in the Neglect, Abuse, Abandonment and
Killing of Infants, in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at 43; Williamson,
supra note 137.
The methods of eliminating an unwanted child, in humans, appear to have changed
little over time. They run the gamut of human devices from deliberate killing, abandon-
ment, and excessive neglect to placing children in particularly dangerous situations. One
mother, for example, placed her baby in the feeding trough of hungry pigs. See Rene
Leboutte, Offense Against Family Order: Infanticide in Belgium from the Fifteenth
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doned, or at least tolerated, the killing of human offspring.m Al-
though today reproduction can be carefully planned, surplus infants,
that significantly drain already-taxed child-rearing resources, have
often historically been looked upon as the unavoidable and incon-
venient result of sexual desire."' The local moral intuition that
Through the Early Twentieth Centuries, 2 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 159, 174 (1991). Drown-
ings appear to be especially preferred (although that appearance may follow only from an
increased likelihood of discovery). Between 1788 and 1829 in England, for example, ba-
bies were drowned in pits full of water, cisterns, wells, ponds, and even pans of water. See
Samuel X. Radbill, Children in a World of Violence: A History of Child Abuse, in THE
BATTERED CHILD 3,6 (Ray E. Heifer & C. Henry Kempe eds., 4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter
THE BATTERED CHILD]. Privies and sewers were then, and in earlier centuries, also es-
pecially favored, for obvious reasons. See MARIA W. PIERS, INFANTICIDE 14-15 (1978);
DAVID L. RANSEL, MOTHERS OF MISERY: CHILD ABANDONMENT IN RUSSIA 6 (1988);
Leboutte, supra, at 173; Radbill, supra, at 3, 6. For example, workers rebuilding Rennes
in France in 1721 discovered the skeletons of more than 80 infants in the sewer. See Le-
boutte, supra, at 173.
Smothering a child, or beating it to death, were common methods that can still be ob-
served today. See, e.g., R. FIRTH, WE, THE TIKOPIA 415 (1957); N. HOWELL, THE
POPULATION OF THE DOBE AREA KUNG 119 (1979); CYRIL JOHN POLSON ET AL., THE
ESSENTIALS OF FORENSIC MEDICINE 514-31 (1985); Radbill, supra, at 8-9; Scrimshaw,
supra, at 439; Williamson, supra note 137, at 61, 64. The burial of living babies is also a
common method, particularly throughout the Amazon. See CHARLES WAGLEY,
WELCOME OF TEARS: THE TAPIRAPt INDIANS OF CENTRAL BRAZIL 137 (1977); Hrdy,
Fitness Tradeoffs, supra note 82, at 33 (citing THOMAS GREGOR, ANXIOUS PLEASURES:
THE SEXUAL LIVES OF AMAZONIAN PEOPLE 89 (1985)).
222. Scholars on the prevalence and incidence of infanticide generally lament the
"remarkable gulf between the historical facts about the practice of infanticide, and what
most people in present-day Western society take those facts to be." MICHAEL TOOLEY,
ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 316 (1983); see also 1, 2 THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN
ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (4th ed. 1996) (reporting, in 1807, infanticide
in Australia, the Pacific, North and South America, Central Asia, India, and China);
TOOLEY, supra, at 322 ("[T]he moral intuitions of people in most societies regarding in-
fanticide have differed significantly from those which are common in present-day
Western society."); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, A Sociobiological Analysis of Human
Infanticide [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infanticide], in
INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 487, 488-95 (describing the prevalence of infanticidal
practices); Langer, supra note 137, at 354 (noting infanticide freely discussed and con-
doned by authorities). According to one commentator:
Infanticide is a practice present-day westerners regard as a cruel and inhuman
custom, resorted to by only a few desperate and primitive people living in harsh
environments. We tend to think of it as an exceptional practice.... The truth is
quite different. Infanticide has been practised on every continent and by people
on every level of cultural complexity.... Rather than being an exception, then,
it has been the rule.
Williamson, supra note 137, at 61.
223. See Langer, supra note 137, at 354.
For those without property, security or prospects, children were sometimes an
unmitigated nuisance. There was the cost of feeding and housing them and the
opportunity cost in the removal of the wife for a time from productive labour in
order to breast-feed and look after the children. Even if the child could be gain-
fully employed after the age of seven .... there were still seven years in which it
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infanticide is cruel and inhuman is in fact a quite recent and minority
view.
An oft-cited statistic estimates that humans practiced infanticide
at least as early as the Pleistocene (the Great Ice Age, roughly 70,000
to 10,000 years ago) when an estimated 15% to 50% of all children
were killed.' Although little data are available to reveal specific pat-
terns in infanticidal practices, we do know that infanticide was not
uncommon among ancestral hunter-gatherer, horticulturalist, and
stratified agrarian societies,' and that the killing of human children
long remained prevalent among ancient Arabs, Chinese, Indians, and
certain Hindu castes.O7 Greeks and Romans practiced infanticide
widely, and often openly, by abandoning live infants in wild areas, a
practice known as "exposure." m Furthermore, each Roman father of
700 B.C. possessed the legal right to sell, abandon, sacrifice, devour,
or kill his child, particularly if he suspected it was not his own. '
While the state generally disapproved of the widespread practice of
exposing healthy infants-exposing weak and deformed infants was
another matter entirely. The law of Sparta, for example, actually re-
quired the exposure of such babes,' ° and The Roman Law of the
Twelve Tables specifically forbade the rearing of the deformed," the
death of whom Aristotle (and many believe Plato also) expressly ad-
would have to be fed.
LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 295
(abridged ed. 1979).
224. As one infanticide researcher put it, "[m]odern humanitarian sentiment makes it
difficult to recapture the relatively detached attitude of [some] parents towards [some]
offspring." Langer, supra note 137, at 354.
225. See Joseph B. Birdsell, Some Predictions for the Pleistocene Based on Equilibrium
Systems Among Recent Hunter-Gatherers, in MAN THE HUNTER 229,239 (Richard B. Lee
& Irven DeVore eds., 1966).
226. See Dickemann, supra note 221, at 109.
227. See TOOLEY, supra note 222, at 315-16; see also Oliverio, supra note 221, at 107
(noting that in the ancient Middle East, Moabites, Phoenicians, and Jews practiced child
sacrifice); Radbill, supra note 222, at 9 (reporting that in China, India, Mexico, and Peru,
children were cast into rivers as offerings). Ritual sacrifice was also apparently common
among ancient Hebrews, Egyptians, and Babylonians, as well as Mayans and Aztecs. See
RYAN, supra note 221, at 177-258; Williamson, supra note 137, at 71-72.
228. See TOOLEY, supra note 222, at 316; Langer, supra note 137, at 354; Cynthia Pat-
terson, "Not Worth the Rearing": The Causes of Infant Exposure in Ancient Greece, 115
TRANSACTIONS AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS'N. 103, 104-23 (1985); Williamson, supra note
137, at 69.
229. See Radbill, supra note 221, at 6, 14; see also Max Radin, The Exposure of Infants
in Roman Law and Practice, 20 CLASSICAL J. 337, 338-43 (1925) (discussing lawfulness of
infanticide by fathers under Roman law).
230. See TOOLEY, supra note 222, at 316.
231. See BREINER, supra note 143, at 7 (citing Emiel Eyben, Family Planning in
Greaco-Roman Antiquity, 11/12 ANCIENT SoC. 5 (1980-81)).
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vocated2m
With the spread of the Christian religions, attitudes toward
child-killing became less uniformly tolerant. Nevertheless, it was not
until the fourth century A.D. that the Roman Emperors even made
infanticide a crime'3--and the practice continued regardless. In the
early Middle Ages, for example, people generally maintained a con-
venient moral distinction between infanticide, which was prohibited,
and mere exposure, which was not.' Either way, parents killed in-
fants or left them to die "on a gigantic scale with absolute impunity,
noticed by writers with the most frigid indifference." 5
Few governments attempted to curb widespread infanticide until
the mid-1700s.26 In London, for example, "the daily sight of infant
corpses thrown on dust heaps" 7 had inspired public support for a
limited admission public child-rearing facility, a "foundling" hospital,
on the theory that parents would give unwanted children to the state,
rather than kill them, if such an option were available. Problems sur-
faced immediately. In English foundling hospitals, for example, as in
similar ones throughout Europe and Russia, unwanted infants were
nursed by "wetnurses" (paid lactating women), many of whom simply
killed one of their own sucklings to take on a paying one in its
stead2 8 In addition, new mothers could often be seen "scrambling
and fighting" ' to be first at a hospital's door, since hospital admis-
sions were limited. Moreover, it was widely believed that many other
parents of that time would still rather dispose of their children se-
cretly than abandon them to the hospitals in full view of their
contemporaries.
232. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, book 7, ch. 16; PLATO, REPUBLIC 174, 410
(Waterfield trans., 1993); Patterson, supra note 228, at 113.
233. See Langer, supra note 137, at 355. Christian religions were influenced by Judaic
law forbidding murder, and the eminent Jewish-Hellenistic philosopher Philo Judaeus
denounced the exposure of children as a form of murder. See id.
234. See id.
235. 2 WILLIAM E.H. LECKY, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS FROM AUGUSTUS
TO CHARLEMAGNE 27 (1869); accord RANSEL, supra note 221, at 4; STONE, supra note
223, at 296-97; R.J. Kellett, Infanticide and Child Destruction-The Historical, Legal and
Pathological Aspects, 53 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 1 (1992) (providing historical overview of
infanticide).
236. See Langer, supra note 137, at 356; Kellett, supra note 235, at 2-3; Trexler, supra
note 220, at 99; Williamson, supra note 137, at 69. Scattered previous efforts to stem in-
fanticide with church-sponsored foundling hospitals, mainly in Italy, had proved
ineffectual. See Langer, supra note 137, at 356.
237. Langer, supra note 137, at 358.
238. See PIERS, supra note 221, at 52; RANSEL, supra note 221, at 207-08.
239. Langer, supra note 137, at 359 (citing JOHN BROWNLOW, THE HISTORY AND
DESIGN OF THE FOUNDLING HOSPITAL 7 (1868)).
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This led governments in many countries to experiment with
open, unlimited admissions policies, which provide some suggestive
glimpse into the rates (properly qualified) at which people acted to
rid themselves, one way or another, of unwanted infants in the ab-
sence of-and even through-such policies.24 In 1756, for example,
the English Parliament threw the foundling hospital doors open to
everyone, everywhere, throughout the kingdom.241 Many European
and Russian hospitals went further, instituting a double-blind
"turning cradle" admissions technique, which preserved the anonym-
ity of a parent who might, it was supposed, otherwise have killed the
child.2
Response to these policies was staggering. In England, for ex-
ample, three to four thousand babies were deposited every year,
"collected in baskets from all over the country by itinerant baby
transporters, who dumped the contents [at the foundling hospital]
dead, dying or half-alive."2 43 In the year 1833 alone, over 164,000 ba-
bies were left among roughly 300 foundling hospitals in France.2'
And, in the late 1800s, the central homes for foundlings in Moscow
and St. Petersburg were taking in 17,000 and 9,000 infants per year,
respectively, many having been collected by the cartload, for a par-
ent-paid fee, by traveling entrepreneurs.4
Parents knew that most abandoned children would die. Babes
were deposited in such great numbers, and with such notoriously
small hope of survival, that the practice was often referred to simply
as "legalized infanticide."2 6 Indeed, so many babies deposited in
England died (10,000 of the first 15,000, for example) that the found-
ling hospitals were called "little more than licensed death camps, '247 a
virtual "charnel-house for the dead."2" The mortality rates were
240. See Langer, supra note 137, at 358-60. On the connection between abandonment
and infanticide, see Hrdy, Fitness Tradeoffs, supra note 82.
241. See Langer, supra note 137, at 359.
242. Parents could deposit a baby on a specially-built turntable in the side of a win-
dowless wall, ring a bell to signal the baby's presence, and then hurriedly leave without
being seen. See RANSEL, supra note 221, at 62-83. Turntabling appears to have started in
France with an 1811 decree of Napoleon. See JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER
149-53 (1994); Langer, supra note 137, at 358.
243. STONE, supra note 223, at 298.
244. See Langer, supra note 137, at 359.
245. See RANSEL, supra note 221, at 3, 150.
246. Langer, supra note 137, at 359.
247. STONE, supra note 223, at 299.
248. Langer, supra note 137, at 359 (citing BROWNLOW, supra note 239, at 7).
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even worse elsewhere,249 ultimately compelling governments to close
the foundling hospitals as a disastrous, failed experiment in the re-
duction of child-killing.20 By the 1860s, then, it was once again
common to see dead infants in English parks, ditches, and garbage
heaps. 1 One hundred fifty dead infants were found each year in
streets and waterways of Middlesex county alone, 2 and in the five
years between 1855 and 1860, nearly 300 killed infants were found in
the waterways and alleys of London.23
Roughly contemporaneously, more enterprising parents enrolled
their infants in so-called "burial clubs"-a life insurance vehicle in
which, for a one pound investment, a parent could reap three to five
pounds of profit when that child was buried; because multiple policies
were available, some parents enrolled their children in ten or more
such clubs and "reap[ed] a rich return at the proper time. '  The in-
cidence of baby-farming and baby-dumping (collecting a fee for
raising a child but killing it instead) was so frequent that in 1872 Par-
liament passed the Infant Life Protection Act."' Nevertheless, forty
newborns were found in the Thames River during the winter of 1895
249. Because nearly all children admitted to hospitals were under a year old (96.5%),
the very trip to the hospital from rural areas was often fatal. See JOAN SHERWOOD,
POVERTY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SPAIN: THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF THE
INCLUSA 129, 139 (1988). Sixty to ninety percent of those surviving the trip, in the mid to
late 1800s, died anyway-in part because many governments sent infants to wet nurses by
whom they were sold or killed. See BREINER, supra note 143, at 7; RANSEL, supra note
221, at 257-59; Radbill, supra note 221, at 3, 7 ("[Eighty percent] of the illegitimate chil-
dren put out to nurse in London during the nineteenth century died. As a matter of fact,
some nurses had a reputation as skilled baby killers."). Additionally, 92% of foundlings
in France died before their eighth birthday. See Hrdy, Fitness Tradeoffs, supra note 82, at
26 (citing A. DUPOUX, SUR LES PAS DE MONSIEUR VINCENT: TROIS CENTS ANS
D'HISTOIRE PARISIENNE DE L'ENFANCE ABANDONNEE, REVUE DE L'ASSISTANCE
PUBLIQUE (1958)). In Spain, the mortality rate approached 87% at the end of the cen-
tury. See SHERWOOD, supra, at 125. At one Spanish foundling hospital, for example,
58% of the infants died before leaving-and of those who survived and were sent to wet
nurses, 88% died. See id. at 174. This represents an overall survival rate of barely five
children for each 100 left alive with the hospital. See id.
250. See Langer, supra note 137, at 359.
251. See RYAN, supra note 221, at 45-176; see also RANSEL, supra note 221, at 6
(describing infanticide in Europe).
252. See PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE
IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND 1558-1803, at 159 (1981).
253. See id. at 159-60; see also RYAN, supra note 221, at 49-50 (quoting local publica-
tion that 500 infants were killed between 1856 and 1861 and that 60 were taken from
waterways alone).
254. Langer, supra note 137, at 360; accord LIONEL ROSE, THE MASSACRE OF THE
INNOCENTS: INFANTICIDE IN BRITAIN 1800-1939, at 136-58 (1986); RYAN, supra note
221, at 21-22.
255. See Langer, supra note 137, at 359-62.
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alone. 6
Today, just a century later, infanticide remains more disturbingly
common than is generally acknowledged. In a modern-day South
American country, for example, many poor Catholics reportedly view
contraception as a bigger sin than infanticide, and not infrequently
kill their seventh or eighth infant.' Additionally, in some modem
human societies, more than 40% of all infants are intentionally
killed5 8 In others, infanticide rates have been estimated between
15% and 20%.2" In the United States, infanticide is nowhere near as
rare an event as the media coverage of the notorious Susan Smith
case seemed to suggest;260 conservative estimates indicate that roughly
1200 to 5000 infants die from child abuse each year.5 In California
alone, in fact, the frequency with which live newborns are left in
dumpsters has lead one hospital to post signs at the dumpsters stating
"Don't Throw Away a Life"-and showing a large red "X" over a
picture of outstretched arms tossing a baby into a trash can. 62
256. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 252, at 160. For particularly gruesome accounts
of infanticides in England, see NORMAN LUCAS, THE CHILD KILLERS (1970).
257. See PIERS, supra note 221, at 15-16.
258. See Wulf SchiefenhSvel, Reproduction and Sex-Ratio Manipulation Through Pref-
erential Female Infanticide Among the Epo, in the Highlands of West New Guinea, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY OF SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE STRATEGIES 170, fig. 10.7 (Anne E.
Rasa et al. eds., 1989).
259. See James V. Neel, Lessons from a "Primitive" People, 170 ScI. 815, 816 (1970).
260. See, e.g., Death and Deceit, TIME, Nov. 14, 1994, at 43 (cover caption, "How
Could She Do It?"). Federal health officials, considering child homicide as a whole, re-
port that nearly three-quarters of all child homicides in the industrialized world occur in
the United States. See Judith Havemann, For Children, An Epidemic of Homicide: U.S.
Leads Rich Nations in Violence Against Youth, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1997, at Al.
261. See CRITICAL FIRST STEPS, supra note 138, at 56. For the purposes of this Arti-
cle, such deaths are considered infanticidal. See supra note 137.
262. See John Ritter, Dead Infants: A Grim Statistic, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 1995, at
3A. The hospital offers to ensure that the baby gets adopted.
DON'T THROW AWAY A LIFE.
WE'LL PICK UP AND CARE FOR
YOUR BABY.
1-800-606-BABY
Don't aban~don your baby. Caii u.
We'll pick up and care for your baby,
and then place him orher with
specil services which will find your
baby a home. And iWYOU need help.
we're here for you, too. All calls arc
confidential. Let us help you. @
1-80" 6B S,.F-ed.h-kC-
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(2) Representative Predictions
Adult Homo sapiens sapiens do kill infants in patterns predicted
by each of the four theories Hrdy identified2m  Consistent with The
Exploitation Theory, infants have been eaten as a resource in a vari-
ety of human societies, spanning time and cultures from Pleistocene
man to the Aztecs and from the Australian aborigines to the Eski-
mose (often on the theory that the blood and flesh of slain infants
would bring good health). Ancient Chinese, Indians, Mexicans, and
Peruvians often threw babies into rivers to bring good harvests *and
good luck, and many cultures sacrificed children by infixing them in
building foundations to ensure their stability.2" And some modem
mothers intentionally induce sometimes fatal illness in their children
in order to arouse sympathy and attention. 7 Consistent with The
Resource Competition Theory, history shows that the dominant often
suppress the reproduction of those deemed inferior, indirectly (as
through castration) or directly (as via gas chambers). Indeed the Na-
zis developed an unusually frank plan to eliminate up to 50,000
Russian children "to reduce the direct growth of enemy strength
[and] to impair its biological strength in the distant future.""2 8 And if
certain texts be accurate, one King Herod's fear of a supplanting
messiah led him to order the death of all males under the age of
two, ' while one Pharaoh, fearing the Jews, reportedly did likewise.Y
Studies indicate, however, that the vast majority of human child-
killings sort into patterns predicted by the DPS and Reproductive Ac-
cess theories. For example, when prominent evolutionary
psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson examined a database of
263. See Mildred Dickemann, Concepts and Classification in the Study of Human In-
fanticide: Sectional Introduction and Some Cautionary Notes [hereinafter Dickemann,
Concepts and Classification], in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 427, 428.
264. See id. at 428-29; Dickemann, supra note 221, at 108.
265. See Thomas, supra note 221, at 296.
266. See id.
267. See, e.g., Lundstrom & Sharpe, supra note 138, at 21 (reporting on mother who
apparently attempted to procure sympathy by feeding child vomit-inducing medicine until
he died). Not all such exploitation is fatal. Parents anxious to secure pecuniary or other
benefits from aroused sympathy have intentionally gouged eyes, amputated or twisted
arms and legs, and broken or deformed feet. See PIERS, supra note 221, at 15-16; see also
Radbill, supra note 221, at 3 (noting instance in which mother continually injected her
child with fecal bacteria because she enjoyed being part of the "glamor of the hospital"
(citation omitted)).
268. See Dickemann, Concepts and Classification, supra note 264, at 429 (quoting a
Wehrmacht memorandum of June 1944).
269. See Matthew 2:16.
270. See Exodus 1:16.
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materials in the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) for sixty socie-
ties,27" ' they found that infanticide was practiced in at least thirty-nine
of the sixty societies and that the rationales for infanticide had been
noted for thirty-five of those thirty-nine.2n Cumulating the rationales
across the thirty-five, Daly and Wilson compiled a total of 112 expla-
nations for infanticide, which they subsequently sorted. They found
powerful support for the hypotheses we examine here: Infanticide
was nowhere common in circumstances that did not make reproduc-
tive, evolutionary sense, and in fact most rationales did.
Consistent with The DPS Theory, for example, which predicts
that infanticide will increase commensurate with factors indicating
that the prospects for a given child to significantly contribute to pa-
rental reproductive success are low, deformed or very ill children
were frequently killed or abandoned in twenty-one of the thirty-five
societies.2  Furthermore, in only one of these societies was such be-
havior disapproved274 (perhaps in part because such children often
burdened the larger community as well). Fully half the rationales
represented variations on maternal overburdening. In fourteen so-
cieties, for example, the birth of twins was commonly thought to
require the killing of one. 5 These particular findings are consistent
with those of other researchers, who have concluded that various
human societies have commonly accepted child-killing when: the de-
271. These sixty are commonly considered the "Probability Sample" from which
maximally accurate estimates can be made about the prevalence of various practices
among humans at large. See Daly & Wilson, A Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infan-
ticide, supra note 222, at 489 (explaining Probability Sample and HRAF). The probability
sample was devised by cultural anthropologists to be independent and representative of
world cultures. The HRAF contains ethnographic source material published up to 1971.
272. See id. This does not mean that infanticide does not occur in the other societies.
See, e.g., W.T. Divale & M. Harris, Population, Warfare and the Male Supremacist Com-
plex, 78 AM. ANTHROPOLOGY 521, 533-35 & app. (1976) (reporting that 36% of
preindustrial cultures studied (40 of 112) practiced infanticide commonly, and at least
13% (14 of 112) did so occasionally).
273. See Daly-& Wilson, Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infanticide, supra note
222, at 490-92; see also Dickemann, supra note 221, at 117-20 (discussing deformity as a
predictor); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Culture, Scarcity, and Maternal Thinking: Maternal
Detachment and Infant Survival in a Brazilian Shantytown, 13 ETHOS 291, 304-06 (1985)
(discussing same).
274. See Daly & Wilson, Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infanticide, supra note
222, at 492.
275. See id. In these societies, the child designated for death was either the second
born, the weaker, or the female. See id. Twin infanticide appeared more common in so-
cieties in which mothers have a heavy workload or have a minimum amount of assistance
in raising their offspring. See Gary Granzberg, Twin Infanticide: A Cross-Cultural Test of
a Materialistic Explanation, 1 ETHOS 405,406-08, 410-11 (1973).
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sired maximum number of children have already been born," the
spacing between them is inadequate,2" the child is not of the desired
sex,27 the mother is mentally or physically defective,279 one parent has
276. See 1 E.A. WESTERMARCK, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL
IDEAS 396-405 (2d ed. 1912); Hrdy, Fitness Tradeoffs, supra note 82, at 3, 6; see also
Scrimshaw, supra note 221, at 439 (noting that Japanese farmers referred to infanticide as
"thinning out"). This is "extremely prevalent" in societies in which custom determines
how many children a family should have, such as in Melanesia and Polynesia, and among
the Australian Aborigines and certain African tribes. See TOOLEY, supra note 222, at
315. Among the formerly highly mobile Australian Aborigines, for example, it was con-
sidered infeasible for a woman to carry more than one infant child with her as the tribe
wandered. See HERBERT APTEKAR, ANJEA: INFANTICIDE, ABORTION AND CON-
TRACEPTION IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 159-60 (1931).
277. See Birdsell, supra note 225, at 239; Neel, supra note 259, at 816; Scrimshaw, su-
pra note 221, at 446, 459; cf. Helen L. Ball & Catherine M. Hill, Reevaluating "Twin
Infanticide," 37 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 856, 861 (1996) ("Twins may... be subjected
to infanticide for birth spacing and / or population control, but because of lack of data we
cannot adequately test these predictions at present."). Birth spacing has been more im-
portant in human history than is commonly realized, because resource-poor mothers may
lose every child if resources are spread among them, rather than concentrated. See Wil-
liamson, supra note 137, at 64-65. Studies indicate that in humans the second child of a
closely spaced pair is more likely to die. See, e.g., D. Wolfers & S.C.M. Scrimshaw, Child
Survival and Intervals Between Pregnancies in Guayaquil Ecuador, 29 POPULATION STUD.
479 (1975). In some parts of the world, "killing a newborn is often explained as a caring
act, done to save the life of an older sibling who is too young to be weaned but is already a
member of the social group and cherished as such." Williamson, supra note 137, at 63.
Multiple births exacerbate the resources problem and often lead to thinning through in-
fanticide. See Bojosi Otlhogile, Infanticide in Bechuanaland: A Footnote to Schapera, 34
J. AFR. L. 159, 161 (1990); Scrimshaw, supra note 221, at 446; Williamson, supra note 137,
at 65. In such cases, the strongest child is generally kept. See Scrimshaw, supra note 221,
at 446; see also Catherine M. Hill & Helen L. Ball, Abnormal Births and Other "Ill
Omens:" The Adaptive Case for Infanticide, 7 HUM. NATURE 381, 382 (1996) (stating
that twins (one or both) are generally victims of infanticide because they are "poorer
quality" infants).
278. See BREINER, supra note 143, at 8 (noting that girls are generally killed more
frequently than boys); KANTi B. PAKRASI, FEMALE INFANTICIDE IN INDIA (1970);
RANSEL, supra note 221, at 11, 130-49; R.K. SAXENA, SOCIAL REFORMS: INFANTICIDE
AND SATI (1975) (describing difficulties of trying to combat the practice of sex-biased
infanticide in India); Sharon K. Hom, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights
Specter and Thoughts Towards (An)Other Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249
(1991-92); Sheila Ryan Johnson, Deferred Infanticide: Excess Female Mortality During
Childhood, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 463; Langer, supra note 137, at 354 (noting
that in ancient times, generally more girls than boys were disposed of); Scrimshaw, supra
note 221, at 439 (discussing female infanticide in China and India); Williamson, supra note
137, at 61, 63, 67-69 (noting that in those societies in which males are strongly preferred,
the society prefers infanticide to abortion); see also Eric L. Chamov, The Evolutionary
Ecology of Sex Allocation: A Primer, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 125 (discussing
advantages of biasing offspring sex ratio); Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolution-
ary Biology, supra note 3, at 187,202-07 (discussing the Trivers-Willard hypothesis on the
parental fitness effects of offspring sex, which vary as a function of both inherently differ-
ent reproductive prospects of each sex and the differential influence of environmental
conditions on those prospects); Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology
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died,m the infant exhibits physical or mental defects,"' or the parents
are poor.'
Consistent with both the DPS and Reproductive Access theories,
Daly and Wilson's study also found that fully twenty of the rationales
explaining infanticide, from fifteen societies, highlighted non-
paternity as a justification.m In two societies, for example (the Tik-
opia of Oceania and the Yanomamo of South America), men
acquiring wives who already have children reportedly can put those
children to death.m Again, this finding is supported by many other
studies, which have found that eliminating an illegitimate child is one
of the leading explanations of infanticide.S
More specifically, a brief and focused comparison of empirical
evidence with several of the falsifiable predictions of evolutionary
theories set forth in Part II.B.L.b above (and re-phrased for uniquely
human contexts) will provide a representative sample of the research
regarding infant deaths in humans.' The first five of these predic-
tions derive principally from DPS Theory, applicable to species
exhibiting significant parental investment. The last two derive prin-
cipally from Reproductive Access Theory, applicable to species, such
Enabling the Predetermination of a Child's Gender, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-19 (1992)
(describing sex preferences around the world).
279. See CHARLES WAGLEY, WELCOME OF TEARS: THE TAPIRAPt INDIANS OF
CENTRAL BRAZIL 251 (1977) (noting that the Tapirap6 Indians buried the children of
epileptic women immediately after birth).
280. See Scrimshaw, supra note 221, at 445.
281. See TOOLEY, supra note 222, at 315; Langer, supra note 137, at 353-54 ("Among
non-Christian peoples (with the exception of the Jews) infanticide has from time imme-
morial been the accepted procedure for disposing ... of deformed or sickly infants.");
Moseley, supra note 220, at 345-51; Otlhogile, supra note 277, at 162; Scrimshaw, supra
note 221, at 446; Williamson, supra note 137, at 61, 64; see also H. Rutherford Turnbull,
Incidence of Infanticide in America: Public and Professional Attitudes, 1 ISSUES L. &
MED. 363 (1986) (reporting continuing biases against the handicapped).
282. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 252, at 115 ("For the poor female servant who
could not afford to lose her job, much less feed another mouth, just as for the overbur-
dened cottager family with perhaps one too many offspring already, infanticide might
have seemed a matter of survival."); ROSE, supra note 254, at 15-21; Langer, supra note
137, at 353-54.
283. See Daly & Wilson, Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infanticide, supra note
222, at 489.
284. See id.
285. See ROSE, supra note 254, at 22-34; RYAN, supra note 221, at 36 (reporting that,
in many countries in the mid-1800s, the mortality rate of illegitimate children was 60% to
70% higher than for legitimate children); TOOLEY, supra note 222, at 315; Otlhogile, su-
pra note 277, at 161-62; Radbill, supra note 221, at 5, 15; Scrimshaw, supra note 221, at
448; Williamson, supra note 137, at 61, 64-66.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 170-73. The predictions build, in part, on the
seminal work ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS, supra note 3.
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as humans, manifesting lactational ammenorheaf 7
Prediction 1: The probability of child homicide by parents will be
maximal with infants and will rapidly decline with a child's age,
in contrast to child homicide by nonparents.
Rationale: An inclination to end investment in dependent offspring,
if adaptive, would be expected to occur more frequently when
the children are young, because such children had (at least
during the environment of evolutionary adaptation) a far
lower probability than older children of surviving to reproduc-
tive age.
Fact: There is a major decrease in parental homicides following the
first year of a child's life.m
Prediction 2: Children of poor health will be at greater risk of infanti-
cide than children of good health.
Rationale: Natural selection will have favored parents that allocate
their parental investments in offspring in proportions reflecting
the projected increase in parental reproductive success each may
ultimately provide. 9
Fact: They are.l Much evidence suggests that mothers vary solici-
tude as a function of health indicators (such as birthweight29 )
287. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
288. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 252, at 124 (noting that 80% of the cases in-
volved neonate victims); ROSE, supra note 254, at 8 (noting that between 1863 and 1887
in England and Wales 61% of all homicides were of children under age one); ALISON
WALLACE, N.S.W. BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, ATTORNEY GEN.
DEP'T, HOMICIDE: THE SOCIAL REALITY 111 (1986) (reporting that 49% of all child
victims are killed before their first birthday; 68% killed before fifth birthday); Martin
Daly & Margo Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks of Not Living with Both Parents, 6
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 197, 197 (1985) [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Child Abuse
and Other Risks]; Daly & Wilson, Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infanticide, supra
note 222, at 496 (noting 137 infant deaths to 49 one-year-old deaths); Michael J. Durfee et
al., Origins and Clinical Relevance of Child Death Review Teams, 267 JAMA 3172, 3172-
73 (1992) (noting that 50% are under the age of one); Wilson & Daly, Psychology of Par-
enting in Evolutionary Perspective, supra note 155, at 83-85; cf. Starr, supra note 115, at 41
(reporting that 79% of physical abuse reports in Arizona, and 85% in Louisiana, concern
children younger than four).
289. See Daly & Wilson, Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infanticide, supra note
222, at 492.
290. See, e.g., Dickemann, supra note 221, at 117-20; see also Scheper-Hughes, supra
note 273, at 304-06 (concluding that, in one Brazilian shantytown, poor infant health often
triggers selective and fatal neglect).
291. See Wilson & Daly, The Psychology of Parenting in Evolutionary Perspective,
supra note 155, at 90-92.
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and that a very high percentage of children killed or abandoned
at birth were born with handicaps or other disabilities.2'
Prediction 3: Infanticidal mothers will be relatively young.
Rationale: Parental willingness to invest in present offspring, other
things being equal, should increase as the parent's own remain-
ing reproductive years dwindle. An offspring will effectively
increase in value as the parent's ability to replace it approaches
zero.
Fact: The frequency distribution of children per maternal age at birth
of child varies significantly from the relative risk of abuse.293 The
292. See Dickemann, supra note 221, at 117-20; Oliverio, supra note 221, at 114-15.
For more on the relationship between abuse and poor health, see INFANTICIDE AND THE
HANDICAPPED NEWBORN (Dennis J. Horan & Melinda Dalahoyde eds., 1982);
AMERICAN HUMANE ASS'N, NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND
ABUSE REPORTING 15 fig.4 (1978); Harold P. Martin et al., The Development of Abused
Children, 21 ADVANCES PEDIATRICS 25 (1974); Carol W. Morse et al., A Three-Year
Follow-Up Study of Abused and Neglected Children, 120 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 439,
445 (1970); and Alice Sandgrund et al., Child Abuse and Mental Retardation: A Problem
of Cause and Effect, 79 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 327,327-29 (1974).
293. For example, in Belgium, historically, the large majority of those committing in-
fanticide were "young servants of rural origin." Leboutte, supra note 221, at 164 (citing
Regina Schulte, Infanticide in Rural Bavaria in the Nineteenth Century, in INTEREST AND
EMOTION: ESSAYS ON THE STUDY OF FAMILY AND KINSHIP 77, 77 (Hans Medick &
David Warren Sabean eds., 1984)). In England, typically, women who kill neonates are
poor, young, and unmarried. See POLSON ET AL., supra note 221, at 514; Morris Bro-
zovsky & Harvey Falit, Neonaticide" Clinical and Psychodynamic Consideration, 10 AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY J. 673, 677 (1971); see also HOFFER & HULL, supra note 252,
at 95, 97 (noting that the typical offender in England and New England is a young, unmar-
ried woman); PIERS, supra note 221, at 18 (noting that mothers who abandon their babies
in the hospital after giving birth are "invariably very young, unmarried, and desperately
poor"); Constance B. Backhouse, Desperate Women and Compassionate Courts: Infanti-
cide in Nineteenth-Century Canada, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 447, 457 (1984) (finding that
most women charged were "very young"); Brozovsky & Falit, supra, at 673, 682 (stating
that mothers are usually young); Paul E. Bugos, Jr. & Lorraine M. McCarthy, Ayoreo
Infanticide: A Case Study, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 503, 514 (noting that
"infanticide rates are highest in the youngest age category"); Richard J. Gelles, Poverty
and Violence Toward Children, 35 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 258,264-71 (1992) [hereinafter
Gelles, Poverty and Violence] (noting that poor, young, single mothers with young chil-
dren are most likely to report that they use violent behaviors toward their children); Neil
S. Kaye et al., Families, Murder, and Insanity: A Psychiatric Review of Paternal Neonati-
cide, 35 J. FORENSIC SCI. 133, 134 (1990) (finding 90% of maternal neonaticide by
mothers under 25 years old); P.T. d'Orbdn, Women Who Kill Their Children, 134 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 560, 561 (1979) (reporting on study of infanticidal women, with a mean age
of 22.4); Phillip J. Resnick, Murder of the Newborn: A Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide,
126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414, 1415 (1970) (noting that mothers in the neonaticide group
were significantly younger than mothers in the filicide group); Ania Wilczynski, Images of
Women Who Kill Their Infants: The Mad and the Bad, 2 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 71, 76
(1991) (noting that infanticidal women are typically young); Ian Wilkey et al., Neonati-
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risk of abuse is at its highest for children born to young mothers
and declines steadily with the increasing age of the mother at
birth of the child. That is, the risk of abuse for any given child
declines as the mother's age at birth varies from thirteen to
thirty-six.2
4
Prediction 4: Infanticidal mothers will be relatively poor.
Rationale: The probable contribution of an offspring to parental re-
productive success decreases as parental access to relevant
resources decreases.
Fact Poor mothers are over-represented in samples of infanticidal
mothers.295
Prediction 5: Infanticidal mothers will relatively often be unmarried.
Rationale: Lack of paternal support diminishes a child's prospective
contribution to maternal reproductive success, and an increased
proportional share of offspring rearing costs interferes with a
female's opportunities to acquire a new mate and to raise addi-
tional offspring.
Fact: Although approximately 88% of babies born in Canada during
one study period were born to legally married mothers, only
cide, Infanticide and Child Homicide, 22 MED. SCI. & L. 31, 34 (1982) (reporting that
many cases involve young, single, poor females).
294. See Daly & Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks, supra note 288, at 204. In one
study, for example, 16% of the infanticidal mothers were 17 years old or less, while only
3% of all mothers were 17 years old or less. See Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Children
as Homicide Victims [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Children as Homicide Victims], in
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONs 201,207,210 (Richard J. Gelles
& Jane B. Lancaster eds., 1987); Daly & Wilson, Sociobiological Analysis of Human In-
fanticide, supra note 222, at 497. This suggests a tendency for women to value their
children more highly as their own reproductive value declines. See Daly & Wilson, Child
Abuse and Other Risks, supra note 288, at 204, 207-08; see also DALY & WILSON,
HOMICIDE, supra note 98, at 62 (discussing the correlation between infanticide and ma-
ternal age); Bugos & McCarthy, supra note 293, at 514 (noting that maternal infanticide
decreases as a function of maternal age); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Child Abuse Risk
and Household Composition in Hamilton, 31 J. ONTARIO ASS'N CHILDREN'S AID SOC'YS
11, 12 (1986) [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Child Abuse Risk and Household Composition]
(noting that maternal age is a risk factor for child abuse); Daly & Wilson, Evolutionary
Social Psychology, supra note 152, at 522 (noting that rates of infanticides by mothers
decrease as maternal age increases).
295. See RANSEL, supra note 221, at 153-54, 160-61 (noting that by early 1900s, over
80% of abandoned children were from the peasant class); Backhouse, supra note 293, at
457 (noting that majority are "from the lower class"); Brozovsky & Falit, supra note 293,
at 682 (noting that mothers are usually poor); Gelles, Poverty and Violence, supra note
293, at 265-66; Kaye et al., supra note 293, at 134; Wilczynski et al., supra note 293, at 76
(noting that infanticidal mothers are typically poor); Wilkey et al., supra note 293, at 34.
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40% of the mothers committing infanticide during that period
were legally married.9
Prediction 6: Children will be at greater risk of infanticide in steppar-
ent households than in natural parent households.
Rationales: Natural selection will have favored the allocation of pa-
rental investment proportional to the probable degree of
relatedness between parent and child.'l Absent perceived relat-
edness, average adults will be less psychologically motivated to
provide for an infant. This decrease in solicitude may be ex-
pected, on the margin, to be positively correlated with stepchild
deaths. Moreover, if ancestral human mating systems reflect lac-
tational amenorrhea, a selectively infanticidal male might
shorten an inter-birth interval and earlier produce offspring with
that infant's mother.
Fact: Children in the United States under two years old are about
100 times more at risk of lethal abuse at the hands of stepparents
than of genetic parents.2 8
296. See Daly & Wilson, Children as Homicide Victims, supra note 294, at 208; see also
Backhouse, supra note 293, at 457 (noting that the "overwhelming majority of infanticidal
mothers are single"); Brozovsky & Falit, supra note 293, at 682 (noting that infanticidal
mothers were usually unmarried); Gelles, Poverty and Violence, supra note 293, at 270
(stating that single mothers are more likely to be abusive to their children); Kaye et al.,
supra note 293, at 134 (noting that mothers were usually unmarried); Resnick, supra note
293, at 1415 (noting that 81% of neonaticidal females were single); Wilczynski, supra note
293, at 76 (noting that infanticidal mothers are typically single); Wilkey et al., supra note
293, at 34 (noting that infanticidal mothers are young and single). Lack of male support is
a strong risk factor for infanticide of children born in certain Amazonian tribes, for exam-
ple. See Bugos & McCarthy, supra note 293, at 518, 520; Kim Hill & Hillard Kaplan,
Tradeoffs in Male and Female Reproductive Strategies Among the Ache: Part 2, in
HUMAN REPRODUCrIVE BEHAVIOUR, supra note 104, at 291,297-98.
297. See Daly, supra note 157, at 32-34 (addressing the concept of parental invest-
ment).
298. See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 98, at 89; Daly & Wilson, Evolu-
tionary Social Psychology, supra note 152, at 520. The 100-fold figure appears to be based
on reinterpretation of 1976 fatal abuse figures, revising downward, from 5.7% to 1%, the
estimated number of all children living with stepparents, in light of more current informa-
tion. See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 98, at 88-89. Prior analysis (using the
earlier and larger estimate) had suggested a 40-fold increased risk of abuse. See Daly &
Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks, supra note 288, at 202 fig.1, 205; Daly & Wilson,
Child Abuse Risk and Household Composition, supra note 294, at 11-12. Subsequent
studies have consistently found dramatically elevated risk for children living with substi-
tute parents. See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 98, at 85-93 (providing
overview of study results); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Some Differential Attributes of
Lethal Assaults on Small Children by Stepfathers Versus Genetic Fathers, 15 ETHOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLOGY 207, 210 (1994) [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Differential Attributes]
(finding risk 60 times greater). For more on the subject, see generally Daly & Wilson,
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Prediction 7: An infant will be far likelier to be killed by a male step-
parent than by a female stepparent.
Rationale: Males eliminating unweaned, unrelated offspring of fe-
males to whom they have sexual access can potentially increase
their reproductive success by shortening the inter-birth interval.
Fact: Most infant abuse by substitute parents is clearly stepfather
abuse. Stepfathers not only kill children at higher rates than ge-
netic fathers, but they also kill them in different ways and for
different reasons.2 9 For example, stepfathers are about 120
times more likely to beat a child to death than is a homicidal ge-
netic father.'
3. How Does the Evidence Fit the Predictions?
Thus far, during this second stage of model evolutionary analy-
sis, The Information Stage, we have explored the evolutionary
theories, identified the predictions they generate, and examined em-
pirical evidence relevant to those predictions. Although here the
evidence apparently aligns With predictions, determining how well it
does so will often require a distinct assessment. No simple measure
exists to quantify precisely the vitality of a behavioral theory. Ani-
mal behaviors are not usually as objectively measurable as mass,
volume, or electric charge. Although neither the presence nor ab-
sence of any one factor will generally validate or eviscerate a theory,
that fact does not foreclose legitimate and useful description of a fit
between theory and evidence as, for example, "non-existent,"
"loose," "tight," or "very tight." A theory's specific and falsifiable
Children as Homicide Victims, supra note 294, at 211-12 (noting that stepparents are over-
represented in the causes of child homicides); Daly & Wilson, Discriminative Parental
Solicitude, supra note 83; Daly & Wilson, Evolutionary Social Psychology, supra note 152,
at 520 (stating that children in stepparent families are more often injured than those in
families without stepparents).
Adoptions are expected to yield different patterns because they require more self-
selected, additional, and affirmative acts than does becoming a stepparent. See Margo
Wilson & Martin Daly, Risk of Maltreatment of Children Living with Stepparents
[hereinafter Wilson & Daly, Risk of Maltreatment], in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEcT:
BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 215, 218-19 (Richard J. Gelles & Jane B. Lancaster eds., 1987);
see also Daly & Wilson, Child Abuse Risk and Household Composition, supra note 294, at
13 (noting that unlike an adoptive parent, a stepparent usually enters a relationship be-
cause he is attracted to the new mate, not because he is interested in raising the mate's
children).
299. See Daly & Wilson, Differential Attributes, supra note 298, at 216.
300. See id. at 211. Genetic fathers, in contrast, are far more likely than stepfathers to
kill a child in sorrow than in anger, either out of perceived necessity or as part of what is
today termed a "rescue" homicide/suicide. See id. at 208.
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predictions will appear accurate or inaccurate some rough percentage
of the time, even if we expect that percentage to vary somewhat with
the study population and ever-changing circumstances. The cumula-
tive effects of assessing independently minor predictions can
ultimately lead to the conclusion that a theory, overall, is extremely
robust.
Such a conclusion will depend, in part, on three variables: 1) the
number of predictions matched by the data; 2) the narrowness of the
predictions matched by the data; and 3) the breadth of relevant spe-
cies" ' constituting the prediction-data matches. The greater the
number of predictions supported, the narrower the predictions them-
selves, and the more relevant species in which data are consistent, the
greater the likelihood that the theory has actual explanatory power.
From discussions above, for example, this is what we now know
of the evolutionary analysis of infanticide. We know that the DPS
Theory predicts that natural selection will have favored over time any
genetic predisposition in animals to treat offspring in ways that best
contribute to reproductive success, according to observable offspring
cues that on average correlate to that offspring's potential contribu-
tion to parental reproductive success. We know the predictions are
falsifiable, with extremely narrow predictions (by sex, age, related-
ness, and the like) of specific circumstances that will be non-
randomly represented among infanticidal incidents. We also know
that a great many animals, in a great many species in the kingdom
(including the primates), behave in ways powerfully consistent with
these predictions. And we furthermore know that the primate Homo
sapiens sapiens also exhibits patterns apparently consistent with these
predictions, and thus with the patterns observable in many other spe-
cies. Indeed, one must certainly conclude that infanticide in most
human societies is considered appropriate in precisely those circum-
stances "in which it happens to be reproductively adaptive for the
parties involved.,1
2
More specifically, the DPS Theory predicts that in species with a
reproductive strategy that involves sexual reproduction, internal fer-
tilization, a lengthy gestation period, small brood size, a relatively
long period of principally maternal investment, and male-male com-
301. See supra note 176.
302. Daly & Wilson, SociobiologicalAnalysis of Human Infanticide, supra note 222, at
495. This conclusion is consistent with observed patterns of homicide, which tend to be
quite sensitive to the relatedness between aggressors. See generally DALY & WILSON,
HOMICIDE, supra note 98, at 52,54-55; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Homicide and Kin-
ship, 84 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 372,372-74 (1982).
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petition for females, young, single, resource-poor females will be
more prevalent in a group of females who killed an offspring than
will: 1) older, resource-poor females; 2) young, resource-rich fe-
males; or 3) older, resource-rich females. And in fact they are. It
predicts that the risk to an offspring of being killed by its mother will
be highest during its infancy and will drop dramatically with increas-
ing age. In fact it does. It predicts that unrelated or substitute
parents will be over-represented among child-killers. And they are.
The theory predicts that, among killed infants, a disproportionate
number will have been sick, or otherwise handicapped. And that is
so. Moreover, the Reproductive Access Theory predicts that, if the
same species exhibits lactational amenorrhea, unweaned infants are
far likelier to be killed than weaned infants, and that unrelated males
are far likelier than unrelated females to do the killing. In fact, this is
almost exclusively the case. For, as seen above, the data are consis-
tent among species with similar reproductive strategies as diverse as
house-mice, lions, langurs, and humans. (Indeed, the adaptive sig-
nificance of infanticide is so well accepted today that it appears in the
major textbooks on evolutionary biology."3 )
Evaluating this sample from the theory and data on infanticide
has illustrated this third step of The Information Stage in evolutionary
analysis. It has also illustrated a very tight theory-data fit, since
matched predictions are numerous, extremely specific, and power-
fully supported by empirical data from a wide variety of human and
303. See, e.g., ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 13-19, 169-72; KREBS & DAVIES, supra note
95, at 5-10; TRIVERS, supra note 43, at 71-77 (discussing infanticide among langurs). The
once-popular view that all instances of infanticide represented pathological responses to
social stresses has been almost universally abandoned. See HRDY, THE LANGURS OF
ABU, supra note 140, at 246-47; INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64, at xi-
xiii; Hiraiwa-Hasegawa & Hasegawa, supra note 203, at 137-39; Sommer, supra note 173,
at 155-57; see also Crockett & Sekulic, supra note 168, at 186-89; Glenn Hausfater, Infan-
ticide in Nonhuman Primates: An Introduction and Perspective, in INFANTICIDE, supra
note 79, at 145, 146-47; Leland et al., supra note 206, at 164; Vogel & Loch, supra note
170, at 253.
The transition was not without its early resistors, however, who for some time con-
tinued to champion the primacy of the social pathology hypothesis. See, e.g., Jane E.
Boggess, Infant Killing and Male Reproductive Strategies in Langurs (Presbytis entellus),
in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, at 283, 286-88; Jane E. Boggess, Troop Male Membership
Change and Infant Killing in Langurs (Presbytis entellus), 32 FOLIA PRIMATOLOGICA 65,
100-03 (1979); Richard Curtin & Phyllis Dolhinow, Primate Social Behavior in a Changing
World, 66 AM. SCIENTIST 468, 473-75 (1978). For replies to Boggess, arguing that the
hypothesis should be rejected, see Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Assumptions and Evidence Re-
garding the Sexual Selection Hypothesis: A Reply to Boggess, in INFANTICIDE, supra note
79, at 315; Yukimaru Sugiyama, Proximate Factors of Infanticide Among Langurs at
Dharwar: A Reply to Boggess, in INFANTICIDE, supra note 79.
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non-human species.'
4. Do the Theories Apply-to Humans?
A prediction-evidence fit cannot alone establish that an ultimate
explanation of behavior in other animals explains an evolutionary
origin of similar behavior in humans. Given a tight fit, however, it is
parsimonious and thus preferable to presume that it does.f5 Those
who would argue that a given difference between humans and other
animals makes a theory inapplicable bear the burden of persuasion
(not vice versa).'
There are two important cautions. The first is that the presump-
tion is rebuttable. Parsimony may suggest that particular human and
non-human behaviors have the same origins, but cannot alone make
it so. Parsimony provides only a default starting point, when theories
appear equally robust, and one must always consider that unique
elements of human evolution may have yielded strikingly similar be-
haviors with unrelated origins in both humans and non-humans. 3 7
The second caution is that there may often be more than one robust
evolutionary theory that can, alone or simultaneously with others,
play a role in explaining the behavior under study in various non-
304. A small number of principally non-biologist commentators have raised objections
to this conclusion that are beyond the scope of a discussion of model evolutionary analy-
sis. See, e.g., Gelles & Harrop, supra note 126; Robert W. Sussman et al., Infant Killing as
an Evolutionary Strategy: Reality or Myth?, 3 EVOLuTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 149
(1995) (arguing that infanticide data could be better interpreted as genetically inconse-
quential epiphenomena of aggressive episodes). To date, this is a distinctly minority view.
Compare, for example, the sources just cited to Daly & Wilson, Reply to Gelles, supra
note 137; Hrdy et al., supra note 171 (replying to Sussman); and sources compiled in both
INFANTICIDE, supra note 79, and INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra note 64.
305. A more thorough discussion of the shifting burdens of persuasion is beyond the
scope of this Article. Useful observations appear, for example, in Browne, Sex and Tem-
perament, supra note 3, at 975-76, 1105. Some appear to believe that the burden of
persuasion falls the other way. See, e.g., Jean Giles-Sims & David Finkelhor, Child Abuse
in Stepfamilies, 33 FAM. REL. 407, 410 (1984) (a non-biological theory is "more parsimo-
nious" because it does not require a biologically based assumption); Unnithan, Historical
and Anthropological Research, supra note 221, at 154-55 (suggesting that biological theo-
ries of child abuse behavior, not non-biological ones, bear the burden of persuasion).
306. Such distinguishing elements must be identified with specificity. While their
power to distinguish must be evaluated in a fashion familiar to lawyers (analogous to
weighing precedential value in legal contexts), constant vigilance against self-
aggrandizing species bias will require evidence grounded in empirical research-not mere
appeals to common faith in the sui generis nature of humanity.
307. Biologists draw a useful distinction between "homology," the possession by two
or more species of a trait derived from a common ancestor, and "homoplasy," possession
by two or more species of a similar trait that has not been derived by both species from a
common ancestor. See FUTUYMA, supra note 14, at 295-99. Some traits humans share
with other animals may therefore in fact exhibit homoplasy rather than homology.
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human animals. In such a circumstance, assessing the relative prob-
able applicabilities of the different theories to humans requires
vigilance for potentially distinguishing differences between human
evolution and that of related apes, or between the apes and other
primates, or between primates and non-primates.
To take but one example that we will return to repeatedly, note
that both the DPS Theory and the Reproductive Access Theory pre-
dict that a non-parent is more likely to abuse a juvenile than will
either of that juvenile's genetic parents. This accords with the over-
whelming bulk of empirical evidence, in humans and non-humans
alike. In addition, the Reproductive Access Theory predicts that, in
species characterized by lactational amenorrhea, males with potential
reproductive access to a nursing female will be more likely to target
the nursing infant with abusive behavior than they will be to target
non-nursing juveniles of the same female. This, too, accords with the
empirical research in relevant human and non-human species. In
humans, in fact, stepfathers are dramatically over-represented among
adults who abuse children, and infants are over-represented among
stepchildren who die of abuse?"
The question is: Why? Parsimony suggests that at least part of
this pattern of increased relative risk of abuse in stepfather homes
can be explained, at least in part, by either the DPS Theory or the
Reproductive Access Theory. Each theory can account for the ob-
served patterns without positing even higher reasoning, let alone any
other distinctly human assumptions, but which theory better de-
scribes reality? Might they both be at work? On one hand, males
targeting unrelated infants could be influenced by narrowly tailored
infanticidal predispositions posited by the Reproductive Access The-
ory, similar to those apparently present among langur monkeys and
other primates. On the other hand, the sex bias among stepparent
abusers might be observable as a general by-product of DPS alone,
played out in typical human mating systems. Human infants, for ex-
ample, as distinct from human children generally, rarely have
stepmothers (since they tend to travel with the mother upon separa-
tion of the parents)-and this alone might account for the significant
sex bias among child-killing stepparents."9
308. See Daly & Wilson, Reply to Gelles, supra note 137; Martin Daly & Margo Wil-
son, Stepparenthood and the Evolved Psychology of Discriminative Parental Solicitude
[hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Stepparenthood], in INFANTICIDE & PARENTAL CARE, supra
note 64, at 121, 129-30.
309. See Daly & Wilson, Differential Attributes, supra note 298, at 208. As the authors
note, some of this bias may derive from the fact that few very small children ever reside
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Put another way, one could reason that human children are tar-
geted not because they are stepchildren per se but rather because
they do not signal the sequence of stimuli that typically evoke paren-
tal care.310 A differential risk of violent lapses of parental solicitude
might therefore be "just one, relatively extreme, consequence of the
fact that genetic parents' solicitude generally exceeds that of steppar-
ents."3"' If this were true, human males (disproportionately likely to
be substitute parents) may be slightly more likely to abuse or even
kill unrelated infants not because it is affirmatively adaptive to elimi-
nate unrelated and needy children of a potential mate, but instead as
a mere epiphenomenon (adaptive or otherwise) of the fact that natu-
ral selection has generally penalized "squandering parental resources
on nonkin. '
Ordinarily, choosing between competing evolutionary theories
will be necessary only if they generate predictions that truly conflict.
Such a conflict, if unresolvable on existing evidence, will suggest an-
other component of a future research agenda. In the meantime, a
preference between the two theories is required only if they may lead
to different legal approaches in The Application Stage, when a policy-
maker may attempt to influence or effect a legal policy in one way or
another. Even before such a conflict may ripen, however, it will
nonetheless be useful to weigh various physical, emotional, and social
differences between humans and non-humans that may suggest that
one evolutionary theory probably has greater vitality than the other
(even where both may operate together). This, in turn, will require a
step-by-step reevaluation of the various premises necessary to make
either theory true.
For example, the effect of lactational amenorrhea on inter-birth
intervals is a necessary, and satisfied, predicate of any applicability to
humans of the Reproductive Access Theory. However, the theory
with stepmothers. See id. Most stepparents (91%) are men. See POPENOE, supra note
126, at 33; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990's, at tbl.L (1992)
[hereinafter MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE].
310. See Richard D. Alexander, The View from the President's Window, NEWSLETTER
OF THE HUM. BEHAV. AND EVOLUTION SOC'Y (Human Behavior and Evolution Soc'y,
Ann Arbor, Mich.), Sept. 1995, at 1, 1-2 [hereinafter Alexander, The View] (citing Rich-
ard D. Alexander, Evolutionary Approaches to Human Behavior: What Does the Future
Hold?, in HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR, supra note 104, at 317,333-34).
311. Daly & Wilson, DifferentialAttributes, supra note 298, at 208.
312. Daly & Wilson, Abuse and Neglect of Children, supra note 160, at 406. Parents
that allocate a substantial proportion of their investment to non-kin will transmit fewer
copies of their own genes into future generations than will parents that discriminate
against non-kin in their provision of resources. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
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would be expected to have greater vitality among species in which the
average tenure of male access to a female is short, as it is in lions and
langurs, than when the average tenure is far longer, as it is in hu-
mans.313 This distinction alone may be enough to distinguish, as have
several theorists, the applicability of the Reproductive Access Theory
in the human context from its applicability in non-human contexts14
Moreover, the widely documented and substantial differences among
the social organizations of primate species35 suggests further caution,
and recommends that the more general DPS Theory may better ex-
plain observable, human stepfather infanticide.
5. Should the Theories Be Considered in Legal Analysis and Policy-
Making?
If a theory-evidence fit appears tight, and if no compelling analy-
sis concludes that natural selection was unlikely to have influenced
the modem manifestation of the defined behavior, we are faced with
the following situation, which typifies this fifth step of The Informa-
tion Stage. On one hand, we have the various and traditional
prevailing theories that purport to explain the behavior under study.
On the other hand, we have a newcomer-a theory judged robust,
which purports to have identified evolutionary influences on the ori-
gin and persistence of the behavior. The question now is whether the
new theory should be taken seriously and included in that group of
theories considered by policymakers who are interested in pursuing
the stated objective by, in part, affecting the incidence of the defined
behavior. 6
Deciding whether to include a robust evolutionary theory re-
garding evolutionary influences on the target behavior requires a
clear standard of review. Having observed a tight theory-data fit, we
313. The shorter the access to a female, the greater natural selection will favor quick
impregnators over slower impregnators.
314. See Alexander, The View, supra note 310, at 2; Buss, supra note 1, at 9; Daly &
Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks, supra note 288, at 207; Daly & Wilson, Reply To
Gelles, supra note 137, at 421-22; Daly & Wilson, Risk of Maltreatment, supra note 298, at
216-17; Daly & Wilson, A Sociobiological Analysis of Human Infanticide, supra note 222,
at 502. But see Van Schaik & Dunbar, supra note 217 (concluding that human pair-
bonding, itself, is likely an adaptive response to evolved predispositions to selective infan-
ticide).
315. See, e.g., Frans B.M. de Waal, Bonobo Sex and Society, Sci. AM., Mar. 1995, at 82,
85.
316. Note that it is not necessary to decide whether a legal approach to the behavior
should reflect the theory. That would depend on a later assessment about whether any
probable benefits of modifying policies in light of evolutionary analysis outweigh any
probable costs of doing so. See infra Part II.D.3.
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must decide at the outset where the burden of persuasion must fall,
and thus what the default result will be. There are only three viable
options: 1) a rebuttable presumption that the evolutionary theory
regarding the behavior should be included; 2) a rebuttable presump-
tion that the evolutionary theory should not be included; or 3) no
presumption at all. Of these, the first is best: There should be a re-
buttable presumption in favor of including a robust evolutionary
theory in that group of theories considered by legal policymakers.
We employ this same presumption in nearly every other area of
intellectual endeavor, reflecting a ubiquitous and facially sound belief
that understanding the history of a thing will usually aid a compre-
hensive understanding of the thing itself. In the fields of politics,
business, technology, philosophy, psychology, literature, music, and
art, for example, we unpausingly presume that the past is relevant to
the present, and that ignoring cross-time perspectives on the emer-
gence of modern phenomena can forfeit valuable insights and
precipitate erroneous beliefs. Entire careers in law, for example,
have been built on the perceived utility of understanding legal his-
tory.
The history of behavior is similarly important to an understand-
ing of modem behavior. Humans will always behave in ways
powerfully affected by their unique experiences. Nevertheless, we
still must properly presume that behavioral patterns emerging from
the cumulated behavior of vast groups of individuals will predictably
reflect the subtle but strong presence of a shared history of experi-
ences-whether a language, a culture, or a common biological
heritage. Understanding human behavior, some of which is law-
relevant, therefore necessarily requires some knowledge of human
history as well as individual history. Fundamentally, evolutionary
theories are about human history-a deeply contextual history that
looks back in time to the processes that influenced the origins and
spread of behaviors through populations and generations long before
humans manifested the form in which we know them today.
We therefore should presume that a robust evolutionary theory
of behavior should be considered in legal analysis, in the absence of a
strong showing to the contrary. For example, when we ask whether
the apparently robust evolutionary theories concerning the existence
and persistence of infanticide should be included alongside other
theories and information considered by policymakers charged with
affecting the incidence of child abuse, the appropriate presumption is
that they should. Evolutionary theories can lay no automatic claim to
being superior to any other theory, and their relationship to other
1997] 1215
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
theories is taken up in the next stage. But their robustness, as well as
their essentially historical nature, makes them sufficiently relevant to
preclude ignoring them.
Consequently, as a product of the Identification and Information
stages of evolutionary analysis, we will carry forward, into the re-
maining stages of this model's demonstration, the DPS and
Reproductive Access theories, with somewhat greater emphasis on
the former.
6. Summary
In sum, this Information Stage provides an outline for that part
of evolutionary analysis in law that explores evolutionary theories
relevant to the legal goal. Specifically, it provides a series of ques-
tions that guides one in identifying the evolutionary theories and the
predictions they generate, examining cross-species evidence that
bears on the accuracy of those predictions, and assessing how well the
evidence fits the theories. In addition, it facilitates critical considera-
tion of how well the theories apply in the human context, and of
whether to include any evolutionary theories in legal decision-making
processes.
To demonstrate how these questions might be answered in a
specific context, this section carried forward the child abuse example
introduced in stage one-narrowing it, for brevity's sake, to the spe-
cific context of infanticide. It introduced several evolutionary
theories underlying ultimate causes of infanticidal behavior, detailed
a number of predictions generated by two of those theories, exam-
ined evidence from non-primate, non-human primate, and human
species bearing on the accuracy of those predictions, and determined
that available evidence fit the theories very tightly. This section also
demonstrated why at least one of the evolutionary theories (The DPS
Theory) was likely to apply in the human context, and argued that, in
such a case, it should be considered along with other theories that
pollcymakers assess when proposing means to pursue the specific le-
gal goal of reducing child abuse.
As we turn to examine the third major stage of proposed model
evolutionary analysis in law, we will continue to carry this example
forward.
C. The Integration Stage
Deciding to include an evolutionary theory in the decision-
making processes by which law pursues a pre-determined goal does
not automatically suggest how to do so. Evolutionary theories and
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prevailing theories may combine or they may clash, and one must as-
sess the extent to which the two are compatible before intelligently
considering the utility and importance of either. The third stage of
the model here proposed, The Integration Stage, therefore asks two
questions: 1) Where, if anywhere, do prevailing and evolutionary
theories conflict?; and 2) How may their non-conflicting elements, if
any, be integrated? Throughout, the purpose of this stage will be to
coordinate systems of knowledge that previously developed inde-
pendently, so as to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of
society's collective understanding of the complex causes of law-
relevant behavior.
1. Where Do Prevailing and Evolutionary Theories Conflict?
Conflicts between prevailing and evolutionary theories are a
subset of their differences, and differences might usefully be divided
into the constitutive and the predictive. That is, I believe that to be-
gin identifying true conflicts between the theories one should first
divide the differences concerning the theoretical substructures of the
theories (the constitutive) from the differences concerning the pre-
dictions they generate (the predictive). We take these in sequence.
a. Conflicts Between Theoretical Substructures
The theoretical substructures of prevailing and evolutionary
theories are simply their conceptual bases and most fundamental
elements of orientation and logic. Two kinds of differences between
the theoretical substructures of prevailing and evolutionary theories,
in turn, are likely to be identified: 1) differences in their levels of
analysis; and 2) differences in their basic assumptions.
(1) Differences in Levels of Analysis
Differences in levels of analysis may obtain because an evolu-
tionary theory is necessarily a theory about ultimate causation (the
"whys" of behavior-where it comes from and why it persists) while
prevailing theories are usually theories about proximate causation
(the "hows" of behavior-how it is triggered into being and effected).
Theories of ultimate causation and theories of proximate causation,
though related, operate at fundamentally different levels of analysis,
and to some extent reflect ancient and artificial disciplinary bounda-
ries.
People often presuppose that the differences between evolution-
ary and non-evolutionary theories must yield a winner-take-all
conflict (as if a prevailing, non-evolutionary theory must vanquish a
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usurping evolutionary theory or die a miserable death). But this sup-
posed conflict, as illogical as it is melodramatic, is rarely a true
conflict at all."' In fact, ultimate and proximate influences on be-
havior are opposite sides of the very same coin, coexisting without
necessary conflict. Ultimate causation simply explains why certain
environmental factors, and not others, are likely to be proximate
causes of behavior, and provides the sort of intellectual coherence
that makes the association between certain environmental factors
and certain behavior more fully understandable. Thus, absent evi-
dence to the contrary, one should begin from the presumption that a
given evolutionary theory is compatible with prevailing theories, not
the opposite."'
More specifically, by failing to first identify differences in levels
of analysis between prevailing and evolutionary theories on child
abuse, for example, many have understandably confused fully com-
patible explanations with alternative ones. Prevailing theories on
child abuse, including theories on infanticide, are principally sociocul-
tural. With only rare exceptions, child abuse is considered the result
of some complex interplay of exclusively social forces-including the
current and uniquely summed influences of family, friends, and
community written against a background of individual experience
that is colored by prior events, perceptions, and behavioral interac-
tions. Evolutionary theories regarding why animals have and raise or
neglect offspring in the patterns they do, on the other hand, suggest
shared, species-typical predispositions. Those few scholars of pre-
vailing theories on child abuse who even mention evolutionary theory
in the context of stepparent abuse (to continue with that specific ex-
ample) tend to present it as an alternative to sociocultural theories
and to cast it in a necessarily competitive role.319 Evolutionary expla-
nations are implied to be completely different and independent of
prevailing theories that may locate causal factors in, for instance, the
frequent inability of stepparents to feel the same sense of "loyalty
317. This conflict echoes the false and silly "nature versus nurture" dichotomies ex-
plored earlier. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
318. See generally Alcock & Sherman, supra note 16, at 60-61 (arguing that proximate
and ultimate explanations should be considered complementary); see also notes 15-20 and
accompanying text (explaining ultimate and proximate causes in the biological context).
319. See, e.g., Marilyn Coleman, Stepfamilies in the United States: Challenging Biased
Assumptions, in STEPFAMILIES, supra note 126, at 29-31 (attacking invocation of evolu-
tionary theories of stepparent mistreatment of stepchildren). But see POPENOE, supra
note 126, at 7-10 (incorporating evolutionary perspective into analysis of child abuse);
McGuire & Gelles, supra note 126 (same).
[Vol. 751218
EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS IN LAW
and belonging" as do genetic parents."
The reason this fabricates conflict where none exists is because
the two causal theories-ultimate, on the one hand, and proximate,
on the other-do not butt heads in the same plane of analysis."' Not
only do the evolutionary theories generally not compete with the
prevailing theories, the evolutionary analysis in fact predicts that
adults will generally not feel as solicitous of unrelated offspring as
they will of their own. For beneath Prediction 6 above ("Children
will be at greater risk of infanticide in stepparent households than in
natural parent households") lies the logic that the marginally in-
creased probability of abuse of unrelated children will accompany a
variety of subjectively perceived emotional states correlated with de-
creased solicitude. Mistaking differences in levels of analysis for true
conflicts will impede integration by fostering a presumption of in-
compatibility, rather than the proper (but rebuttable) presumption of
compatibility of the theories.
(2) Differences in Basic Assumptions
By the "basic assumptions" of prevailing and evolutionary theo-
ries, I refer to those logical predicates, presupposed to be true, upon
which and around which the evolutionary and prevailing theories are
built and shaped. Again, not all such differences are conflicts. But,
unlike differences between levels of analysis, which rarely, if ever, are
for that reason alone conflictual, differences between basic assump-
tions will sometimes be mutually exclusive, so that only one can be
right. (An obvious, though non-biological, example of this: Theory
X assumes the Sun revolves around the Earth; and Theory Y assumes
the Earth revolves around the Sun.) True conflicts between basic
assumptions will generally recommend the search for testable differ-
ences between the theories' predictions.
It might appear that a true conflict between theories would arise
whenever they maintained exactly opposite assumptions. However,
this is not always the case, and one should remain alert to false con-
flicts seemingly attributable to opposing assumptions. For example,
evolutionary theories assume that evolutionary processes influenced,
and continue to influence, significant human behaviors." Non-
320. See, e.g., Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman, Research on Stepfamilies, 14 ANN. REV.
SOCIOLOGY 25, 39 (1988).
321. "Evolutionary theory is not a substitute for psychological analysis, but a valuable
aid thereto .... ." Wilson & Daly, The Psychology of Parenting in Evolutionary Perspec-
tive, supra note 155, at 96.
322. It is important to stress that evolutionary theorists are not trying to locate the
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evolutionary theories, by omitting consideration of any effect of
natural selection on studied behavior, often implicitly presuppose
that evolutionary processes did not and do not operate to significantly
influence modem, law-relevant human behaviors. Despite these op-
posing assumptions, however, this is not a true conflict. The apparent
conflict is simply a function of what we might call "exclusionary bi-
ases," rather than "exclusionary necessities." Exclusionary bias is
present when proponents of a non-evolutionary theory intentionally
or in effect exclude the possibility of evolutionary influences when
such exclusion is not a logically necessary predicate of the non-
evolutionary theory-in other words, when the non-evolutionary
theory does not require that evolutionary processes not influence
human behavior. 3 Even opposing assumptions can appear to be mu-
tually exclusive without in fact being so.
Prevailing theories on why stepparents abuse children more than
genetic parents, for example, are intricate constructs of environmen-
tally determined causality. But their assumption of "no evolutionary
influence" is a function of an exclusionary bias, rather than an exclu-
sionary necessity. Indeed, it is not necessary to the theory that abuse
can flow from stepparental "role confusion" (on which more will be
said shortly) that the affectional impediments such confusion may
cause be entirely non-evolved. Only the well-worn grooves of disci-
plinary boundaries, and the exclusionary bias they evidence, have
established a tradition of assuming no evolutionary influence. Never-
theless, the difference between these basic assumptions of prevailing
and evolutionary theories of stepparental abuse, at least, are not nec-
essarily in conflict.
b. Conflicts Between Predictions
Identifying differences between the predictions of prevailing and
evolutionary theories requires careful comparisons, with attention to
particularity and with vigilance for similarities, overlaps, divergences,
and inconsistencies. Under this approach, differences between pre-
dictions generated by evolutionary and non-evolutionary theories will
genetic basis for behavioral traits. Evolutionary biologists are not generally focused on
the developmental (proximate) bases of behavior. Nevertheless, their discipline inevita-
bly relies on the fact that there have been genetic differences among individuals in the
past that have resulted in different developmental trajectories (and thus characteristics)
that are then subject to natural selection.
323. Another way of saying this is that the assumption on which the conflict appears to
rest is not truly basic to the non-evolutionary theory. Because it is in reality tertiary, it
could be modified to include some role for natural selection without eviscerating the non-
evolutionary theory.
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be considered conflictual if and only if the theories generate two pre-
dictions that cannot both be true at the same time (a, b, c, and a, b,
not c, respectively). Otherwise, and more often the case, the theories
are compatible because: 1) they generate the same predictions (a, b,
c, and a, b, c, respectively); 2) they generate different but not con-
flicting predictions (a, b, c, and x, y, z, respectively); 3) they generate
overlapping predictions, where the overlapping predictions are iden-
tical (a, b, c, and a, b, z, respectively); or 4) one generates all the
predictions of the other, as well as more besides (a, b, c, and a, b, c, d,
e, f, respectively).
It would, of course, be useful if the prevailing theories enumer-
ated their predictions in a fashion that allowed direct comparison.
But that will rarely be the case, since a great number of non-
evolutionary theorists often fail to enumerate falsifiable predictions
to test against the evidence.324 A fair comparison thus requires inter-
pretive efforts. And those in turn require recourse to the general
orientation of various prevailing theories in order to approximate and
locate any true conflicts in predictive power.
To illustrate: A close examination of the prevailing and evolu-
tionary theories concerning the disproportionate child abuse and
infanticide by stepparents, for example, will reveal few, if any, true
conflicts. The traditional social-science explanations, on one hand,
attribute stepparent abuse to: some combination of stresses suppos-
edly uniquely created by stepfamily life;3  the tensions attributable to
the ambiguity, newness, and conflicting expectations surrounding the
stepparenting role; and to the resulting lack of "institutionalized
norms." 6 The evolutionary theories, on the other hand, attribute the
324. Jean Giles-Sims is one of the notable exceptions. See, e.g., Jean Giles-Sims, So-
cial Exchange in Remarried Families, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING: CURRENT
RESEARCH AND THEORY 141, 144-50 (Kay Pasley & Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 1987)
[hereinafter REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING].
325. See, e.g., Giles-Sims & Finkelhor, supra note 305, at 410-11; Diane Reinhart
Kompara, Difficulties in the Socialization Process of Stepparenting, 29 FAM. REL. 69, 70-
72 (1980); articles collected in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING, supra note 324.
326. Jean Giles-Sims, The Stepparent Role: Expectations, Behavior and Sanctions, 5 J.
FAM. ISSUES 116, 117 (1984); accord Andrew Cherlin, Remarriage as an Incomplete In-
stitution, 84 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 634 (1978); Giles-Sims & Finkelhor, supra note 305, at
410-11; Jamie Kelem Keshet, Cognitive Remodeling of the Family: How Remarried Peo-
ple View Stepfamilies, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 196, 197 (1990); Kompara, supra
note 325 (summarizing the literature); Mary Ann Mason & David W. Simon, The Am-
biguous Stepparent: Federal Legislation in Search of a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445, 467-72
(1995); Kay Pasley & Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman, The Evolution of a Field of Investigation:
Issues and Concerns, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING, supra note 324, at 303,309-
11; Kay Pasley, Family Boundary Ambiguity: Perceptions of Adult Stepfamily Members,
in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING, supra note 324, at 206,221; see also CHILDREN'S
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distinctive patterns of stepparent abuse to discriminative parental
solicitude or evolutionary pressures to behave in ways that speed re-
productive access, or both. Both sets of theories predict that raising
an unrelated child will be somewhat more stressful than raising a re-
lated child.327 And while the "role confusion" theory suggests that
stepparent abuse will diminish substantially as "divorce and remar-
riage become more common [and] institutionalized standards for
conduct in reconstituted families ... emerge,'32 the evolutionary
theories, while different in focus, are not contrary. While they ac-
knowledge the important influence of cultural norms on human
behavior, they simply predict that the patterns of stepparent abuse, as
a product in part of evolved psychology that links emotional states
with motivations, may be even more difficult to overcome than the
prevailing theories suggest.
2. How May Non-Conflicting Elements Be Integrated?
In this final step of The Integration Stage, one should carefully
DIV., AM. HUMANE AsS'N, GUIDELINES TO HELP PROTECT ABUSED AND NEGLECTED
CHILDREN (June 1993) (proclaiming that child abuse "usually reflects the inadequacy or
incapacity of parents to live up to parental roles"); Daly & Wilson, Risk of Maltreatment,
supra note 298, at 216-21 (discussing social science perspectives).
327. Much information from the vast literature on dissatisfactions with stepfamily life
seems to support this proposition. See, e.g., LUCILE DUBERMAN, THE RECONSTITUTED
FAMILY: A STUDY OF REMARRIED COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN (1975). As Daly
and Wilson note in Stepparenthood, supra note 308, both stepchildren and stepparents
generally consider their relationships to be less satisfying and loving, and less supportive
(both materially and emotionally), than genetic parent-offspring relationships. See Id. at
131; accord ELSA FERRI, STEP CHILDREN: A NATIONAL STUDY 46 (1984); Judith
Zucker Anderson & Geoffry D. White, An Empirical Investigation of Interaction and
Relationship Patterns in Functional and Dysfunctional Nuclear Families and Stepfamilies,
25 FAM. PROCESS 407, 409 (1986); Terry F. Perkins & James P. Kahan, An Empirical
Comparison of Natural-Father and Stepfather Family Systems, 18 FAM. PROCESS 175, 176
(1979); John W. Santrock & Karen A. Sitterle, Parent-Child Relationships in Stepmother
Families, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING, supra note 324, at 273, 274; Lynn K.
White & Alan Booth, The Quality and Stability of Remarriages: The Role of Stepchildren,
50 AM. SOC. REV. 689, 695-96 (1985). Stepparents do not generally feel the same child-
specific love and commitment as genetic parents, nor do they perceive the same emo-
tional rewards from their parental investment. See Daly & Wilson, Risk of Maltreatment,
supra note 298, at 218. For example, researchers have found that only 53% of stepfathers
and only 25% of stepmothers claimed "parental feeling" toward their stepchildren and
even fewer claimed to "love" them. See id. Furthermore, both marital partners in step.
families indicate they are looking forward to the children's departure, and stepchildren do
in fact leave home at an earlier age than those living with natural parents. See Joseph H.
Rankin, The Family Context of Delinquency, 30 SOC. PROBS. 466, 475 (1983); White &
Booth, supra, at 695, 696-97. Incidentally, the ubiquity of neglecting or abusing steppar-
ent stories in folklore is surely not coincidental. See 5 STITH THOMPSON, MOTIF-INDEX
OF FOLK-LITERATURE 300-02 (1955) (compiling folk tales about cruel step-relatives).
328. Giles-Sims, supra note 326, at 127.
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test and compare the prevailing and evolutionary theories where they
do conflict, and integrate them where they do not. Where evolution-
ary and prevailing theories truly do conflict (that is, where their
theoretical substructures or predictions are mutually exclusive), an
evolutionary theory will either be better than, equal to, or worse than
a prevailing theory. The evolutionary theory can only be judged
somehow "better" in two circumstances: 1) if its predictions are
more consistent with observable patterns of behavior than are those
of the prevailing theory (in which case the evolutionary theory has
more "predictive power"); or 2) if it achieves an equal predictive
power with fewer or simpler assumptions (in which case the evolu-
tionary theory is more "parsimonious"). If either of these
circumstances obtains, the evolutionary theory can represent any-
thing from a marginal improvement to a thoroughly new paradigm
for understanding the behavior. Less predictive power, or equal pre-
dictive power predicated on either more or more complex
assumptions, renders an evolutionary theory "worse," in which case it
should be refined or discarded. In contrast, when an evolutionary
theory is more or less "equal," that is, if neither appreciably better
nor worse, both theories should be pressed for narrower testable-
and then tested-predictions.
Where evolutionary and prevailing theories do not conflict, one
should attempt to blend them into an integrated whole. This requires
that one at least temporarily marginalize the vague, unspecific, or
disconnected elements of the theories, and then seek to construct a
coherent partnership of ultimate and proximate causation that vindi-
cates any unseverable connections between them. Successful
integration requires, for example, that one look to align related pre-
dictions of the different theories in order to nest the more general
predictions into the more specific ones, to the extent consistent with
the facts. 29 Demographic predictors usefully identified by sociology,
for instance, by sex, age, marital status, and the like, may be folded
into more specific predictors, where they exist, generated by evolu-
329. Although there may be many points of common connection between evolutionary
and non-evolutionary theories, it is important to recognize that it is not necessary for the
partnership to succeed that all resultant explanatory models showily display specific evo-
lutionary theories. So long as the integrated model is written against the backgound of
the general, or meta-level, evolutionary theory, it may command as much of the contem-
porary, uniquely modem foreground as required by the strictures of science. The
partnership need not be 50150 with respect to the behavior under study, for sound behav-
ioral theories will manifest a diversity of ratios reflecting the centrality or relative
unimportance of specific evolutionary theories to a modem understanding of the behav-
ior, as it operates in a distinctly modem world.
12231997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tionary theories. The point of integration is to construct a unified,
coherent, interwoven, historically accurate, and generally superior
theory of the behavior that impedes or furthers social access to the
specified goal.
For example, there are at least four ways in which evolutionary
theories can combine with prevailing theories to yield better theories.
First, they can provide across-time context, helping to uncover addi-
tional causal influences beyond the boundaries of that sliver of time
from the birth of an abusive parent to the incident of abuse. Patterns
thought recent appear ancient, as we learn that our ancestors acted in
ways often detrimental to juveniles long before the emergence of a
distinctly hominid brain or modern mind. Scrutiny of the present, to
the exclusion of the past, will fail to see the behavior in the full social
context its unique evolutionary history created.
Second, evolutionary theories can provide across-species con-
text, helping to avoid segregation errors owing to any unjustifiably
exclusive obsession with our own species. Theories that focus over-
narrowly on humans can fail to see human behavior as, by definition,
only a variation of animal behavior, and must largely forgo the often
relevant and useful body of empirical and theoretical work respecting
the rest of the animal kingdom.
Third, evolutionary theories can help to remedy instances of
biologically naive environmental determinism, which may otherwise
over-aggrandize the human species. Theories presupposing that child
abuse can be comprehensively explained by only cultural roles, ex-
pectations, experiences, and socialization processes, for example, are
likely to miss important aspects of the many and complex influences
underlying abusive behavior. They are therefore similarly likely to
overestimate somewhat the malleability of human behavior.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, evolutionary theories can
balance proximate causes of child abuse with evolutionary causes.
Prominent child abuse researchers acknowledge that even theories
popularly reputed to explain "why a parent might abuse a child"33
typically perform a more limited function: identifying "marker vari-
ables associated with abuse," rather than a theoretical framework to
explain those associations." For example, researchers have argued
that because abused and neglected children are disproportionately
premature, of low birthweight, mentally retarded, physically or sen-
330. See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 118, at 56.
331. See Richard J. Gelles, Physical Violence, Child Abuse, and Child Homicide: A
Continuum of Violence, or Distinct Behaviors?, 2 HUM. NATURE 59,67 (1991).
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sorily handicapped, or subject to the care of substitute parents, the
stresses caused by these conditions must cause the abuse.332 While
useful, however, these observations can offer no full explanation for
why these correlations occur-why, for example, parents perceive
these environmental facts (and not others) as stressful, or why these
stressors increase the likelihood of child abuse (and not of kite-
flying).33 They are theories of proximate causation unsupplemented
by the richer understanding of the ultimate causes of child abuse that
only evolutionary analysis can provide.
Evolutionary theories can therefore help to complement and
supplement those prevailing theories with which they do not conflict.
Gracefully enmeshing the two kinds of theories, at the two different
levels of analysis, will require narrower statements of predictions (as
biology reins in occasionally overbroad speculation of sociocultural
theories) and more thoughtfully rearticulated evolutionary theories
(as the latter are met by sometimes challenging data collected within
the more human-obsessed social sciences). The key to integrating
evolutionary and prevailing theories is in recognizing that the evolu-
tionary pressures of our deep ancestral past have shaped human
neural architecture and concomitant behavioral predispositions in
ways that often yield precisely the emotional realities that prevailing
theories associate with the behavior under study. For example, evo-
lutionary analysis enables us to step back and see stepparental
infanticide within the larger context of human infanticide, infanticide
itself within the larger context of child abuse and neglect, and the lat-
ter, in turn, as but a single motif within longer and larger patterns of
human behavior-that span reproductive strategies and reflect the
relentless pressure of natural selection to increase reproductive suc-
cess. The advantages this provides to our efforts to stem child abuse
(explored in the next stage) will be paralleled with respect to many
other law-relevant behaviors and the legal policymaking challenges
they create.
3. Summary
In sum, this Integration Stage provides an initial outline for that
part of evolutionary analysis in law that follows when a given evolu-
tionary theory on law-relevant behavior is sufficiently robust, and
332. See Ammerman, supra note 118, at 203.
333. See, e.g., Giles-Sims & Finkelhor, supra note 305, at 410 (observing, in the context
of stress theory, only that "it is well-documented that stepfamilies experience stress, and
that stress is related to child abuse" (emphasis added)).
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sufficiently likely to apply to humans, that it should be included along
with other theories and information to be considered by legal poli-
cymakers. Specifically, this stage asks two questions. First, it asks
where, if anywhere, do prevailing and evolutionary theories conflict.
The model proposes that differences between theoretical substruc-
tures (i.e., levels of analysis and basic assumptions) be distinguished
from differences between the predictions of the respective theories.
This helps to narrow the set of apparent conflicts to only the true
conflicts. Second, it asks how the non-conflicting elements, if any, of
the respective theories can be integrated. The model proposes that
related predictions be aligned, and that logical connections between
proximate and ultimate causes be drawn and tightened. 34
To demonstrate concretely how these two questions might be
answered in a specific context, this section carried forward the child
abuse example introduced in the first stage (narrowing it, for illustra-
tive purposes, to the specific context of infanticide and occasionally,
within that context, to infanticide committed by adults unrelated to
the victim). The important point is that because human psychology
tends to reflect an adaptive logic, integrating ultimate and proximate
causation analyses will tend to improve behavioral models-
increasing their predictive power and rendering them more accurate,
more subtle and sophisticated, more embracing of the complexities of
human existence, more dimensional, and more fully contextual. Ul-
timately, of course, the value of such integration will be evident only
through application.
D. The Application Stage
The Identification Stage of the model helps to define a specific
legal goal and to assess the likelihood that evolutionary analysis will
prove worthwhile. The Information Stage of the model guides an ex-
amination and assessment of theory and evidence concerning
possible evolutionary influences upon specific human behavior im-
peding or facilitating pursuit of the legal goal. The Integration Stage,
in turn, provides a process to determine the proper relationship be-
tween a robust evolutionary theory and a prevailing theory. In the
fourth and final stage, The Application Stage, evolutionary analysis
must pay its way. The process of integrating evolutionary theories
with prevailing theories may prove useful in at least four ways:
334. The integration process is explored at greater length in Owen D. Jones, Law and
Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES
(forthcoming May 1997).
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1) refining behavioral models that predict the statistical incidence of
the behavior; 2) generating new social and legal strategies for ad-
dressing the behavior; 3) clarifying cost-benefit analyses regarding
the implementation of legal policies; and 4) pointing future research
in promising directions.
1. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help To Refine Behavioral
Models?
a. How It Can Help
Behavioral models attempt to explain the incidence of certain
behaviors. Because the primary purpose of a legal system is to regu-
late human activity-by discouraging some behaviors and
encouraging others-the legal system can ultimately be no more ef-
fective than the behavioral models on which its regimes depend.
Indeed, the first of four important applications of evolutionary analy-
sis involves improving these models by: 1) integrating the proximate
and ultimate causes of behavior; 2) identifying relationships between
the behavior and previously unidentified environmental factors; 3)
helping to define with more precision those previously identified en-
vironmental factors already associated with the behavior; and 4)
generating predictions about how various associated environmental
factors may interact.
First, by integrating proximate and ultimate causes of behavior,
evolutionary analysis encourages a more holistic and accurate under-
standing of the origins of human behavior. It adds historical
dimension, and facilitates a deeper appreciation of the complex and
dynamic interaction of genetic and environmental factors that affect
the behaviors law seeks to regulate. Evolutionary analysis prompts
us to anticipate that natural selection will have left humans today
with behavioral predispositions that tended to increase individual in-
clusive fitness in ancestral times. Consequently, it enables us also to
anticipate that these evolved predispositions will now be generally
more widespread in current populations than would be various con-
temporaneously existing alternative predispositions that had less
beneficial effects, on average, on individual reproductive success.
This insight will often reveal opportunities to improve prevailing
theoretical models, and thus those aspects of law that base remedial
policies upon them.
For example, evolutionary analysis provides both a broader and
more subtle understanding of adult-infant relations, which in turn lets
us see child abuse in a larger context. It makes plain that parental
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care, and the subjective motivational states that prompt it, evolved as
part of an evolutionarily adaptive reproductive strategy. In humans,
as in other animals employing parental care, we expect the majority
of parents to exhibit an evolved discriminative parental solicitude, in
the form of generally adaptive emotional predispositions (such as, in
humans, feelings of parental love) that tend to bias a parent's re-
sources toward genetic offspring at the expense of non-offspring, and
toward those children likely to contribute most to parental inclusive
fitness. We know, of course, that such predispositions will not auto-
matically cause any particular behavior in any individual person,
because a wide variety of highly significant and additional factors
(such as religion, thoughtful analyses of distributive fairness, and the
like) also mediate human motivations. But, to the extent that what
we call child abuse can be seen as something of an inverse of parental
solicitude, and to the extent that behavioral predispositions will by
definition affect behavior on the margin, evolutionary analysis sug-
gests that diminished solicitude will correlate positively, in a society
of millions, with increased abuse and neglect-even with infanticide.
Evolutionary analysis therefore exposes as anachronistically naive
the prevalent theoretical assumption, underlying many social and le-
gal efforts to reduce child abuse, that "normal" parents will treat
each of their own children with roughly equal love and care. It sug-
gests that our normative preference for that to be the case has heavily
influenced our supposition of "normality"-causing us perhaps to
assume that normal adults will exhibit the emotional responses we
wish they would.
Second, because many adaptive behavioral predispositions are
highly context-specific, evolutionary analysis will often identify new
connections between specific proximate environmental factors (let us
call these "associated environmental factors") and law-relevant be-
havior. That is, by enabling us to recognize that certain associated
environmental factors will have created selective pressures that in the
past favored the evolution of certain behavioral predispositions,
evolutionary analysis provides the legal system with new or better
predictors of the kinds and confluences of environmental stimuli
most likely to result in behaviors relevant to the legal system, and
enables it to make some judgment as to the relative strength of their
influence.
For example, evolutionary analysis suggests that parental solici-
tude toward children will vary according to the available amount of
parental investment, to observable characteristics predictive of each
child's probable contribution to parental inclusive fitness, and to the
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likelihood that parental investment would earn higher fitness returns
if invested elsewhere. It thus suggests that the likelihood of infanti-
cide will therefore also vary as a function of specific parental
demographic characteristics, such as sex, age, marital and economic
status, genetic relationship to a child, and the like. For instance, it
suggests that substitute parents, such as stepparents, will be far more
likely per capita to abuse a child than will be natural parents, because
the conditions that most easily invoke extraordinary parental solici-
tude are absent.
Third, evolutionary analysis will enable us to restate with greater
precision those connections between environmental factors and be-
havior of which we may already be aware. For example, we have
long known that young mothers are more likely to abuse a child than
older mothers. But evolutionary analysis more specifically suggests
that, given a population of millions, and where all else is equal, we
may expect that the risk a mother will do so will decline rather
smoothly across her reproductive years, as a function of the propor-
tion of her remaining reproductive years to her total reproductive
years.
Fourth, evolutionary analysis will help us make more accurate
predictions than we could otherwise when all else is not equal-as
when humans confront combinations of various environmental fac-
tors. For example, it suggests that the kinds of "stressors" that
traditional social science has identified will be relevant to child abuse
in proportion to how significantly the presence of those stressors
would have affected human reproductive success not in current envi-
ronments, but in ancestral ones. The likelihood that a behavioral
predisposition will in fact manifest itself will then be partly a function
of the number of such stressors that cumulate.
b. Aren't Statistics Alone Enough?
If it is true, for example, that a stepparent is statistically more
likely to abuse a child than a natural parent, one might wonder
whether we need evolutionary analysis at all. In other cases, as in this
one, the descriptive data alone may appear sufficient. Statistics do
not compile themselves, however; they are a function of the way we
organize and collect data. Those processes, in turn, often reflect pre-
suppositions that may be wrong and that may unintendedly obscure
law-relevant behavioral patterns. For example, and in hindsight quite
surprisingly, before evolutionary psychologists predicted that step-
parents are more likely to abuse, no one bothered to collect data in a
systematic way that differentiated stepparents from natural parents,
1997] 1229
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
an obvious prerequisite to analysis of victimization rates and relative
risk. 35 Indeed, commentators have recently observed that many who
had studied child abuse for decades never thought to rigorously scru-
tinize the kinship variable.336
Such blindspots are not easily remedied. Although evolutionary
psychologists studying child abuse called upon official agencies, par-
ticularly census bureaus, "to recognize the importance of the
distinction between natural and substitute parenthood" more than a
decade ago,337 most studies and reporting procedures that today cap-
ture information regarding a perpetrator's relationship to an abused
child continue to collapse "stepparents" into the definition of
"parents." To cite but a few surprising examples:
* The United States Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices, in a 1995 report on child abuse, defines "parent" as "the
birth mother/father, adoptive mother/father, or step-
mother/father of a child."3 38
" When the Inter-Agency Council on Child Abuse and Neglect
published the Child Death Review Team Report for 1994,
part of that report, concerning "Child Homicides by Par-
ents/Caretakers in Los Angeles County," included thirteen
Tables and ten Figures of data sorted according to such
things as gender of victim, age of victim, ethnicity of victim,
types of injury, month of year, reasons for prior Child Pro-
tective Services involvement (if any), and the age, sex, and
ethnicity of the parent or other caretaker. And yet all of
335. See Daly & Wilson, Risk of Maltreatment, supra note 298, at 221-25; Daly & Wil-
son, Stepparenthood, supra note 308, at 128-29. Some prior, general studies of child abuse
had remarked on the number of child abuse victims in stepfamily homes. See, e.g., DAVID
G. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE UNITED
STATES 117, 140 (1970). But for many years child abuse statistics were quite crude, pro-
viding little useful demographic data about characterisitcs of children or parents. See
Richard J. Gelles, Violence Towards Children in the United States, 48 AM. J. OF OR-
THOPSYCHIATRY 580,580 (1978). Moreover, before 1983 no one in either Canada or the
United States had any accurate sense or data regarding how many children actually lived
with stepparents-an obvious prerequisite for any rate-based analysis. See Daly & Wil-
son, Child Abuse Risk and Household Composition, supra note 294, at 11.
336. See RANDOLPH M. NESSE & GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, WHY WE GET SICK: THE
NEW SCIENCE OF DARWINIAN MEDICINE 223 (1994).
337. Daly & Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks, supra note 288, at 209.
338. NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 1993: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE
NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT glossary B-5 (1995) [hereinafter
REPORTS FROM THE STATES]. "Perpetrators" are divided into seven categories:
1) parents; 2) other relatives; 3) foster parents; 4) facility staff; 5) child care providers;
6) non-caretakers; and 7) unknown. See id. at item 15, at 3-12.
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these data lumped genetic parents, stepparents, substitute
parents, and other caretakers together.3 9  Indeed, the
"Relationship of Perpetrators" Table made no distinction be-
tween mothers and stepmothers, or fathers and stepfathers. 3
* The 1996 report of the Bureau of Justice Statistics on Child
Victimizers: Violent Offenders and Their Victims includes
stepchildren in the definition of "Own Child" when describ-
ing victim-offender relationships."4
Because we cannot see what we do not look for, it is unsurprising
that such reports typically conclude, without more particularity, that
"[p]arents account for 77 percent of perpetrators."3 42 In contrast, an
evolutionary analysis' prediction of risk factors such as stepparentage
can facilitate the collection of relevant data. The analysis tells us
where to look, what to look for, and how to slice the data in ways that
may further the pursuit of legal ends.
c. Won't Evolutionary Analysis Often Simply Confirm
Common Intuitions?
Evolutionary analysis sometimes will help to explain things peo-
ple already believe. For example, many undoubtedly believe, even
absent evolutionary analysis, that a child will be at greater risk of
abuse by a stepparent than by a parent.3  Yet explanations matter.
We routinely suppose that unexplained intuitions (such as those
339. See Los ANGELES COUNTY INTER-AGENCY COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT (ICAN), ICAN, CHILD DEATH REviEW TEAM REPORT FOR 1994, at 15-34.
340. See id. at tbl.12. Moreover, a suggested model "Child Fatality Review Team
Comprehensive Data Set" requires only that investigators specify, for each person com-
monly involved in the deceased's life and for each suspected perpetrator, only a
"relationship to deceased." ANDERSON & WELLS, supra note 139, app. C at 6, 10.
Nothing in the model data set or its instructions suggests that investigators should identify
stepparents as anything other than parents. See id. Curiously, the proposed "Minimal
Data Set," purporting to be a streamlined version, encourages differentiating stepparent
caretakers from genetic parent caretakers, but again requires no such identification with
respect to suspected perpetrators. See id. item 31, app. B, at 3.
341. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD VIC-
TIMIZERS: VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 10 tbl.13 (1996). This leads to
such undifferentiated conclusions as: "Nearly a third of those serving time in State pris-
ons for violence against children had victimized their own child or a stepchild." Id. at iii
(emphasis added).
342. REPORTS FROM THE STATES, supra note 338, §2.4, at 2-12.
343. "Cruel stepparent stories are a cross-cultural universal." Gelles & Harrop, supra
note 126, at 78; accord Daly & Wilson, Risk of Maltreatment, supra note 298, at 215-16
(discussing popular, mythological, and cross-cultural perceptions of stepparents); Daly &
Wilson, Stepparenthood, supra note 308, at 121-22 (same); Gelles & Harrop, supra note
126, at 78 (same) (citing M.R. COX, CINDERELLA: 345 VARIANTS (1892); S. THOMPSON,
MOTIF-INDEX OF FOLK LITERATURE (1955)).
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about stepparents) lack any basis in fact, and then design legal strate-
gies that ignore them or are designed to counteract them. That
supposition may often be correct. Nevertheless, evolutionary analy-
sis will sometimes suggest clear causal relationships underlying
observable correlations that we suspected, but could not explain, as
in the case of stepparental child abuse.44 That should, in turn, sug-
gest reevaluation of policies presupposing the absence of explanation,
such as those that may be designed to treat parents and stepparents
alike. While there may of course be independent reasons for law to
give no effect to a perceived behavioral pattern, such as the increased
risk of stepparental abuse, evolutionary analysis will often at least
make clear that doing so may hinder law's ability to interrupt that
pattern.
2. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help To Generate New Legal
Strategies?
Because behavioral models are the foundation of effective legal
policies, they limit the number and nature of the possible regulatory
interventions from among which policymakers choose. Deficient
models yield poor options and poor results. In the second of four ap-
plications of evolutionary analysis, then, policymakers equipped with
more refined models of the causes of law-relevant behaviors may de-
velop new ways to address them.
A legal system informed by evolutionary analysis might more
precisely target, regulate, or otherwise control the existence of, or
access to, newly identified associated environmental factors. If envi-
ronmental factor x increases the likelihood that people in a given
society will exhibit behavior y, then one strategy law may pursue to
reduce y is to reduce the prevalence of x. Legal systems already do
this, but to the extent evolutionary analysis identifies new links be-
tween such factors and law-relevant behaviors it reveals new avenues
for channeling behavior in fashions consistent with pre-articulated
social and legal goals.-" A legal system informed by evolutionary
analysis might also design programs that take account of evolved mo-
344. Cf. Browne, Sex and Temperament, supra note 3, at 977-84 (demonstrating how
sex differences in behavior may contribute to differential representation among certain
kinds of jobs).
345. It is extremely important to recognize that the contribution of evolutionary analy-
sis, in this regard, is fully and functionally compatible with the purposes of the traditional
social science theories, which likewise focus their attentions on environmental stimuli.
Members of traditional social science disciplines should therefore find evolutionary analy-
sis threatening only if they claim a monopoly on useful analytical techniques.
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tivational links between environmental stimuli and behavior by nar-
rowly tailoring legal regimes to interrupt or weaken them. This could
involve invoking the panoply of tools available to society, such as so-
cial or educational programs targeted at those most likely to
experience the stimuli, incentive programs, or refocused deterrence
initiatives.
For example, prevailing child abuse policies built on theories un-
supplemented by an evolutionary foundation rely on the "critical
theoretical assumption [that] [c]hild abuse is a learned behavior that
can be conceptualized in social learning terms.""6 As long as one as-
sumes this-that the origins of child abuse lie exclusively in learned
behavior-regulatory efforts will over-rely on "learning opportuni-
ties, ' '" 4 and overestimate the likelihood of their effectiveness. Thus
today, for instance, such social and legal campaigns to eradicate child
abuse focus on such things as:
* post-act state interventions, such as termination of parental
rights or criminal prosecution;
* developing strong positive habits of child rearing through
successful and rewarding parent-child interaction at an early
stage of development;
" improving the parent's abilities to cope with stress through
exposure to a mental health support system;
* developing the child's adaptive behaviors that will contribute
to his or her emotional and psychological adjustment;
* competency enhancement (through parent education pro-
grams);
* public awareness campaigns (through information services);
* programs for high-risk groups during periods of transition
and stress (such as family support programs);
* child management training;
* parent education and support groups;
* stress management classes;
* community outreach or educational programs; and
* group or individual training.m
346. WOLFE, supra note 118, at 125; cf Jeffrey A. Kelly, Treating the Child Abuser, in
CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 112, at 269, 269-71 (discussing approaches based on so-
cial-interactional conceptual models).
347. See WOLFE, supra note 118, at 125.
348. For discussion of such campaigns see, for example, SETH C. KALICHMAN,
MANDATED REPORTING OF SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE: ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY
145-66 (1993); WOLFE, supra note 118, at 125-33; Ammerman & Hersen, Research in
Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 112, at 3, 16; Maxine R. Newman & John R. Lutzker,
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These efforts, while certainly constructive, are not as effective as
they might be. Recognizing the effects of evolution on the incidence
of child abuse and neglect can expand and reorient our view of ap-
propriate interventions. For example, those studies that attribute the
special difficulties stepfamilies encounter to "role confusion" lead to
arguments that "[s]trengthening the role of the ambiguous steppar-
ent" would eliminate stresses, reduce child abuse, and "provide more
protection for children," 9 and that "institutionalized standards for
conduct in reconstituted families are likely to emerge" as divorce and
remarriage become more common.3" In contrast, an evolutionary
analysis suggests that stepparents may be finding their roles less satis-
fying and more conflictual than natural parents not simply because
they do not know what they are supposed to do, but rather because
they do not want to do what they feel obliged to do. 5' It suggests that
"when people are called upon to fill parental roles toward unrelated
children, we may anticipate an elevated risk of lapses of parental so-
licitude. 352  By expecting stepparents to feel less solicitous of
unrelated children, policies can focus less on teaching stepparents
how to "be" stepparents, and more on encouraging stepparents to
expect, overcome, or compensate for statistically probable disinclina-
tions.
If policymakers wanted to do something aggressive about step-
parental child abuse, a whole new set of possibilities unfurl.
Choosing advisable policies from among possible policies demands
caution, however, because there are more ways to make a situation
worse than there are to make it better. Viable alternatives will gen-
erally include pre-act strategies (rather than, for example, trial-
related post-act strategies)-because evolutionary analysis can tell us
very little about why a single individual acted as he did, even though
it can tell us a great deal about patterns likely to emerge in large so-
cieties. But if we momentarily suspend our evaluative judgments, for
example, possibilities for new legal and social strategies might theo-
retically include:
modifying Child Protective Services report prioritization
procedures to weigh stepparenthood more heavily;
Prevention Programs, in CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 112, at 225,228.
349. See Mason & Simon, supra note 326, at 467, 482; see also Giles-Sims, supra note
326, at 117 (explaining that lack of institutionalized stepparent roles leads to family
stress).
350. Giles-Sims, supra note 326, at 127.
351. See Daly & Wilson, Risk of Maltreatment, supra note 298, at 220.
352. Daly & Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks, supra note 288, at 197.
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* modifying Child Protective Services risk assessment patterns,
upon investigation, to weigh stepparenthood more heavily;
" providing a separate legal standard for the disciplinary
privilege afforded stepparents;. 3
" specially targeting parts of prevention program educative ef-
forts toward stepparents;
354
* reducing the number of children living with stepparents
(such as with laws making divorce between biological parents
more difficult);
* mandating that state agencies collect child abuse data in ways
that differentiate genetic and non-genetic parents;
315
* establishing a stronger preference for the biological parent in
child custody actions;
* encouraging single parents to marry their in-laws;
* increasing deterrence (such as with legal penalties that more
harshly punish unrelated abusers);
* biasing child abuse prosecutions toward stepparents;
* advising mandatory child abuse reporters (such as pediatri-
cians) that the "information relevant to present risk" entry
on their "Report Information Sheet"356 should include any
non-genetic relationship between adult and child.
It is clear that the spectrum of possible legal strategies informed
by evolutionary analysis can range from the most restrictive and ab-
surd, such as outlawing divorce, to the least restrictive and passive,
such as ignoring evolutionary analysis altogether. Between will often
lie plausible and achievable strategies that, combined with other ef-
forts, may significantly improve a society's ability to achieve its
established goals. The purpose here is not to develop or examine ad-
visable legal strategies, but simply to demonstrate how useful
353. Parents are specially privileged by both statutory and common law to use corpo-
ral force upon their children (so long as it is not unreasonable, pursuant to an improper
purpose, or unduly damaging). A stepparent generally is entitled to the same disciplinary
privilege as a parent. See, e.g., Natural Mother v. Hinds County Welfare Dep't, 579 So.
2d 1269, 1270-71 (Miss. 1991); MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW
194-99 (1994).
354. It appears that no existing programs specifically target stepparents. See UN-
DERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEcT, supra note 112, at 164 tbl.5.1 (citing D.P.
MUELLER & P.S. HIGGINS, FUNDERS' GUIDE MANUAL: A GUIDE TO PREVENTION
PROGRAMS IN HUMAN SERVICES, FOCUS ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (1988)).
355. The Report of Suspected Child Abuse Neglect for the Connecticut Department of
Social Services, for example, asks for the name of the suspected perpetrator, but not the
relationship of the perpetrator to the child. See KALICHMAN, supra note 348, at 133.
356. Id. at 128.
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evolutionary analysis can be in helping to identify new ones."7 Many
of these strategies might never be considered absent the more holistic
perspective evolutionary analysis encourages.
3. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help To Improve Cost-Benefit
Analyses?
A legal system often must ascribe relative values to independ-
ently laudable goals and make trade-offs between them. Pursuing
any goal zealously may compromise another. Individual justice, for
example, trades against administrative simplicity, and many things of
social value trade against the amount of money necessary to secure
them. The key to rationalizing this process is the ability to make in-
formed (though rarely precisely quantifiable) cost-benefit analyses.
The third of four applications of evolutionary analysis, then, in-
volves increasing the precision of the cost-benefit analyses that help
society select and prioritize legal goals. Evolutionary analysis can
accomplish this in two ways. First, it helps identify potential conflicts
between goals. Many conflicts are already patent. Curbing sexual
harassment in the workplace may require some encroachment upon
generally prized autonomy in dating behavior, for example. Known
conflicts make trade-offs more obvious, and enable informed deci-
sions about which goal takes precedence, and under what
circumstances. Yet other conflicts between policies are often decep-
tively latent. These hidden conflicts impede legal regimes, as surely
as efforts to drain a pool at one end, and to fill it at the other. Evolu-
tionary analysis provides a powerful tool for exposing such hidden
conflicts. By enabling us more clearly to see the inter-connectedness
of different kinds of human behavior, it often reveals hidden tensions
between two policies.
Second, evolutionary analysis increases the comprehensiveness
of each cost-benefit calculus by providing some sense of what the
costs of the tensions actually are. For example, it can help define the
effect upon the pursuit of one goal of more zealous pursuit of an-
other. Although evolutionary analysis generally says little about
which goal society should favor,358 it can highlight previously uncon-
357. Several of these approaches are explored in BECKSTROM, DARWINISM APPLIED,
supra note 3; and BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW, supra note 3.
358. One possible exception: When an existing goal rests heavily on an assumption
that biology reveals to be overstated or otherwise incorrect, as a matter of fact, the ra-
tionale supporting the goal might be weakened. This would not require that the goal be
changed, but it would probably recommend reexamination, and perhaps alternative ar-
ticulation, of the basis for the goal.
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sidered costs of social and legal policies. Exposing and loosely quan-
tifying conflicts therefore increases the accuracy of the cost-benefit
analyses by which known conflicts are resolved.
Three simple examples will suffice to illustrate the power of
identifying potential conflicts between goals and improving cost-
benefit analyses. Consider the following: Primary responsibility for
investigating reports of child abuse currently falls to state child pro-
tective services (CPS) agencies.3 9  Because they are typically
overburdened, 6 they often fail to make timely investigation of re-
ports of child abuse.36 Such a circumstance makes critical the precise
criteria by which CPS workers organize risk factors to prioritize re-
ports for investigation.362 While little is known about how CPS
agencies prioritize reports,363 it is generally known that the presence
of a stepparent in a home where child abuse is suspected does not
affect CPS decisions.3" At the same time, the number of children
359. See UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 268. For
more on the operation of CPS agencies, see KALICHMAN, supra note 348, at 134-40;
KRAMER, supra note 113, at 73-79.
360. For many, case loads are two to three times beyond manageable levels. See
CRITICAL FIRST STEPS, supra note 138, at 73.
361. See UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 268. It is
common for agencies to operate in violation of legislatively mandated maximum response
times. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., Too YOUNG TO RUN: THE STATUS OF
CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA 5, 6 (1986) [hereinafter Too YOUNG TO RUN]; CRITICAL
FIRST STEPS, supra note 138, at 34-35 (noting that as many as one-third of state CPS
agencies do not routinely investigate within legally prescribed time); KALICHMAN, supra
note 348, at 133; UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 268.
In New York City, for example, one study found that 10% of reported child abuse went
uninvestigated for 40 days or more. See Douglas J. Besharov, Unfounded Allegations: A
New Child Abuse Problem, 83 PUB. INTEREST 18, 24 (1986). Although for a long time
child abuse reporting increased far faster than CPS budgets, see NATIONAL CTR. ON
CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION RESEARCH, NATIONAL COMM'N FOR PREVENTION OF
CHILD ABUSE, CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES: THE
RESULTS OF THE 1992 ANNUAL FIFTY STATE SURVEY 20-21 (1993); 1990 SURVEY, supra
note 114, at 1. Congress in 1993 provided all states with new funding for child welfare
intervention and prevention services. See CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE RE-
PORTING AND FATALITIES, supra note 113, at 17. Over time, this may improve the
timeliness of investigations.
362. Cf. Too YOUNG TO RUN, supra note 361, at 5-6 (describing the factors agencies
consider when prioritizing investigations and the problems with such priorities). The
agencies "often lack consistent criteria to help workers to make informed judgments in
their investigations of reported or suspected child maltreatment." UNDERSTANDING
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 269.
363. See DEAN D. KNUDSEN, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: DISCRETION, DE-
CISIONS, DILEMMAS 53-67 (1988) (reporting on what little is known about CPS worker
decisions to investigate reported abuse); UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NE-
GLECT, supra note 112, at 268-69.
364. See MAHONEY, supra note 353, at 192-93:
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who will live with a stepparent is increasing dramatically."' Evolu-
tionary analysis suggests that, if the agency were to ascribe more
weight to the presence of a stepparent, say by modifying its standard
operating procedures to preferentially investigate reports of child
abuse in homes with substitute parents, children would be better pro-
tected.
Still, pursuing such a plan would immediately put two important
goals into tension. On one hand, governments want to eliminate
child abuse. On the other hand, they want to avoid stigmatizing en-
tire groups on the basis of the transgressions of the few." Indeed, it
appears that the legal trend is to argue for and actively expand the
rights of stepparents (with respect to custody and visitation disputes,
for example) in an effort to bring them into parity with biological
parents and to combat what are perceived as historical and unjust
prejudices against them."7 Finally, many commentators argue that
"we should take great care not to stigmatize stepfamilies."3" Evolu-
tionary analysis therefore forces recognition that the costs of
aggressively pursuing one goal, such as the prevention of child abuse,
must often be defined, in part, in terms of interfering with pursuit of
As a general rule, the decisions made by child protection agencies are not af-
fected by the fact that the child resides in a stepfamily. Furthermore, the focus
of many state neglect and abuse laws is on the family or household in which the
child resides, without regard to the particular composition of the household.
365. The number of stepfamily households increased 36% during the 1980s. See
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE, supra note 309, at tbl.L. In 1990, at least
7,000,000 children lived with stepparents, whose marriages had grown to represent 20%
of all married-couple households with children. See id. at tbls.L & N. Some predict that
soon as many as one child in three, perhaps even one child in two, will spend some child-
hood years in a stepfamily. See Paul C. Glick, Remarried Families, Stepfamilies, and
Stepchildren: A Brief Demographic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24,26 (1989) (predicting one in
three, or one in two); see also Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., The New Extended Family: The
Experience of Parents and Children After Remarriage, in REMARRIAGE AND STEP-
PARENTING, supra note 324, at 42,44 (predicting one in four).
366. On negative images associated with stepparentage, see BRENDA MADDOX, THE
HALF-PARENT: LIVING WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S CHILDREN 32-37 (1975) and sources
cited supra note 343.
367. See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of
Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 410
(1994) (arguing the law should "granto parent-like individuals greater consideration than
the current jurisprudence affords"); Carol Lynn Tebben, An Expansion of Stepparent
Rights? The Equitable Parent Doctrine After Atkinson, 6 AM. J. FAM. L. 43, 53 (1992)
(arguing for "significant legislative reforms in the recognition of stepparent rights" in
order to combat "1[i]njustices... still occur[ring] in the courts"); see also MAHONEY, supra
note 353 (providing comprehensive overview of trends in legal status of stepparents).
368. Furstenberg, supra note 365, at 42, 57; accord Coleman, supra note 319, at 30;
Daniel S. Halperin, Risk Factors for Child Abuse and Neglect in Human Parents, in
MOTHERHOOD, supra note 162, at 125, 131; Mason & Simon, supra note 326, at 481.
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the other, such as the expansion of stepparent rights. Thus, either
one cost of reducing child abuse is in stigmatizing stepparents, or the
cost of not stigmatizing stepparents is some number of otherwise pre-
ventable child abuse incidents (even infanticides), on the other.
As another example, one can anticipate that, because natural
selection has long favored animals with sensitivities to potential costs
and benefits of parental investment, recent efforts by some states to
impose on stepparents the same financial obligations for child sup-
port that a biological parent endures might increase child abuse in
some fraction of the substitute parents-by effectively and signifi-
cantly raising the costs, to them, of each stepchild.369 Indeed,
evolutionary analysis will align with economic analysis to predict that
such new obligations, if enforced, might even create disincentives to
marry persons with dependent children.37 While scholars arguing for
increased stepparental obligations and rights may be motivated, in
part, by the no doubt accurate perception that such legal intervention
will improve the lot of some children and some stepparents,37' the
369. In most states, stepparents are not required to provide for the stepchild's support
during or after marriage. See MAHONEY, supra note 353, at 13; Margaret M. Mahoney,
Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
38, 41-45 (1984) [hereinafter Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects]. Missouri, how-
ever, mandates that: "[a] stepparent shall support his or her stepchild to the same extent
that a natural or adoptive parent is required to support his or her child so long as the
stepchild is living in the same home as the stepparent." Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400
(1986); see also MAHONEY, supra note 353, at 7 n.24, 39 & n.78 (noting several other state
statutes with similar effects).
370. This will be true, so long as the demand for marriage is not perfectly inelastic.
Some have argued that newly imposed financial obligations are unlikely to create signifi-
cant disincentives to marry because marriage decisions involve more than economic
factors, and because marriage is already common even with the financial obligations one
incurs for one's spouse. See, e.g., Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects, supra note 369,
at 46-48.
An analysis informed by evolutionary psychology, however, makes clear that an at-
traction to potential mates and a disinclination to cater to unrelated juveniles are both
likely to be strongly developed in animals because a mate can potentially contribute di-
rectly to reproductive success while an unrelated juvenile never can. Nonetheless, new
obligations may create few disincentives in any event because states quite rarely enforce
them-even against genetic parents. Personal Communication with Professor Ira Ellman,
Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law, in Tempe, Ariz. (Mar. 12,
1996).
371. See, e.g., David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learning from Social Sciences: A Model
for Reformation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 DICK. L. REV. 49, 75-80 (1992)
(arguing for liberalization of law's treatment of stepparents); Mahoney, Support and
Custody Aspects, supra note 369, at 41, 78 (arguing for "assigning stepparents greater
duties during marriage... [and] balancing concurrent stepparent and natural parent obli-
gations," and that "[l]aws requiring the stepparent to share the child support duty of his
or her spouse during marriage would better accommodate the financial interests of family
members"); Mason & Simon, supra note 326, at 450 (arguing that "children will benefit
1997] 1239
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
other side of this equation cannot be ignored. It should affect analy-
sis, even should it prove non-dispositive.
As a final example, evolutionary analysis exposes as predictable
a rise in child abuse and infanticide as a consequence of anti-abortion
and anti-contraception policies. This phenomenon is evident in coun-
tries like Brazil, where recent and widespread conversion to
Catholicism has in some places rendered the use of contraception and
abortion procedures somehow more sinful than pre-existing infanti-
cidal practices3 2 Incidents of the latter have increased as those of the
former have decreased.
Consequently, evolutionary analysis can starkly reveal signifi-
cant subsurface tensions between policies that previously seemed to
coexist peacefully. Although it provides little guidance, if any, as to
which policy should be primary, it does help to expose, and at some
rough level to quantify, previously hidden costs in the aggressive pur-
suit of one or the other.
4. How Can Evolutionary Analysis Help To Reveal Promising
Directions for Future Research?
A fourth useful application of evolutionary analysis is to point
out promising, law-relevant directions for future research. First, as
mentioned earlier, evolutionary theories can suggest the search for
hidden patterns unpredicted by prevailing theories73 For example,
while recent recommendations on future child abuse research em-
phasize only "the importance of knowing more about the
backgrounds and experiences of developing children and their fami-
lies, within a broader social context that includes their friends,
neighborhoods, and communities,"'374 evolutionary analysis suggests
the utility of greater research emphasis on understanding the proc-
esses by which generally adaptive behaviors may contribute to the
incidence of child abuse.
Second, the process of critically evaluating the applicability of
from having more responsible adults in their lives rather than fewer," and that a federal
initiative increasing stepparent obligations would promote child welfare); Michael J.
Markoff, Note, Stepfamily Law: Review and Proposals for Change, 18 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 701, 714-20 (1984) (arguing for expansion of stepchild rights to post-divorce sup-
port, inheritance by intestate succession, and recovery for the wrongful death of a
stepparent).
372. See PIERS, supra note 221, at 15-16; vom Saal, supra note 221, at 62-64.
373. This is, for example, one of the profound benefits of Daly and Wilson's work on
stepparents, which for the first time argued convincingly for the separate collection of
data on genetic parents and stepparents.
374. UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 112, at 4,49-52.
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evolutionary theories in the human context, explored in The Infor-
mation Stage, will often generate a need for further research when
more than one evolutionary theory purports to explain various as-
pects of human behavior.375 For example, one might collect further
data to attempt to distinguish the relative importance of the DPS
Theory and the Reproductive Access Theory in the context of stepfa-
ther abuse.
Third, the process of attempting to integrate robust evolutionary
theories with prevailing theories, explored in The Integration Stage,
may generate researchable questions where true conflicts may exist
between the predictions of evolutionary and prevailing theories. By
helping to identify each of these research agendas, evolutionary
analysis encourages improvement in the behavioral models on which
all law is based.
CONCLUSION
Law deals in human behavior. Every legal regime therefore in-
escapably reflects some behavioral model purporting to draw causal
arrows between supposed influences and law-relevant behavior. In a
very real sense, the model defines and limits the targets and tools of
legal policies. The power of the model limits the power of law.
Of course, few components, if any, of our decentralized national,
state, and local legal systems could accurately be said to reflect a sin-
gle behavioral model consciously chosen, and well-defined. To date,
little has suggested that this is necessary or plausible. Nonetheless,
common features of operative behavioral models do emerge. One of
these is a preoccupation with the immediate causes of human behav-
ior, to the exclusion of evolutionary causes of human behavior. This
all too easily lends itself to the presupposition that the influence of
human mind on behavior means that all human behavior (at least all
truly significant, law-relevant human behavior) comes from mind-a
mind socially and individually constructed by the summed experi-
ences and encounters of each human lifetime.
Behavioral models that overemphasize immediate causation are
not so much wrong as they are importantly incomplete-continuing
to obsolesce at the quickened pace of behavioral sciences. Evolu-
tionary analysis restores holistic balance and comprehensiveness to
the study of causation, making clear that human behavior, like all
animal behavior, follows from two very different kinds of causes-
proximate and ultimate-that operate simultaneously. Failing to ac-
375. See supra Part II.B.3.
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commodate this uncontroversial aspect of modern science means
foregoing opportunities to increase law's effectiveness and can also
lead to legal realities that are out of touch with the way human be-
havior actually operates.
The inevitable potential for misunderstanding or misusing biol-
ogy indisputably warrants constant vigilance, careful empirical
studies, and regular reflection. 6 But it similarly warrants good faith
efforts at self-education. Because proper evolutionary analysis is
probabilistic, not deterministic, it can help us better understand hu-
man behavior by illuminating its historical context, highlighting its
dynamic processes, providing insights into its origins, and suggesting
circumstances that are more likely to evoke certain behavioral re-
sponses than others. Properly used and qualified, evolutionary
analysis in law can refine behavioral models that identify risk factors
for behaviors, help generate new legal strategies to pursue pre-
articulated and socially defined goals, improve cost-benefit analyses
of potential legal policies, and reveal promising new directions for
future research.
376. Here I am in full agreement with Professors Dreyfuss and Nelkin that we should
not assume that insights from biology require alteration of such concepts as "personhood,
normalcy, responsibility, and culpability that are fundamental to the law." Dreyfuss &
Nelkin, supra note 13, at 348. On the other hand, the law needs a rigorous theory of nor-
mality in order to have a rigorous theory of abnormality, and evolutionary biology can
provide powerful insights into the origins of species-typical behaviors.
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